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ABSTRACT
Containment is a policy most often associated with
the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and RATO and of
course the prevention of Soviet expansionism.

The policy's

success in Europe has often overshadowed the fact that it
has also been the foundation of America's Asian policy since
the outset of the Korean War.

A study of the evolution of

the United States Asian containment policy shows that it
has created rather than solved problems in American rela
tions with Asia.

The present tragedy in Vietnam, a product

of the policy; is the prime example.
Containment was formulated as a policy for Europe,
based on the conditions in Europe.

It was hastily extended

to Asia to cover the Korean War and was continued in the
post-Korean War period without proper consideration for
Asian needs and wants.

The differences in opinion between

American policy-makers and many Asian leaders concerning
these vital factors has greatly handicapped the policy.
The fact that American official rhetoric, originally a
device used to "sell” the policy to the American public,
became at times the basis for actual policies, has further
o

hindered the containment policy.
iii
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In Asia, containment has evolved into an open-ended
commitment to defend every nation against communist pres
sures regardless of /the fact that the cost was at times
out of proportion to the American interest involved..
American policy-makers have overextended' the principles of
containment, valid in Europe, and misapplied them in Asia.
As a result, Americans now find their country in a
catastrophic situation in Vietnam, and their efforts to
(
achieve a balance of power in Asia complicated.

iv
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PREFACE
The United States today faces many serious foreign
policy issues; Vietnam, the Middle East and the question
able status of RATO in Europe to mention "but a few.

The

most pressing and divisive issue, of course, is the war in
Vietnam.

Yet, while the debate has centered on Vietnam,

many leading Americans are questioning almost all aspects
of American policy in Asia.

The debate on Vietnam has

come to express the "even more basic divisions and doubts
1
about American purposes and interests in Asia generally."
Thus numerous questions have arisen, such as:

What is

America's Asian policy; what are its objectives; do the
objectives reflect the national interest of the United
States; has the policy been successful; if so, why is the
United States involved in the Vietnam War; if the policy
has been unsuccessful, why?
These questions are difficult ones, and some may
have no single absolute answer, but the Vietnam War has
brought out the need to at least attempt to find the
answers.

^Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia:
A Strategy for American Foreign Policy, (Englewood Cliffs,
1969), p T 1.
v
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In order to begin to answer some of the questions,
it is necessary to go beyond Asia as the area of study,
lor example, to understand the basic underlying principle
in America’s Asian policy for most of the postwar period containment, it is necessary to begin at its roots in
Europe.
The study of American policy in Asia is clouded
by the overriding ambiguity of Asia's relation to the U.S.
national interest.

While America has since the days of

the Open Door Policy and the acquisition of the Philippines
always expressed an interest in Asia, American leaders
have failed to clearly define what this is.

It has been

said that "beneath the confusion, reversals, of policy and
moralistic generalities which have made up the surface of
the Asiatic policy since McKinley, one can detect an under
lying consistency which, however vaguely, reflects the
permanent interests of the United States in Asia.

This
2

principle is ... the maintenance of the balance of power."
However, since Hans J. Morgenthau made this claim in 1951,
it may be asked today whether the containment policy in
Asia has been based on this principle; and, if so, whether
the policy has been able to achieve the maintenance of the
balance of power.
It will be the purpose of this thesis to analyse
o

^Hans J .. Morgenthau, "Policy of the U.S.A.",
Political Quarterly, January, 1951, p. 43.
vi
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the evolution of containment as a policy for Asia.

Chapter

I is an introductory chapter which discusses the concept
of containment itself in its original European context.
This is done in order to convey what is meant by the term
"containment" and also to provide the basis of a comparison
with containment as it evolved as an Asian Policy.
The following chapter deals with the Korean War.
Korea, as will be shown, is the place where containment was
first applied in Asia.

However, the war's importance goes

beyond the fact that it marked the beginnings of contain
ment in Asia; for it was during the Korean War and at its
conclusion that perceptions were acquired by American leaders
which were to serve as guide lines for the containment policy
up to and into the Vietnam War.
Next there is a chapter devoted to a general
discussion of the instruments of containment at work in
Asia between the Korean War and the Vietnam War.
And finally, Vietnam is used as a case study of
containment . While the United States has admittedly made
many mistakes in its specific Vietnam policy, I will attempt
to prove to the reader that the failures in Vietnam are
representative of the failures in the entire Asian contain
ment policy.
James Burnham writing in 1953 on containment said
that "to review the record of the containment policy is not
to perform an autopsy but to diagnose the conditions of a
vii
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3
still breathing organism."

I believe that his words are

still valid today, but ponder the question whether it might
not better serve American interests if this were not so.

•z

James Burnham, Containment or Liberation,
York, 1953), p. 72.
viii
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I
THE CONCEPT OE CONTAINMENT
Europe 1947 - 1950
It is clear that the United States cannot expect
in the foreseeable future to enjoy political
intimacy with the Soviet Regime.
It must continue
to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a
partner in the political arena. . . .
. . . the United States (warrants) entering with
reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm contain
ment, designed to confront the Russians with unalter
able counter-force at every point where they show
signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful
and stable world.
1
These words are taken from George Kennan's famous
article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" which appeared in
Eoreign Affairs July, 1947-

It marks the first time the

word "containment" is used to refer, to American foreign
policy objectives.

Twenty-two years later, containment is

still a most appropriate word to describe American foreign
policy objectives, although its present ambiguous meaning
has brought the United States into the Vietnam War.
Mr. Kennan's article while it is responsible for
naming the United States postwar policy, it does not mark
the actual beginnings of the policy.

Actually the initial

^"George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct",
Eoreign Affairs, xxv, No. 4, July, 1947, pp. 566-82.

1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

program of the containment polipy was the Truman Doctrine
(March, 1947) which preceded the Kennan exposition.

The

famous writing of Mr. Kennan was not an official statement
of U.S. policy, hut an academic endeavor to describe the
realities of the then existing Soviet-American relations,
J

with a personal suggestion of how the (Jnited States could
meet the situation.
The Truman Doctrine was to usher the United States
into a position of international involvement to an extent
previously unknown in that nation's history, outside of the
two World Wars.

Some students of American foreign policy

have claimed that it was inevitable that the United States
become a dominant force in international affairs after
World War II.

This assumption seemed to be based on the

fact that the power positions of the nations of the world
had altered as a result of World War II and the United
States had emerged from this shuffle as the strongest nation
on the face of the globe.

However, while it may have appeared

inevitable to most of the world leaders and some American
statesmen at that time, it was not inevitable to the
majority of the American people.
The United States in the immediate postwar years
(1945 to mid-1946) had entered into a phase that Gabriel
2
Almond describes as "utopian romanticism".
It was a time
2
Gabrien Almond, The American People and Foreign
Policy, (Hew York, I960), p. xii.
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in -which most Americans believed that a lasting peace had
at last been secured and thus there was no reason why the
world would not settle back into normalcy and order.

Pew

Americans among the general populace were in the mood to
pay attention to world problems at the close of World War II.
Por those few who were concerned about the problems of a
bankrupt and devasted Europe, and the possible consequences
of atomic weaponry, they believed that such problems could
be adequately resolved by the United Nations through
programs of relief and rehabilitation and peaceful negotia
tions .
While the Truman Administration was-.- dismayed in
the immediate post-war period by the expansionist tendencies
displayed by the Soviet Union, most Americans did not realize
that the Soviet actions would complicate the cooperation
both nations had enjoyed in their war-time alliance.

They

could not foresee the future problems of negotiating with
the Soviet Union that were to occur in the United Nations.
Instead, many Americans retained an image of the Soviet
Union as the land "of the heroic Soviet people",

a nation

lead by Joseph Stalin, a great patriot, whom Americans
viewed as "a tough bargainer- but still a bargainer."^
With this perception of the Soviets, the American people
had little reason to conclude, that the Soviet Union had
o
3
4

Ibid., p. xiii.
Ibid., p. xiii.
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embarked upon a policy for world domination.
The belief in the lasting nature of the peace won
by the allies and their preoccupation with the settling of
domestic problems lead the American public to demand a
speedy demobilization.

In the eight-month period, May,

1945 to March, 1946, the United States reduced its armed
forces from 3-5 million to 400,000 men.

This program was

carried out despite the continual warnings from the British
Government that deliberate and unilateral disarmament was
exceedingly dangerous until the Soviet Union had been made
to live up to its Yalta obligations.

When the Truman

Administration seemingly disregarded the British warnings,
former Prime Minister Churchill appealed directly to the
American public.

Churchill had little immediate success in

changing the American people's attitude, but in the process
he did coin the phrase "iron curtain", a phrase that has
since come to dominate the American imagination.
Thus, if one was to draw conclusions based on the
temper of the American people at that time, one would not
reasonably conclude that the United States was on the
threshold of a new phase in its foreign policy.
Many men in the Truman Administration and some U,S.
Congressmen, however, did not share their constituents'
optimism.

These men maintained a watchful eye on the Soviet

5
John W. Spanier, American Poreign Policy Since
World War II, (New York, i960)j p. 23.
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post-war actions and were becoming increasingly concerned
by them.

Their decision to act, however, was not prompted

by a direct Soviet action, but rather came in response to
a decision by Great Britain.
In February, 1947, the British government informed
the United States that Britain could no longer afford to
continue the economic and military burden of insuring Greek
independence.

Greece at the time was in the midst of civil

war between the conservative government and the Greek
Communists.

All intelligence reports indicated that with

the British withdrawal, "the Communist insurgents would
succeed in seizing control 'within a matter of weeks’ unless
the Government of Greece received prompt and large-scale
aid."

&

Truman believed if the Communists were successful

in Greece, it would only be a matter of time before Turkey
and Iran would also crumble before the Soviet power.

7

The

possible results of a Communist victory in Greece had even
wider implications than these nations losing their independence.
Britain had long theorized that Russian control of Greece and
the Dardanelles would constitute a threat to the European
balance of power.

If this

balance was to be upset, the

very security of Europe would be threatened, and it had
g
Seyom Brown, The Faces o_f Power, Constancy And
Change In Unite_d_ States_ Fo_reign Policy From Truman "To
Johnson, (hew York, 1968)’, "p." 40."*
7
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial
And Hope, (Garden City, 1956), p. 100.
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always been an assumption of American foreign policy that
European security was vital for its own security.

It had

"been a proven fact that when the European balance had been
disrupted, as it had twice in the previous three decades,
the United States had found itself in war.

Truman inter

preted the Greek crisis in such a way that the maintenance
of the pro-Western regime in Greece was essential if vital
American interests were to be secured.
Britain's admission that it could no longer meet
the task of preserving Greek independence, placed before
the United States the cold fact of a bipolar world.

Then

Undersecretary of State Acheson in explaining the Greek
crisis to a bipartisan group of Congressional leaders
stated:
Only two great powers remain in the world, the United
States and the Soviet Union. ... and it was clear that
the Soviet Union was aggressive and expanding. Eor
the United States to take steps to strengthen countries
threatened with Communist subversion ... was to protect
the security of the United States .... 8
Acheson concluded that the Truman Administration had no
real alternative but to meet this perceived Soviet threat
in Greece.

In stating the Administration's position, the

Undersecretary said that America had a choice, either to
act "with energy" to meet the situation or lose by default.
America's decision to meet the challenge posed by
8
Brown, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
q
Ibid., p. 41. Also see Truman, op. pit., p. 105*
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"Soviet expansion", was stated in President Truman's message
to Congress on March 12, 194-7.

The message contained a

request for a Congressional appropriation of $4-00 million
for economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey.

In

explaining the necessity for such aid, Truman did not
identify America's direct interest in Greece and Turkey or
their importance in the maintenance of the European balance
of power.

Instead, Truman's request was explained in terms

of "a vague and indeterminate commitment to the support of
freedom everywhere.

Underlying the President's message

seemed to be the acknowledgment of a long-held American
belief, that they were a chosen people and the time had once
more come for the United States to save the world, as it
had been compelled to do in the previous World Wars.

Explicit

in the message was the acknowledgment of a basic conflict
between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Truman

defined this conflict in broad ideological terms.

In his

Congressional message he stated:
At the present moment in world history, nearly every
nation must choose between alternative ways of life.
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority
and is distinguished by free institutions, representa
tive government, free elections, guarantees of indi
vidual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and
freedom from political oppression.
The second way of life is based upon the will of a
minority forcibly imposed upon the majority.
It
relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled
press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression

■^'Norman A. Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, 1945-1960,
(New York, 1962), p. 41.
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of personal freedoms.

11

President Truman, in announcing his administration's
global commitment to support freedom, went far beyond the
immediate crisis in Greece.

It is at this point that "the

Truman Doctrine merges into the policy of containment."

12

The containment policy, as expressed in the Truman
Doctrine, gave the impression, either intentionally or
unintentionally, that the United States had embarked upon
a "Holy Crusade" against communism.

Such an impression was

instrumental in aligning Congressional support and the
support of the American people for this "new" policy.
Truman, in appealing to America's human emotions, brought
before the American public a sense of danger and moral
obligation, that a "factual" explanation of the Greek civil
war by itself could not have accomplished.

The American

people's previous reluctance to become involved in world
affairs was transformed into support for a policy of involve
ment, because they felt such a policy was necessary if the
American way of life was to be preserved.

This messianism

or crusading spirit was not an innovation in American foreign
policy; it had been periodically evident in previous policies.
However, since the Truman Doctrine, this emotionalism has

■^From a message of the President to a joint session
of Congress, March 12, 1947. Department of State Bulletin,
xvi, March 23, 1947, pp. 536-537.
12
Hans J. Morgenthau, "The American Tradition In
Foreign Policy," in Foreign Policy In World Affairs, ed.
Ray C. Macredis, (Englewood Cliffs, 1967), p. 249.
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come to be a dominant aspect of American foreign policy,
often times obstructing American decision-maker's percep
tion of a situation.
The immediate programs of the containment policy
■were not of the same vague general nature and the ’’openended" commitment Truman expressed.

On the contrary, the

principal programs of the containment policy up until 1950,
the Marshall Plan and NATO, which followed the Truman
Doctrine, were designed specifically to fortify Western
Europe economically and militarily, so that, that area
would be able to resist a Soviet threat.
In 1947 "the picture of Europe was one of mammoth
slow-moving crisis."

15

W.W. Rostow in his book The United

States In The World Arena writes that
There was a growing awareness (on the part of the
Truman Administration) that something big had to be
done in Europe to avoid a disaster to the American
interest; that a substantial program of economic
aid addressed constructively to the problems of
economic recovery was required to deal with the
multiple threats to the Eurasian power balance.
14
The Truman administration had become especially con
cerned with the internal situations in Prance and Italy.
In both these nations domestic communist parties had shown
increased strength.

The American policy-makers feared that

unless the internal instability of these nations and all of

15
W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena,
(New York, I960), p. 209.
14Ibid., p. 209-
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Western Europe was corrected the Communist would exploit
the crisis, and W'estern Europe would fall under Communist
control from within.

Although the Truman Administration was

fully aware of the potential external threat the Soviet
Union posed to Western European security,, they maintained
that the economic instability of the region posed a much
more immediate threat.
President Truman reasoned that the rise in communist
appeal in Prance and Italy was due, for the most part, to
the increasing despair among their working classes.

This

despair was caused by these nations' inability to rebuild
their economies after the War.

Hunger, poverty and despera

tion, not ideological beliefs, were considered by U.S. policy
makers, to be the conditions which laid Western Europe inter
nally vulnerable to Communist domination.

American leaders

held the belief that once these internal problems were
rectified, Western Europe would be able to insure its own .
security.

However, the United States recognized the fact

that the countries of Western Europe were not able to solve
their internal problems alone; American assistance would be
necessary.

In a response to Western Europe's needs, the

Truman Administration devised a program of economic
assistance.
The assistance program, known as the Marshall Plan,
was named, after the then American Secretary of State, George
Marshall. . The program offered economic aid to all nations
who were willing to cooperate and to take the initiative in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

11
determing their respective needs.

The Marshall Plan

■was intended to he a program directed toward the countries
of Western Europe, hut Secretary Marshall in announcing
the program was careful in his choice of words, so as not
to exclude the countries of Eastern Europe and its leader,
the Soviet Union, from possible participation.

Marshall,

in his initial announcement of the program, declared, "Our
policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, hut
against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos." 15

The

announcement of the Marshall Plan was worded in such a way
that it could he interpreted as an American effort to heal
the split between Communist and non-Communist Europe through
economic assistance and collaboration.

Marshall was keenly

aware of the political repercussions that a verbal restric
tion on participation would have brought about.

Had the

program been limited to just the Western European countries,
the United States would have been vulnerable to verbal attacks
from the restricted nations.

America could then have been

accused of reinforcing the division of Europe and intensify
ing the cold war.

Additionally, a program which distinctly

excluded the Soviet dominated Eastern European nations from
participation might have alienated the Communist workers in
Prance and Italy, whose numerical strength was in part
responsible for the program's being.

"One of the purposes of

the Marshall Plan had been to gain the political allegiance

15

Graebner, _op. cit.. p. 44.
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of the working class" and thus "render them immune to the
blandishments of Communism.1,16
Marshall

never really anticipated Russian or East

European participation in the program.

Noting the Congress

ional feeling of animosity toward the Soviet Union, he
fully realized that participation by the Soviet Union or
its satellites in the program would have insured the
assistance program's defeat in the Congress.

The American

Congress, in fact, had become so anti-Soviet that a program
which would assist this "Soviet enemy" could have been
interpreted as being an act of treason.

However, since

Russian refusal to participate in the program seemed assured
Marshall felt that in extending an open invitation to all
nations,' the Soviet Union, in refusing, could be accused of
continuing and aggravating the cold war.
Russian refusal to participate in the Marshall Plan
seemed inevitable due to the program's construction.

The

United States had devised the program in such a way, that
had the Soviet Union decided to participate, it would have
had to disclose information concerning its economy as well
as allowing the United States some control in its future
economic planning and that of its satellites.

Russia, if

it had participated would have found itself to be involved

16 Spanier, op. cit., p. 44. ^
17

Truman,- op. cit., p. 114-115.
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13
in a program that was assisting the stabilization of
European capitalism and thus such an offer was naturally
declined by the Soviet Union.

In stating its reason for

refusing to participate in the assistance program, the
Soviet Union claimed that the Marshall Plan "would repre
sent an intolerable interference in the internal affairs
of the European countries," and therefore was no more than
a plan to increase United States imperialism. 18

The Soviet's

vocal denunciation of the program, assured Congressional
approval for the Marshall Plan.
The Marshall Plan was eagerly welcomed by the
countries of Western Europe, especially Great Britain and
France.

In all, seventeen nations of Western and North

Western Europe participated in the program. 19

The United

States asked the participating countries to present a plan
for their common needs that were necessary for recovery.
The plan, the members devised, became the basis of the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation.

The members

of the Organization pledged to "cooperate in reducing
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to promote with
vigor the development of productivity through (the)

18

Jules Davids, America And The World of Our Time,
(New York, I960), p. 411.
19Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg, Denmark, France,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Western Germany and
Trieste.
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14
efficient use of the resources at their command."

20

In

the first four year period (1948 to 1952) American assis21
tance through the program amounted to $13 billion. '
Marshall Plan aid was a massive success in restoring
economic stability to Western

Europe.

.By 1950, that area

was already exceeding its pre-war production rate by 25 per
cent.

22

The "dollar gap", a term used in the post-war years

to describe Europe's inability to obtain enough dollars for
the purchase of commodities required for its economic
recovery, was soon reduced from $12 billion to $2 billion.

2'3

The economic assistance provided through the Marshall Plan
enabled the countries of Western Europe to establish a
stable economic basis from which future progress and social
reform would be possible.
American policy-makers made the Marshall Plan the
cornerstone of their new containment policy.

In assisting

Western Europe rebuild its economy, American policy-makers
felt the end product would be the strengthening of free
institutions in these countries, which they believed was a
necessity, if Western Europe was to meet the internal threat
of communism.

20
21

22

The importance the United States placed on

Spanier, ojo. cit. , p. 42.
Truman, op. cit., p. 119.
Spanier, £p. cit., p. 43.

25Ibid., p. 43.
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15
strengthening free institutions abroad was stated in the.
preamble of U.S. Public Law 472, April 3, 1948.

The pre

amble described the Law, of which the Marshall Plan was a
part, as an act
;.. to promote world peace and the general welfare,
national interest and foreign policy of the United
States, through economic, financial and other measures
necessary for the maintenance of conditions abroad
in which free institutions may survive and be con
sistent with the maintenance of the strength and
stability of the United States. 24
President Truman, on signing this Law, called it
America's answer to the challenge facing the free world,."

25

American policy-makers were to find, however, that
a program of financial assistance alone was not a sufficient
instrument for deterring the Communist threat in Western
Europe.
In February, 1948, the Soviets engineered a coup
d' etat in Czchoslavakia.

News of this event was received

with great alarm by American leaders but Western European
leaders were even more concerned because of their proximity
to the area.

To some members of the West, Truman and

Churchill in particular, the event resembled Hitler's
actions concerning Czechoslavakia prior to World War II.
Pour months later, in June, 1948, the Russians imposed a

^Burnham, ojo. cit. , p. 52.
25Ibid., p. 52.
26
Edmund Sallman states that in "reviewing the
evidence of the Czechoslovak coup d' etat twenty years
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26

16
blockade on West Berlin.

The Soviet's attempt to dislodge

the West from Berlin, following closely behind the "fall"
of Czechoslovakia to Communism, instilled such a sense of
insecurity in Western Europe, that a heavy strain was put
on their economic recovery programs.

The peoples of Western

Europe, faced with what they considered to be a Soviet
threat to their security, began to despair. 'They feared
that Soviet power would one day come to dominate the entire
European continent.

Therefore, many Europeans felt that

the sacrifices they were asked to make to achieve economic
stability were in vain, for they would not be able to reap
the benefits of such a recovery, if they were under Soviet
domination.

It became apparent to Western European leaders

that economic recovery could not be achieved, until their
nations were militarily secured.

afterward, it is evident that in the elections of 1946 the
Communists and their left-Socialist puppets had an absolute
majority in the Czechoslovak parliament of 50.8 per cent
(and a commanding one of 55-67 in the key provinces of
Bohemia and Moravia). While there is some suggestion
that this majority would have been reduced in the forthcoming
elections, in 1948, the majority of political activists in
Czeckoslovakia were in the Communist Party or its satellite
organizations; the population was apathetic and, if may be,
even generally approving the coup." Edmund Stillman,
"The Political Issues: Pacts and Bantasies" in Can We Win
In Vietnam? by Prank E. Armbruster, Raymond D. Gastil,
Herman Kahn, William Pfaff and Edmund Stillman, (Hew York,
1968), p. 143 fn. Also see Edmund Stillman, "The Pall of
Czechoslovakia", The Hew York Times Magazine, February 18,
1968 .
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Five European nations, noting their need for
military security, took the initiative and formed a
military alliance.

In March, 1948, Great Britain, France,

the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg signed the Brussels
Pact, a collective defense alliance.

According to the

provisions of the alliance the contracting parties pledged
to come to the assistance of any member country that was
attacked, with military and any other aid in their power
to produce.
President Truman immediately announced America's
approval of the Brussels Pact.

In speaking to the Congress

Truman said, "The determination of the free countries of
Europe will be matched by an equal determination on (the
27
part of the United States) to help them to do so."
Truman was especially pleased with the multilateral design
of the alliance, which he viewed as a notable step towards
European unity.

However, for all its good intentions, the

alliance, because of the individual military weaknesses of
its members, was an ineffective force if faced by a Soviet
challenge.

If Western Europe was to be militarily secured,

an alliance in which the United States was a member would
be necessary.

The United States was the only nation in

the world which had the military strength to successfully
meet a Soviet attack.
Following the Brussels Pact, the United States

27

Davids,

ojd.

cit., p. 413.
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Senate passed the Vandenberg Resolution which went on
record as being in favor of regional arrangements of
collective security based on continuous and effective
self-help and mutual aid.

28

The Congress overwhelmingly

approved the resolution, a factor which was to greatly
assist the Truman Administration in forming a similar
security alliance.
Although Congress had approved the basic premise
of a security alliance, the Truman Administration realized
that it was still not prepared at that time to accept
American membership in a purely military alliance during
peace time.

Thus, the Administration faced a dilemma; the

needs of Europe were military, and yet, there was some
Congressional disapproval of a strictly military alliance.
In its final draft for a collective defense alliance,
American policy-makers attempted to skirt the problem of
Congressional opposition by emphasizing the common heritage
and civilization shared by the United States and Western
Europe and the need of continuing cooperation between the
two while de-emphasizing the basic military structure of
the alliance.
The resulting alliance is known as the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) “7^

After some heated debating,

28Ibid, p. 422.
29

The original members of NATO were Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France,' Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portgual and the United States.
Greece and Turkey joined in 1952 and West Germany in 1954.
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the U. S. Senate in April, 1949, ratified the alliance.
The heart of the alliance is found in Article 5 in the
text.

It states:

The parties agree that an armed attack against one
or more of them in Europe or North America shall be
considered an attack against them all; and conse
quently they agree that, if such an armed attack,
each of them in exercise of the right, of individual
or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51
of the Charter of the United Nations will assist
the Parties so attacked by taking forthwith indivi
dually and in concert with other Parties, such action
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
force, to resolve and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic Area.
30
Despite the claims made by the advocates of NATO
that the alliance was of a unique nature, it was basically
an old-fashioned military alliance.

While the text of

the alliance was so worded that cooperation could be
extended beyond the military sphere, there was no doubt
among the contracting parties that the alliance's primary
function was military.

There seems to be two main reasons

why the Truman Administration intentionally blurred the
dominant military aspects of the alliance; first, the need
to gain Senate approval of the alliance and secondly, the
Administration's reluctance "to abandon their high idealistic way for a descent into power politics."

31

American

30
Pull text of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
signed April 4, 1949 in Hearings, "North Atlantic Treaty,"
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 1st Session,
Part
(Washington, 194971 PP* 1-331Roland N. Strombeg, Collective Security And
America.n Foreign Policy, (New York, 19&3), p- 193-
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policy-makers refused to admit that NATO was essentially
a "traditional device, one strictly in the European tradition, worked essentially hy European rules."

32

Although

the United States refused to concede this fact, it was
this very same fact that made the alliance possible and
initially successful.

American officials spoke of NATO

as an alliance "embodying the concept of containment,"
which it indeed did, however,

"they might more accurately

have said the Western Powers had put together in NATO a
balance of power coalition, hopeful of holding a military
line in Europe."
NATO, with its basic military orientation, was in
fact to make the division between East and West more pro
nounced.

Although NATO, prior to the Korean War, had not

yet evolved into its present complex structure, with a
unified command structure, and there were then no American
military bases in Europe outside of Germany, the alliance
made it quite clear to the Soviets that the United States
was willing to meet, "by force if necessary," a Soviet
challenge, at every point where the Soviet Union showed
signs of encroaching upon West European interests.
.American leaders firmly believed that such a commitment
would deter the Soviet Union from launching an attack on
Western Europe.

The Truman Administration viewed NATO as

■^Coral Bill, "The Containment of China," The Year
book of World Affairs 1968, (London, 1968), p. 134.
^Ibid. , p. 133•
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an instrument which would assist the United States in
avoiding all-out war.
During the 1948-1949 period, the West envisaged
its greatest security danger "in terms of an overt Soviet
attack in Europe that might lead to global war."

34

NATO's

defense strategy was, therefore, based on this assumption,
and thus relied on the United States' strategic air-defense,
the only Western defense which could overcome the Soviet
combat power.

In 1949, after the Soviet Union exploded its

first atomic device, the NATO strategy was seriously
questioned.

Nonetheless, the strategy remains the same

today, although conventional weapons and combat forces have
been added to the defense structure.

NATO marked the

beginning of the military aspect of the containment policy,
an aspect which for the most part has dominated the policy
ever since.
The policy of containment in its initial years
(1947-1949) was essentially a policy designed to meet the
threat of Soviet expansion into Western Europe.

Eor

President Truman and the members of his administration a
Communist threat and a Soviet threat were identical and
they used the terms interchangeably.

In announcing the

containment policy Truman said the United States must
support the cause of freedom everywhere against the evils
of Communism, yet his early policy suggests that Truman

34

Davids, ojo. cit., p. 423.
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really meant the United States would support any nation,
faced with a Communist threat, that was considered vital
to European security and thus vital to American security.
This interpretation seems valid if one compares the Ameri
can response to the Communist threat in Europe to the
American response to Communist activity in China during
the same period.
China, after World War II, was engulfed in a civil
war.

The Nationalist regime, under the leadership of

Chiang Kai-shek, a wartime ally of the United States, had
been greatly weakened by the effects of the extended war
with Japan.

On the other hand, the strength of the

Communists had increased.

Though probably of marginal

significance the Soviet Union lent military support to the
Communists by placing at their disposal surrendered
■55

Japanese arms.

By early 1949, it became apparent to the

Kuomintong that it would be defeated by the Communists,
unless it received massive outside assistance, which the
American leaders rightly interpreted to mean American
intervention.

The Truman Administration refused, and indeed,

was, because of demobilization, in no position to give that
degree of assistance, though it had already supplied sub
stantial military and economic aid.to the Nationalists.

In

the fall of 1949, Chiang Kai-shek was forced to flee from
Mainland China to the island of Formosa.

Mao Tse-tung, leader

■^Tang Tsou, America's Failure In China 1941-50,
(Chicago, 1963), pp. 330-331.
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of the Communist forces claimed victory and on October 1,
1949 formally announced the establishment of the People's
Republic of China.
The news of a Communist victory shocked and enraged
many Americans.

They could not believe- that their "long

time friends," the Chinese, were to be ruled by a Communist
regime.

Heavy demands were placed on the Administration to

explain how such an event had been allowed to occur.

Some

American Congressmen, especially the so-called "China bloc",
demanded to know what policy the Administration intended to
pursue in regards to the new regime on mainland China.

The

Administration replied that because they believed the situa
tion in China was still unstable, their immediate policy
would be one of "wait and see."

The Government of the

United States had just recently taken upon itself heavy
commitments in Europe and was not prepared, at that time,
to do the same in Asia.

American policy-makers, therefore,

intended to keep a watchful eye on the Chinese situation and
any further developments that might occur, and when they felt
the situation had stabilized itself, they would make a deci
sion as to what policy to pursue there.
During World War II, American policy-makers antici
pated a friendly China which after the war would become the
"mainstay of a new emerging balance of power in the Ear East."

Robert Blum, The United States And China In World
Affairs, (Hew York, 1966), p. 5.
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To further this desire, the United States initiated actions
which conferred upon China the status of a great power.
It was primarily through the efforts of the American
Government that China was awarded one of the five permanent
seats on the United Nations Security Council; China was
thus granted equal status on that Council with the Soviet
Union, Great Britain, France and the United States.
However, despite America's war-time efforts to make
China a leading Asian power, they were for naught, for China
was not even a unified nation in the immediate post-war
years. 37

The United States, during the waning years of

World War II and up until 1947, supported the Nationalist
regime politically, economically and within limits militarily,
in an effort to estahlish peace in China.

In 1947, President

Truman sent George Marshall to China in an attempt to mediate
a settlement in the Chinese civil war hut Marshall's efforts
failed.

Marshall in explaining his failure to achieve a

settlement, stated the main obstacle had been a lack of cooper
ation by both parties.

Marshall's report indicated that the

Nationalist regime was in need of reform and that the United
States could do little to settle the struggle between the
two factions.

Further reports brought out the fact that

Chiang Kai-shek's Government was corrupt, inefficient and
■
ZQ

reactionary.

This type of Government "did not provide a
o

37 Truman, ojo.

cit., p. 62.

^ T a n g Tsau, ojo. cit., pp. 438, 454.
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politically effective instrument through which to carry
out the social and economic reforms China needed,"

if

China was to he a stable nation, let alone an effective
leader in Asia.
By late 1948, Secretary of State Marshall in effect
abandoned the Kuomintong regime, although his policy was
not one of total or prompt disengagement.4®

Because of

some Congressional opposition to its China policy and in
order to insure full authorization of its Economic Recovery
Program, the Truman Administration was forced to accept a
heavy Congressional appropriation for aid to Chiang under
the Marshall Plan.44

Such action was to complicate later

attempts by the United States to disengage itself from
the Chinese civil war, for it tied American policy to the
Kuomintang.
During 1948, and early 1949, the position of the
Nationalist regime steadily deterioriated to the point that
a Communist victory seemed assured.

On July 30, 1949, in

anticipation of an imminent Communist victory, the United
States State Department issued a "White Paper" on United
States relations with China.

In this document the Adminis

tration's position was summed up thus:

Spanier, ojo. cit., p. 80.
4®Tang Tsau, ojo. cit., pp. 492-493*
41Ibid., p. 493*
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The unfortunate hut inescapable fact is that the
ominous results of the civil war in China was beyond
the control of the United States. Nothing that this
country did or could have done within reasonable
limits of its capabilities could have changed that
result; nothing that was left undone by this country
has contributed to it.
It m s the product of internal
Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to
influence but could not. A decision was arrived at
within China, if only a decision by default.
42
After the People's Republic of China came into
existence, the Truman Administration continued its efforts,
which began in earnest in January, 1949

to disengage itself

from the Kuomintang regime, despite some heated Congression
al objection.

In January, 1950, Truman stated:

The United States Government will not pursue a course
which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict
in China. Similarly, the United States Government
will not provide military aid or advice to the Chinese
forces on Formosa.
45
In addition to disengaging itself from the immediate conflict
in China, the Administration felt it could do little else
but sit and wait, until the conflict was resolved.

The

probability of extending formal recognition to the People's
Republic of China, while the Nationalists remained in power
on Formosa, was remote.

The Truman Administration was

already under heavy Congressional attack because of its China
policy, and any official proposal to recognize the Communist
regime would only intensify the furor of its opponents, who
42

letter of Transmittal, accompanying The China White
Paper, August, 1948, (Stanford, 1962), p. xvi.
45 Department of State Bulletin, xxii, January 16,
1950, p. 20.
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were already accusing the Administration of selling Chiang
Kai-shek "down the river."

Under these circumstances

the Administration's only recourse was to wait until the
Communists gained control of Formosa, which they believed
44
was inevitable.
Once the Communist had control of the
r
%
mainland and Formosa the civil war would end and China
would be a unified nation under one government.

American

policy-makers hoped that as soon as this had taken place,
45
recognition would follow in due time.
However, before
such a situation was to occur, the Korean War broke out,
and as a result American policy toward Formosa was
drastically altered.
The United States' policy toward China, during the
period 1947-50, was based on the realities of the situation
as viewed by the Truman Administration.

A pblicy of contain

ment was not pursued in China, although such a policy was
being pursued in Europe, because Truman did not believe a
policy of containment could be successful in China.

Ameri

can policy-makers stated that all their information indicated
nothing short of a full-scale American intervention would
have saved the nationalist regime, and it was questionable
AC

whether even such an intervention would have been successful.
44

Blum, ojo. cit., pp. 109-110.

45Ibid., p. 110.
46Ibid., p. 107.
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She United States faced an entirely different situation in
China then it did in Europe.

In Europe there was every

indication that American objectives, the economic recovery
and military security of the region, could be achieved,
whereas in China no such assurance offered itself.

In

Western Europe, most of the people viewed' Communism as an
external force that was seeking domination.

In China,

however, according to Dean Acheson "the foreign domination
had been masked behind the facade of a vast crusading move
ment which apparently (was seen by) many Chinese to be
wholly indigenous and national."

47

Under these circumstances

a policy of containment would have been to no avail.

The

policy of containment to function successfully, had to have
the people's support in resisting Communism; this was not
the case in China.
The Containment Policy, therefore, for all intents
and purposes, during the period 1947-1949, was a policy that
applied exclusively to Western Europe.

Its objective was

the security of Western Europe which involved the stemming
of Soviet expansion in that area.

In practice, containment

was a regional policy, based on a balance of power concept
rather than an ideological conflict despite the rhetorical
flourishes.

The concept of an ideological conflict seems

to have been introduced in an attempt to obscure the reality
of a balance of power strategy, a strategy condemned and
47

The China White Paper, op. cit., p. xv.
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detested by a large segment of the American people and
blamed for causing the First World War.
The globalization of containment in terms of
operational commitments as well as rhetoric was to begin
with the outbreak of the Korean War.
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II
CONTAINMENT EXTENDED TO ASIA:
The Korean War
The decision,by President Truman and his advisers
to disengage the United States from the Chinese Civil War,
made it clear that his administration intended to make the
security of Western Europe the prime objective of their
efforts.

In order to meet the heavy demands of their

European commitment, American policy-makers, felt that
the U. S. commitment in Asia had to be limited."*'

In early

1950 the Truman Administration made their desire to limit
.American commitments in Asia known publically in a series
of announcments.

Early in January, 1950 Truman announced

the United States would not protect the island of Formosa.
Secretary of State Dean Acheson on January, 12, 1950, in a
speech before the National Press Club, amplified Truman's
earlier announcement.

In this speech Acheson defined the

United States defense strategy in the Far East.

He stated:

(The United States) defensive perimeter runs along
the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. 2
Davids,

ojd.

cit., p. 436.
0

2
Full text of speech in Department of State Bulletin,
January 23, 1950, pp. 111-119.

‘

30
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The Philippines because of its special relationship was
accorded special mention in the American strategy.

The

"defensive perimeter" defined by the then Secretary of
State, noticeably excluded, both Formosa and South Korea.
Some critics of the Truman Administration later claimed
that this statement of American security interest in Asia,
excluding South Korea, encouraged the Forth Koreans to
attack, because it led the latter to believe that the
United States would make no response.

Acheson's speech,

however, merely reflected the Truman Administration's
belief that the next war would be a world-war and that
Europe was likely to be its site.

Under such circumstances

Formosa and South Korea were not considered to be strategically important to the United States.

In no way did

Acheson insinuate that the areas omitted from the "defensive
perimeter" were to be automatically forfeited to the Com
munists.

On the contrary, he made it perfectly clear that

any Communist aggression in the
that it would have to be met
United Nations.

area should be met, but

by the nation attacked and the

Further on in the speech Acheson had stated

It must be clear that no person can guarantee these
areas against military attack. But it must also be
clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or
necessary within the realm of practical relationships.
Should such an attack occur - one hesitates to say
where such an armed attack could come from - the
initial reliance must be on the people attacked to

^David Rees, Korea:
1964), p. 23.

The limited War , (New York,
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resist it and then upon the commitments of the
entire civilized world under the Charter of the
United Nations which so far has not proved a
weak reed to lean on by any people who are
determined to protect their independence against
outside agression.
4
The North Korean attack on South Korea, June 24,
1950, cauised American policy-makers to reevaluate their
stated position in the Ear East.

In early 1950 the United

States had primarily thought of Korea in terms of its
strategic significance in the context of America's military
concept of "total-war."

The military leaders concurred,

with the policy-makers' belief that the next war involving
the United States would be a global war, in which case
"Korea would be of relatively minor importance."

American

military strategists had further concluded that Korea in
a global war, would be almost impossible to defend in any
event.^

The security of South Korea thus was viewed pri

marily, from the point of military strategy, with the poli
tical significance of its security never seriously considered.
No thought was given to the possible repercussions on Ameri
can policy if the Communists were to expand its control over
South Korea, because American policy-makers never anticipated
an isolated Communist attack but rather thought in terms of
a global confrontation.

The invasion of South Korea led to

a re-appraisal by American policy-makers of both the situation

^Department of State Bulletin, op. cit., Jan. 23> 1950.
5

i

Mathew B. Ridgeway, The Korean War,
1967), p. 7."
-

(Garden City,

6Ibid., p. 7.
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of South Korea and their Asian policy in general.
The United States originally viewed the attack on
South Korea as the first explosion in a far greater con7
flict.
In the spring of 1950, American intelligence
reports had claimed "that the Communists in many parts of
the world were preparing a pattern of conquest for (that)
g
summer."
Based on the information they had received the
aggression in Korea was viewed hy American decision-makers
as merely a first step in a greater Communist onslaught.
Inherent in the United States' interpretation of the North
Korean attack was the assumption that the Kremlin was
ultimately responsible for the aggression.

Q

This interpre

tation rendered the political importance of South Korean
security in American policy unquestionable.• The Truman
Administration felt that the Kremlin was using Korea as a
testing site, in which American determination and will power
7
Michael Donelan, The Ideas of American Foreign
.Policy, (London, 1963), p. 149.
g
Hanson Baldwin, New York Times, July 2, 1950 quoted
by Alexander George, "American Policy-Making and the North
Korean Aggression" in Korea And The Theory of Limited W a r , ed.
by Allen Guttman, (Boston, 1967), p. 67. See also Truman,
Memoirs, Vol. II, ojo. cit., p. 331. In Baldwin's account the
word "Communist" is used while Truman in his account uses the
term "Soviet".
It is evident, however, both men meant the
Soviets.
q
Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, o j d . cit., p. 336, Rees,
op. cit., p. 19, Alexander George, ojo. cit., p. 67, John W.
Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And The Korean W a r ,
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1959), in 23•
For a statement of the opposite view, see Wilbur H.
Hitchcock, "North Korea Jumps the Gun," Current History,
March, 1951, pp. 136-144.
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to resist Communist military expansion was being tested.
The Administration felt if the U.S. failed to make an
appropriate response to the situation, there would be farranging repercussions.

Truman and his advisers concluded

that if the United States did not meet this Soviet challenge,
the Soviets would succeed:
... in demonstrating to the world their (Soviet) own
strength and resolution, and conversely, American
fear and unreliability; in disintegrating the Western
alliance; in forestalling the creation of a situation
of strength in the Pacific; and in frightening the
leaders of the neutralist nations of Southeast Asia
and the Middle East.
The resulting power vacuums
would provoke further acts of aggression and render
World War III inevitable ... 11
Korea, therefore, was regarded by American decision-makers
as an extension and related to the "dangerous conflict of
Russo-American

power politics"in Europe.

In viewing the

Worth Korean aggression in this context, President Truman,
his political advisers and his military advisers were in
complete agreement - the Soviet challenge had to be met.

12

The first action the United States took was to alert
the Security Council of the United Nations of the North
Korean aggression.

The American desire to see U.N. partici

pation in meeting the Korean situation seems to have been

^Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And The
Korean W a r , op. cit., p. 29, Tang Tsftu, op. cit., p. 557.
■^Spanier, Ibid., p. 29^ C a r l Berger, The Korean Knot,

(Philadelphia, 1957),

p. 108.
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three fold:

first, the aggression was thought to be a

direct challenge to the whole system of collective security,
and thus it fell under the auspicies of the United Nations.
It was also consistent with the earlier stated position
of the United States, that any Communist aggression in an
area not included in the United States' "defensive perimeter"
should be met by the United Nations.
Nations was already involved in Korea.

Secondly, the United
Ernest Gross, Ameri

can deputy representative at the United Nations stated, "the
North Korean attack was an 'invasion upon a state which the
United Nations, itself, by action of its General Assembly,
had brought into being.

It is armed aggression against the

Government elected under United Nations supervision.1" ^
And finally, the "American depreciation of power and un
willingness to recognize and accept power as a factor in
human affairs (made) it psychologically necessary to ration
alize actions in the international arena in terms of ideological objectives and universal moral principles."

15

On June 25, 1950, the United Nations Security Council
adopted a resolution, drafted by the United States, which
declared,

~^Ibid., p. 108., Leland M. Goodrich, Korea A Study of
U.S. Policy in the United Nations, (New York, 1956),
pp. 102-103.
“^Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And The
Korean W a r , op. cit., p. 39.
15Ibid., p. 40.
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that the action of the North Korean forces constituted
"a breach of the peace," called for "the immediate
cessation of hostilities," called upon the North
Korean authorities "to withdraw forthwith their armed
forces to the thirty-eighth parallel," requested the
United Nations Commission to submit its recommendations
and to keep the Council informed of the execution of
the resolution, and called upon all Members "to render
every assistance to the United Nations in the execution
of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance
to the North Korean authorities.
16
This U.S. resolution made it clear-that the desired objective
in Korea was the re-establishment of the status quo*ante bel'lum.
American leaders pessimistic about the probability
of North Korean compliance with the U.N. resolution, under
took some unilateral action in meeting the Korean crisis.
In a press statement on June 26, it was announced that
American arms and equipment would be sent to the South
17 On the follow
Korean forces from American bases in Japan.•
ing day, June 27, President Truman announced additional
American action.

The President declared that American naval

and air forces had been ordered "to give the Korean Govern1ft
ment troops cover and support "
and the Seventh Fleet had
been ordered into the Formosa Straits to neutralize the
island of Formosa.

The Seventh Fleet was to prevent, if

The resolution
Goodrich, o j d . cit., pp. 105-106.
was passed by a 9 to 0 vote with Yugoslavia abstaining.
The Soviet Union's representative was absent at the time,
in a protest, which had begun in early January, against the
Council's refusal to unseat the Chinese Nationalist
representative.
17

Goodrich,

ojd.

cit., p. 107.

■^Truman', Memoirs, Vol. II, ojo. cit., p. 339-
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ne’cessary, ""both a Chinese Communist invasion of the
19

island and Nationalist forays toward the mainland."

In

addition Truman announced he had directed that the Ameri
can forces in the Philippines "be strengthened and that
military assistance to the Philippine Government be accel*7

erated," and similarly, "the acceleration of American
military assistance to the forces of Prance and the Associa20
.
.
ted States in Indochina."
A U.S. military mission was
21
also ordered to Indo-China to work with those forces.
The decision to neutralize Formosa, was explained
by Truman as an effort ."to prevent Communist action that
22
might enlarge the area of conflict."
While this was
the intention of.'the action, in effect it "enlarged the
struggle in Asia from one of resisting North Korean aggres
sion to one of frustrating the ambitions of Red China with
23
respect to Formosa."
The American action with respect
19
20

Rees,

0 £.

cit., p. 23., Truman, Ibid., p. 339.

Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II,

ojd.

cit., p. 339.

21Ibid., p. 339.
22
Rees, o j d . cit., p. 23. Tang Ts6u:,suggests that a
memorandum on Formosa, by MacArthur prior to the North
Korean aggression, which stressed the strategies interests
of the United States in denying Formosa to the Communist
might have had some influence on Truman's decision although
the degree of influence cannot be determined, (Tang Tsau, op.
cit., pp. 559-561). Goodrich observed:
"It is quite
possible that the neutralization of Formosa was a condition
set by the Joint Chiefs for their consent to the State Depart
ment's proposal to come to the assistance of the Republic of
Korea with armed forces."
(Goodrich, o j d . cit., p. 111.)
23
Davids, ojo. cit. , p. 439.
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to Formosa, with its possible consequences alarmed many
U.N. members.

They felt the United States had not presented

any concrete evidence "that the action was necessary to the
attainment of the limited objective set forth in the
24
Security Council's resolution."
Some U.N. members feared
that Truman's decision to connect the 'question of Formosa
to the Korean crisis might, broaden the scope of the action
and be a gratuitous offence to Communist China.

25

However,

in view of the importance of whole-hearted American support
for U.K. efforts to meet the North Korean aggression, dis
gruntled members could do little but voice their fears to
each other and the United States, though their disagreement
with American action regarding Formosa was to create "serious
rifts in the conduct of the Korean War."

26

Communist China's response to the presence of the
Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Straits was immediate.

Cho.u

En-lai, Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister of Commun
ist China, on June 28th, denounced American action "as armed
aggression against the territory of China in total violation
of the United Nations Charter."
24

27

While the Feting regime

Goodrich, o£. cit., p. 110.

*^Ibid., p. 110.
26
Davids, o j d . cit., p. 439.
27
Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, The
Decision to Enter The Korean War, (New York, 19&0), p. 58.
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was infuriated there was no indication at that time that
Communist China would actively support the' North Koreans
in their fight against the American "imperialists." However,
it is quite evident that the neutralization of Formosa was
the first in a series of developments which subsequently
T

5

led to the Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean
War.

The final decision by the Chinese to enter the war

was not based on the Formosa question, but. having been
frustrated by the United States in their desire to gain
control of Formosa, the Peking regime later became more
Op
concerned with events in Korea.
The American main effort in meeting the North Korean
aggression was carried out in the name of the United Nations.
29
While this was done for reasons already mentioned,
it is
quite clear that the United States had been willing, if it
had had no alternative, to act unilaterally in meeting the
Communist challenge in Korea.

This is supported by the

fact that President Truman announced that American naval
and air support would be given to ROK forces

ten hours

before the U.N. resolution was passed endorsing American
action and providing for an international military effort

28

Communist China's decision to enter the Korean
War is discussed later in this chapter.
o

^ V i d e Supra, p. 35.
30
Abbreviation for Republic of Korea.
referred to as ROK.

Hereafter
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to aid South Korea.

31

Undoubtedly, had the United Nations

decided not to act in Korea, the course of American action
taken would have been altered, but the fact remains the
United States would have made the commitment anyway.
Arnold Wolfers states that even with U.N. participation,
*7
3

the character of the action in Korea must be
judged by the decisions and acts of the United
States and its associates.
It would seem
permissible, in fact, to concentrate on the
conduct of the United States because the other
nations which made contributions to the defense
of South Korea might conceivably have done so
as friends and allies of the United States ... 32
On June 27th President Truman,hoping that American
action had convinced the Kremlin of American determination
to meet the challenge in Korea,sent a note to the Soviet
Government in an effort to bring a quick halt to the Korean
crisis.

The message asked the Soviets to disavow any

responsibility for the aggression and "to use its influence
with the North Korean authorities to withdraw their invad
ing f o r c e s . T h e Kremlin did not comply with the American
request but it is doubtful it was because they questioned
American determination.

In fact before the Soviets did

31
^ Referring to U.N. resolution passed on June 27,
Truman's announcement came at 12 noon, the U.N. resolution
was passed at 10:45 P.M. (Goodrich, o j d . cit., p. 113).
32
Arnold Wolfers, "Collective Security And The War
In Korea", in Arnold Wolfers, Discord And Collaboration,
(Baltimore, 1962), p. 172.
•2*2

Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And
The Korean War, _op. cit., p. 32.
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reply to the Washington petition the U.N. had also reinforced its earlier resolution in passing a second resolu
tion on the Korean crisis recommending "that members of
the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic
of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and
»

restore international peace and security in the area."

34

The Soviet reply on June 29th, stated "that it considered
the events in Korea to be part of the internal affairs of
Korea, and declared Soviet opposition to foreign inter- '
vention in the domestic concerns of other nations."

35

The Soviets therefore opposed both American action and
U.N. policy.
Washington was relieved by the Soviet note, despite
the fact that the Soviets were clearly opposed to American
36
policy.
Acheson interpreted the Soviet reply to mean
that the Soviet Union, itself, would not interfere in Korea.

37

That ended the Truman Administration's fear that the attack
70
on Korea was merely a Soviet diversionary act.
Prior to

34

Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services And
The Committee On Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress,
1st Session "TEe Military Situation in the Far East",
(Washington, B.C., 1951), p. 5371.
35

Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And The
Korean W a r , op. cit., p. 33.
56Ibid., p. 33.
37
Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 342.
7Q
Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And The
Korean War, op. cit., p. 33.
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that time, President Truman had displayed a great reluctance
to commit American ground forces to Korea, despite General
MacArthur's insistence that ground forces were necessary
if the Republic of Korea was to he saved.

Truman, in his

Memoirs recalls his reluctance at the time:
I wanted to take every step necessary to push the
North Koreans hack behind the 38th parallel. But
I wanted to he sure that we would not become so
overly committed in Korea that we could not take
care of such other situations as might develop.
39
However, once Truman, greatly influenced by Acheson's
evaluation of Soviet intent, was convinced that the Soviets
did not intend to become directly involved in Korea, he
immediately followed MacArthur's recommendation and dis
patched U.S. ground forces.
American response to the North Korean aggression
signalled the beginning of the active pursuance of the
containment policy in Asia.

While there was the need to

meet the aggression if the validity of concept of collective
security established in the United Nations was to be pre
served, American decision-makers seemed to have based their
Korean decision in the context of the East-West power struggle.
Up until that time the containment policy had been based on
the belief that this struggle was to be carried out in
Europe.

After the North Korean aggression, while Europe
£
still remained the primary center of the struggle as fpr
39

Truman, Memoirs Yol. II, op. cit., p. 341. The
"other situations" that Truman referred to were primarily
in Europe.
Ibid., p. 341.
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most American leaders were concerned, the U.S. came to
believe that the power struggle could be won or lost in
secondary theaters, which for the United States meant
40
Asia.
Again referring to Truman's Memoirs it states:
We let it be known that we considered the Korean
situation vital as a symbol of the strength and
determination of the West, firmness now (in Korea)
would be the only way to deter new actions in
other parts of the world. Not only in Asia but
in Europe, ... the confidence of people adjacent
to the Soviet Union would be adversely affected
in our judgement, if we failed to take action ... .
If, however, the threat to South Korea was met
firmly and successfully, it would add to our
successes in Iran, Berlin and Greece a fourth
success in opposition to the aggressive moves of
the Communists. And each success, we suggested
to our allies, was likely to add caution to the
Soviets in undertaking new efforts of this kind.
41
It is apparent then, that Truman had come to believe that
if containment was to be successful in Europe, it would
have to be a global policy as announced initially in the
Truman Doctrine.

This conviction differed from the Presi

dent's previous position with regard to the Chinese Civil
War.

The Korean War, for the United States, therefore,

became first a war to contain communist expansion and
second, a war to uphold the principle of collective
security.

American policy-makers, however, did not make a

clear distinction between the two.

^Brown, op. cit., p. 59*
^Truman, Memoirs, Yol. II., ££. cit., pp. 339-340.
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By the time U.S. forces

42

reached South Korea, the

military situation had deteriorated to the point where the
North Koreans seemed assured of victory.

The arrival of

the U.N. forces had no immediate effect in "turning the
tide" of the war in South Koreans' favor.

Only after some

weeks of continual Battle and "brilliant" military strategy
on the part of General MacArthur,

45

Commander of the U.N.

forces in Korea, did the military situation swing in favor
of the allies,

finally, by September, 1950, the U.N. forces

had successfully driven the North Korean forces back beyond
the thirty-eighth parallel.

Once the thirty-eighth parallel

had been secured by the U.N. forces, the question of whether
or not to cross the parallel came to the forefront.
This was a delicate question involving matters of
both military tactics and political policy.

Tactically it

was impossible to achieve a complete defeat of the North
Korean forces TtTT if the United Nations forces were not
allowed to cross this l i n e . ^

Politically, there were

other considerations.
In the early days of the Korean War, the political
abjective of the United States and the United Nations had
42

Goodrich states: At the end of 1951, close to
two-thirds of the total force in Ko^ea under the United
Nations Command had been contributed by the United States.
((Goodrich, ojo. cit., p. 117).
45Rees, oj3. cit., Chapter V.
^ T a n g Tsf^u, ajL cit., p. 569.
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had been the restoration of the status quo ante helium.
Geographically this meant the re-establishment of the
thirty-eighth parallel as the boundary between Worth and
South Korea.

This objective had been achieved by the end

of September, 1950.

Accordingly the next logical step

would have been the establishment of a truce, followed by
negotiations, in which the parties involved would have con
firmed the boundary between the two Korean regimes.

This

was not to occur.
With the repercussions of a divided Korea before
them, and noting the past record of failures by the United
Nations to unite Korea through negotiations, American
leaders, as early as the beginning of August, pondered the
thought of going beyond the parallel and completely crush
ing the aggressor.

Starting in August, 1950, American

officials in public statements began to speak more and more
of a united Korea rather than a restoration of the status
quo.

American Ambassador to the United Nations, Austin, in

a debate in the Security Council on August 17, "declared
that the General Assembly in adopting its resolutions on
Korea in 1947, 1948 and 1949" had sought the establishment
of a united and independent Korea, and the U.N. should not
turn from these objectives. 45 Austin ended his speech say
ing:

"The opportunity is here.

time is at hand.

The place is here.

The

Only the word and the deed are lacking."

45Ibid., p. 570.
46Ibid., p. 570
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These sentiments were reinforced in early September by
Secretary of State Acheson, who said that crushing the
North Korean aggression was not the end of the United
Nations' objective. 47

■' then
Two days later, Dean Rush,

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Ear Eastern Affairs,
in reviewing the general lines of America's Ear Eastern
Policy stated that "the United Nations must have an oppor
tunity to give effect to its long-standing policy in favor
of a free and united Korea along the lines set forth in
the resolutions of the General Assembly over the past
three years."48
The shift in the United States political objectives
in Korea cannot be explained with any certainty in terms
of one event or factor.

However, it does appear that the

optimism of General MacArthur that a united Korea was
possible militarily without any serious threat of enlarging
the conflict, was extremely influential.

Of a much lesser

influence, yet still a factor, were the repeated warnings
from the South Korean government that it would not be satis
fied with any agreement or settlement that left Korea divided.
Additionally of course was the underlying traditional belief
that the objective in any military conflict was total victory.
Although American officials tooh the lead in express47Department of State Bulletin, September 18, 1950,
pp. 450-51.
48Ibid., p. 467.
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ing this "new” objective to he sought in Korea, they were
not alone.

Secretary-G-eneral lie, stated that "it would

'not he enough' to hring ahout the withdrawal of the North
Koreans to the thirty-eighth parallel and that 'the aim
of the United Nations (was) and must be a united and indet

j

pendent Korea in which all of the people of Korea are able
40
to freely seek a government of their own choosing!"
On September 11, 1950 Truman made the decision to
extend military operations beyond the thirty-eighth parallel.
Truman, on that day, approved a Joint Chiefs' directive
which authorized General MacArthur,
... to conduct the necessary military operations
either to force the North Koreans behind the 38th
parallel or to' destroy their forces.
If there wa’
a
no indication of a threat of entry of Soviet or
Chinese Communist elements in force, the National
Security Council recommended that General MacArthur
was to extend his operations north of the parallel
and to make plans for the occupation of North Korea.
However, no ground operations were to take place
north of the 38th parallel in the event of Soviet
or Chinese Communist entry.
50
Later in September another directive was transmitted to
MacArthur which authorized him to conduct military operations
north of the thirty-eighth parallel.

This directive contain

ed specific restrictions to be observed in carrying out this
operation.

As in the first directive, MacArthur was author

ized to cross the parallel only if at the time there was no
indication that the Soviets or Chinese Communists intended
49
50

Tang fsoui* ££•

> P- 570-71.

Truman, Memoirs Vol. II., op. cit., p. 359.
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to counter such, operations.MacArthur was further instructed,
... that under no circumstances were any of his forces
to cross the Manchurian or U.S.S.R. borders of Korea,
and, as a matter of policy, no non-Korean ground
forces were to be used in the provinces bordering on
the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian
border. Similarly, support of his operations north
or south of the 38th parallel by air or naval action
against Manchuria or the U.S.S.R. territory was
specifically ruled out.
51
The General Assembly adopted a resolution on October
7, 1950,

(despite doubts expressed by some Asian and Arab

nations, especially India), which in effect "placed the
seal of the United Nations' Approval on the Unified Command's
proposal to complete the destruction of the North Korean
52
armed forces and pacification of North Korea."
While the
General Assembly'*s authorization was of substantial value,
in that it justified the American position, the real deci
sion had already been made in Washington.

MacArthur had

sent the first South Korean troops across the parallel on
October 1, six days before the U.N. resolution.
The United States decision to meet the North Korean
aggression really meant that the area of "containment" had
been expanded to include the Par East.

Yet, although the

area of containment was expanded, Europe maintained its
primacy in American policy planning.

While the military

conflict centered in the Korean peninsula, the United States,
nonetheless increased its military commitments to Western

51Ibid., p. 360.
52

Goodrich, ojo. cit., pp. 133-134.
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Europe during the war.

This action was in keeping with

the American belief, that Europe, not Korea, was the
ultimate target of the Communist "conquest."

Many of the

decisions of the Truman Administration concerning Korea
in fact were based on what they believed was necessary in
the maintenance of Western European security.

For Truman

and his advisers the Korean crisis paralleled the Greek
crisis in 1947, in that it constituted a challenge of
wills between East and West.
The influence of the theory of containment was even
evident in the United States' military conduct of the Korean
War.

America's original objective in Korea was to achieve

the re-establishment of the border dividing the two Koreas,
prior to the outbreak of the conflict.

At the same time

the United States wished to prevent the conflict from escal
ating into a possible atomic confrontation between the two
superpowers.

In order to prevent this possibility the con

cept of limited war was introduced in Korea.

General Ridge

way in his book’The Korean War describes the concept of
limited war:
A limited war is not merely a small war that has not
grown to full size. It is a war which the objectives
are specifically limited in light of our national
interest and our current capabilities.
54
55

^Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy And The
Korean W a r , op. cit., p. 3354

Ridgeway, ojo. cit. , p.. 245.
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The traditional concept of war was inadequate in Korea
because it was open-ended - "it had no clearly delineated
geographical, political and military goals beyond
'victory'".

55

In that sense it is a war "that may escalate

itself indefinitely, as wars will, with one success requiring another to insure the first."

56

That is exactly

what the world wished, to avoid in Korea.
Even after the United States expanded its objective
in Korea, the concept of limited war was maintained, des
pite the violent objection of General MacArthur.

However,

the Truman Administration, their allies and even the Soviet
Union apparently realized that to pursue the traditional
concept of war in the atomic age might prove to be suicidal.
Otherwise, the Korean War may have meant "the turning back
of civilization by several thousand years, with no one left
capable of signaling the victory." 57
When the Truman Administration decided it would
attempt to unify Korea, the policy of containment was temp
orarily abandoned.

Containment, in essence, was a policy to

maintain the "status quo"; the unification of Korea, on the
other hand, meant a change in the ante bellum Korean

55Ibid., p. 24556Ibid., p. 245.
57Ibid., p. 245.
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situation.

58

The concept of containment had originally

been adopted by the Truman Administration because it was
their belief that the policy would stem Soviet expansion
and at the same time prevent the outbreak of another World
War.

The Administration's decision of September, 1950,

therefore, must have been based on their belief that Korea
offered the United States an opportunity not only to stem
Communist expansion but in fact to "roll back" the line of
Soviet control, without the risk of global confrontation.
Such an opportunity had not existed in Europe.
The decision to extend military operations into the
North proved to be a disastrous one for the United Nations— ■
but especially for the United States and the people of
Korea.

As a result of this action, the Chinese Communist

intervened in the war, and the Korean War became intensified
and drawn out as the threat of global war was renewed.
The United States decision to attempt to unify Korea
by means of a military victory and the U.N. approval of this
objective had been based on the assumption that neither the
Soviet Union nor Communist China would intervene in the war
in an attempt to prevent the achievement of that goal.

And

yet, Peking, since the latter part .of August had voiced its
increasing concern over the developments in Korea, and their
relationship to China's own security.

On September 30, the

58 It may be argued that the division of Korea was
not officially recognized, nonetheless, the division did
exist.
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day before the ROK forces under^the United Nations Command
first crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, Communist China's
Premier Chou En-lai publically declared:
The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate
foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate
seeing their neighbors being savage.ly invaded.
Whoever attempts to exclude nearly ;’500 million
people from the United Nations and "whoever ignore
and violate the interest of this one-fourth of
mankind and fancy vainly to solve arbitrarily
any Par Eastern problem directly concerned with
China, will certainly break their skulls.
59
After the first ROK units "crossed the thirty-eighth parallel,
and MacArthur broadcast his ultimatum, ordering Pyongyang
to surrender," Chau En-lai informed the Indian Ambassador
in Peking, that should U.S. ground troops invade North
Korea, China would enter the war.

60

The Indian Ambassador

promptly informed American sources of the warning.

Similar

information was also given to the United States from other
sources and American intelligence reported a heavy build-up
of Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria.

The threat of

Chinese intervention was nevertheless minimized by American
leaders, who believed that Chou En-lai's threats "were a
bald attempt to blackmail the United Nations by threats of
61
intervention in Korea."
The United Nations at the time
was deliberating over a resolution that would recommend
59

Tang Tso.u, ojo. cit., pp. 572-573.
cit., p. 139.

Goodrich, op.

^Whiting, ojo. cit., p. 108.
61

Truman,

ojd.

cit. , p. 362.
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"that all appropriate steps he taken to insure stability
throughout all of Korea."
While Washington for the most part minimized the
Chinese Communist threats, -it did take a precautionary
measure and sent MacArthur a directive, authorizing him
to engage Peking forces in Korea, only as long as in his
judgement, such action offered a reasonable chance of
success.

62 While the Truman Administration was again re

emphasizing their desire to limit the Korean conflict, they
left the ultimate decisions concerning military operation
up to MacArthur to interpret.

On October 7, the first

American ground forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel,
and within a week of that event the first Chinese Communist
troops crossed the falu River.

63

The entrance of Communist China into the Korean War,
drastically changed the entire complexion of the war.
Militarily, by late 1950, the Communist had once again re
gained the advantage.

The United Ration forces at that time

were forced back behind the thirty-eighth parallel and there
was some speculation that they might be forced to retreat
from the entire Korean peninsula.
The Communist military success presented the Truman
Administration with a grave decision.

It had to decide

whether or not the war was to be extended to China.
62Whiting, ojo. cit., p. 111.
65Ibid., pp. 114-115.
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MacArthur insisted, after the Communist Offensive in Novem
ber, that such a course was imperative if his forces were
to he victorious.

While the Administration desired a

military victory, they were aware of the political consider
ations that had to he taken into account, before a decision
on whether or not to carry the war to China could be met.
Political considerations were of paramount importance in
Korea because the military operations were being conducted
under the flag of the United Nations.

Almost every U.N.

member had expressed their opinion at various times, that
they were opposed to any enlargement of the war.
Then Secretary of Defense Marshall in discussing
the diplomatic aspects of the situation in Korea had stated
that it was his opinion,
... (that) it (was) essential for the United States
to go along with the United Nations approach to the
Korean question, even if going along with the United
Nations meant some difficult problems ......... it
(was) essential for (the U.S.) to keep a unanimity
of approach in the U.N.
64
Marshall further stated that the three American Service
Secretaries agreed that it was most important that the United
States not become involved "either individually or with the
65
United Nations in a general war with China."
At the same decision-making meeting at which Marshall
spoke, Secretary of State Acheson also expressed his opposition

^Truman,

ojd.

cit., p. 586.

65Ibid., p. 386.
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to any extension of the war.

A^cheson explained his position

from the standpoint of America's overall foreign policy:
We had hanked our foreign policy on the idea of
keeping Russia contained, and we had succeeded
in repulsing her attempts to break out. If we
allowed the Russians now to trap us inside their
perimeter, however, we would run the risk of
being sucked into a buttomless piti There would
be no end, and it would bleed us dfy. 66
A-cheson, therefore, was also opposed to a war with China,
because he believed it would hinder rather than assist the
main U.S. objective, the containment of Soviet expansion.
With President Truman, his advisers, except of
course General MacArthur, and U.K. members all in agreement,
the decision was made not to extend the war to China.

Prom

this point on the'United States' avowed objective of uniting
Korea through a military victory is played down and replaced
by expressed desires to end hostilities.

The re-establishment

of the status quo ante bellum seems to become once again
the main objective to be achieved by the United Rations and
the Truman Administration in the Korean conflict.
Goodrich states in his book Korea:

Leland M.

A Study of U.S. Policy in

the United Rations, that during the period, December 1950
and early January 1951, when U.R. military operations in
Korea were at low tide, that,
There was a reluctant willingness, (on the part of
the U.S.) as evidenced by the acceptance of the

66Ibid., p. 388.
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rn

"Five Principles"
... to maintain the "coalition"
intact, to agree to discuss certain political issues
raised by the Chinese Communists in return for a
cease-fire agreement which would provide for the
withdrawal of North Korean and Chinese Communist
forces back of the 38th parallel.
Thus it can be
said that during this period of uncertainty and
adversity, the restoration of peace was accepted
as an objective which to some extent took prece
dence over the resolve to deny to the aggressor any
possible fruits of aggression.
68
While the Truman Administration was adamant in its
decision not to enlarge the conflict, General MacArthur
was just as adamant in his belief that the war had to be
carried to China.

This sharp difference of opinion

between the President and the General, caused U.K. members
many anxious moments.
MacArthur not only disagreed with President Truman's
policy of limitation, he openly ridiculed it.

In a final

attempt to force Truman to change his policy, MacArthur
appealed directly to the U.S. Congress and the American
people.

MacArthur's actions and statements instilled doubt

and fear in some U.N. members.

They began to doubt Truman's

authority in the making of policy decisions, fearing he
might be a mere figure-head and that the real decisions were
made by some military complex.

If this were the case, as

r t-j

The Five Principles were a group of five proposals
established by the General Assembly in the U.N. in an effo.rl;
to find an acceptable negotiating position for both the
United States and the Peoples' Republic of China.
Communist
China rejected them as an acceptable solution.
The "Five
Principles" are listed in Goodrich, ojo. cit., pp. 160-161.
66Ibid., p. 180.
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allies of the United States they feared that they might he
drawn into a major war without previous consultation or
choice.

The Truman-MacArthur rift, therefore, often hindered

U.S. - U.N. cooperation.
By March, 1951, the tide of the military battle in
*7
5
Korea shifted in favor of the U.K. forces. President Truman
decided that because of the more favorable military situation,
the time was ripe to begin a new approach to a negotiated
cease-fire.

Truman in his Memoirs recalls his reasoning

behind his decision.
... since we had been able to inflict heavy casualties
on the Chinese and were pushing them bach to and beyond
the 38th parallel, it would be in their interest (the
Communists) as much as ours to halt the fighting.
69
On March 24, the day Truman was to release a statement declar
ing the United States desire for a cessation of hostilities,
MacArthur issued a statement "that was entirely at cross
purpose" with the statement Truman intended but never did
release that day.7^

America's allies, who had known of

Truman's intentions, became confused by MacArthur's statement
and immediately rushed inquiries to Washington to learn if
71
there had been a sudden shift in the President's policy.
President Truman became increasingly disturbed with MacArthur,
who continued to misrepresent "official" American policy.
69
. Truman, ojo. cit., p. 438.
7?Ibid., p. 440.
71Ibid., p. 442.
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It had come to the point where the General was not only
i

openly expressing his opposition to the President's
policy hut he was also confusing American allies and foes
alike*and therefore hindering American peace efforts in
Korea.

A few weeks later, General MacArthur wrote a
J
letter to House Minority leader, Joseph Martin, which
caused Truman to relieve MacArthur of his command.

The

letter, read by Mr. Martin in the House of Representatives,
72
belittled President Truman's diplomatic efforts in Korea-.
In belittling the President's policy, MacArthur condemned
the concept of limited war and the policy of containment.
Truman felt he had no choice but to relieve MacArthur of
his duties as Commander of the U.N. forces because of this
open insubordination to his Commander-in-Chief, especially
since such actions were forestalling a possible settlement
in Korea.

73

General MacArthur's return to the United States
set off a public protest against Truman's Korean policy.
Americans who had grown disenchanted with the various
aspects of Truman Administration's policies rallied together
in support of the great General.

The supporters of the

General varied from those who were then opposed to the

72Ibid., p. 446.
75Ibid., p. 447.
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Korean War,

74

to those who rejected the concept of limited
■*»«

war, the containment policy and the leadership of President
Truman.

Many Americans dismayed by the American retreat

since the November Communist Offensive felt that MacArthur
had become a scapegoat for Truman's blunders.

They did

s

not understand that MacArthur's open opposition to Truman's
policy had greatly hindered the American war effort and
caused a serious rift in ally cooperation.

Por most,

MacArthur remained the World War II hero who was being dis
missed because he insisted on a military victory - the
traditional American objective in war.

To condemn a great

man because of this was too much for many Americans to bear.
They felt they could no longer remain silent as American
failures mounted.
Americans of many political persuasions had become
confused and contradictory in their wants.

Por example, those

who criticized the concept of "limited war" were pleased that
the Korean War was waged below the level of a general war, yet
at the same time they despised it because "it whittled down

^iQien the United States entered the Korean War,
a Gallup Poll released showed that 81$ of the people polled
were for the war and only 13$ opposed. In another release
shortly after MacArthur's forced retreat by the Chinese,
66$ of the people polled favored pulling out and 25$ were
opposed. Cited in Thomas A. Bailey", A Diplomatic History
of the American People (New York, 1964), p. 821, p. 823.
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the real superiority of the United States."

75

Other

Americans had come to "believe that Truman's policy of con
tainment was nothing more than a policy of appeasement,
03? a policy of fear.

76

The rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine

had so overcome the American people, that they could not
tolerate a policy of "appeasement" or a policy that "brooked
compromises with the all-evil Communists.

This attitude

was influencial in the following Administration's decision
to adopt a stronger "anti-Mao and pro-Chiang policy," 77
which would come to jeopardize America's entire Asian policy.
On July 10, while public criticism continued to rage
in the United States, delegations representing "both sides in
the Korean conflict began to meet at Kaesong, near the
thirty-eighth parallel, for discussions "concerning the
cessation of military activities and the establishment of
no

peace."

These meetings continued with no substantial

results until finally an impasse was reached.

Despite the

impasse, however, negotiations continued to take place off
and on until 1953.

During this period the fighting dragged

on.

75

Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Daugherty, "The
lessons of Korea: War and The Power of Man" in Korea And
The Theory of Limited W a r , op. cit., p. 82.
^Truman, ojo. cit., p. 4-57•
77 Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World
War II, o p . cit., p. 98.
^^Truman, ojo. cit., p. 459-
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The American people displayed
their dissatisfaction
■**«
with the Korean War in 1952, and elected a Republican
President, Dwight David Eisenhower.

The Republicans had

based their presidential campaign on Eisenhower's pledge
to the American people to end the Korean War if elected.
?
1
President Eisenhower, however,*>upon assuming office,
found, as had his Democratic predecessor, that the Communist
were reluctant to conclude the war.

The Eisenhower Adminis

tration, finally frustrated by the lack of progress achieved
at the negotiation table and irritated by the sporadic
Chinese Communist Offensives, .threatened the use of atomic
weaponry if a truce was not soon arranged. 79

Whether it was

the threat of an 'atomic attack, as Dulles and Eisenhower
believed,

RO

or whether it was the uncertainty that came over

the Chinese- and North Korean leaders because of a change in
Soviet leadership in 1953, or most likely a combination of
the two, nonetheless negotiations did take.on a different
nature with the Communists becoming more moderate in their
demands.

In late June 1953 an agreement was reached and a

truce signed at Panmunjom at July 27, 1953, ending all
military activity in Korea.
The armistice was almost disrupted by Syngman Rhee,
the leader of the South Korean Republic who insisted that
the conflict could not be settled as long as Korea remained
79

Por more detail see Rees, ojo. cit., pp. 417-420.

80Ibid., pp. 418, 420.
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divided, and thus refused to comply with any armistice
based on such a division.

Ehee's threats to resume the

conflict on his own, caused the United States and the
United Nations some anxious moments.

American desires to

end the confrontation forced it to "buy-off" Ehee.

In

return for Bhee's cooperation in complying with the truce,
the United States pledged itself "to train and equip a
South Korean army of twenty divisions, to extend some one
billion dollars in economic aid, and to conclude a mutual
security pact to protect South Korea against future
81
Communist aggression."

The mutual security pact with

the South Korean Government was ratified by the U.S. Senate
in January, 1954.
The armistice agreement of July 27, 1953 ended the
military conflict in Korea, but the political settlement
of the Korean question was left to be resolved at a later
diplomatic conference.
The Korean War had a profound effect on the world
leaders.

Heads of Government faced the reality of a global

power struggle between the United States and the Soviet
Union, as well as a revival of Chinese power.

Many came to

realize that in lieu of these world realities they must
re-evaluate their foreign policies.

The possibility of an

atomic war and consequently the possible annihilation of
world became very real.
81

If they were to insure their very

Davids, ojo. cit., p. 457.
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survival they realized they had to make every effort to
prevent a future Korea, for there was no guarantee that
the next time the two superpowers met, the conflict would
be a limited one.
American leadership, during the Korean War, had
built up very little credit for itself either in Europe
82
or Asia.
Initially most U.K. members were pleased and
impressed by the prompt American initiative in meeting the
Korean crisis, in defense of the principle of collective
security established in the United Nations.

Yet, as the

war continued, many of the members, especially the Arab
and Asian members, became disillusioned by American
motives and objectives.

More and more it became apparent

that American interests were taking precedent over United
Nations interest, when the two may have conflicted.

Neutrals

and alliance partners of the United States discovered that
there were disadvantages of following American decisions.
As for example, they found themselves in a war against
Communist China, even though it was not in their interest,
and they had expressed their desire to avoid it.
Unquestionably, the quick response by the United
States to the North Korean aggression -

thereby exhibiting

its determination to face up to the Soviet challenge, was
instrumental in preserving the then newly organized Atlantic
82

Cottrell and Daugherty, ojo. cit. , p. 91, Richard
Stebbins, The United States In World Affairs 1934, (New
York, 1956TJ p* 8.
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Alliance.

In fact during this^jperiod, the United States

increased its military assistance to the NATO allies,
and with the American leading the way the military strength
of the alliance was greatly strengthened.

Yet, while

American allies were impressed with American efforts in
}
Europe, these governments were not ple'ased with all of
American’s Asian policy.

Some felt that the United States,

by forestalling the "natural” integration of Eormosa with
the Chinese mainland and by the use of its powerful
influence to keep Red China out of the United Nations, was,
in part responsible for the continued state of tension in
the Ear East.8^
American 'prestige had declined especially in Asia
by the end of the Korean War.

Some Asians interpreted

American efforts to unify Korea by means of a military
victory, an act of white "imperialism", which caused the
devastation of the Korean peninsula.

The increased American

involvement in Indochina on the French colonist side, rein
forced these thoughts.

In noting the U.S. involvement in

Korea, Taiwan and Indochina, other Asians feared that the
United States had embarked upon a program in which small
Asian territories were to be used as pawns in America's
gigantic power contest with the Soviet Union.
On the other hand, the prestige of the Communist .
nations, the Soviet Union and Red China, was on the upswing

85Ibid., p. 91.
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in Asia at the end of the Korean War.

Many Asians, desiring

a quick end to the Korean conflict, were impressed with the
various Soviet efforts to conclude a truce in Korea.

These

efforts overshadowed the fact that the conflict was started
by a government whose troops were armed with Soviet weapons.
Peking's ability to fight the most powerful Western nation
to a stalemate commanded the respect of all Asian nations.
The United States emerged from its three year
struggle in Korea as a scared nation.

"Where it had once

felt itself as one of an alliance," after Korea, "it felt
84
85
alone."
As a nation it was "hurt and humorless."
Despite the fact that it had achieved its original objec
tive in Korea, having been denied a clear victory, America
lost much of its self-assurance.

The moral defeat incurred

by the Communists in Korea, increased America's determina
tion to stand up to the Communists to a point where it
was to evolve into an obsession.
American leaders then viewed China as the most
powerful ally of the Soviet Communist empire.

Communism,

therefore, came to be viewed as a monolithic threat with
Peking being an enemy in Asia of the same type as was the
Soviet Union in Europe.

This perception manifested itself

84

Edmund Stillman and William Pfaff, The New Politics,
(New York, 1962), p. 33.
8 5Ibid., p. 33Donelan,

0 £.

cit., p. 173.
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in the U.S.. post-Korean War policy..

Secretary of State

Dulles ■was to bring into operation in Asia the full appara
tus of European-style containment — "the. iron-clad military
resistance on the free world's borders with Red China, the
butteressing of Red China's neighbors with economic and
military assistance, .the building of perimeter alliances
ft7
and the rejection of diplomacy."
The military aspect of the containment policy, which
had begun with lATO, was reinforced during and after the
Korean War.

Collective defense alliances became the key

stone of American foreign policy in Asia.

During the Korean

War defense pacts were signed with the Philippines, Japan,
Australia and New Zealand, and another was concluded with
South Korea at the end of the war..

The war in Korea taught

the United States that "there must be no further power
vacuums into which the forces of Communist aggression could
move with impunity."

88

Even before the Korean War had ended,

American policy-makers, were attempting to apply this lesson
to Indochina..

871b i d p. 173:..
88 Thomas Mahoney "Lessons Prom Korea," The Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
July, 1951, Vol. 276, pp. 43-47.
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. CHAPTER III
CONTAINMENT IN ASIA
1954-1963
7
«

Up until the outbreak of the Korean War, as pre
viously noted, the policy of containment as an operative
policy pertained to Western Europe.

While Korea marked

the beginning of the United States' active pursuance of
the containment policy in Asia, it was in the post-Korean
period that the policy became clearly identifiable in its
Asian context.

Because containment has been and is the

fundamental theme of American foreign policy in Asia, every
Asian event dealing with either domestic affairs or exter
nal affairs, during the 1954-1963 period examined here, had
some affect on American policy.

The type of affect varied

of course with Washington's perception of the event's
importance with regard to American policy.

Therefore, a

precise study of the Asian version of the containment policy
would, in effect, involve a day-to-day account of all events
during this period, which had in any way, shape or form
some relation to it.
this dissertation.

Such a task is beyond the scope of
Rather, it will be the purpose of this

chapter to identify and examine the main elements or instru-

67
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merits of the containment p o l i c y as they pertained to Asia.'*'
during the ten year period 1954-1963 and to further attempt
an evaluation regarding the appropriateness or inappropriate
ness of such a policy in Asia.

Insofar as there are various

elements or instruments of the containment policy, the
discussion of containment in this chapter will accordingly
he divided into several subsections, each of which will
deal with a specific aspect of the policy.
The Legacy of the Korean War
"The Korean War left its mark not only on American
attitudes and policies toward China but also on United
States security strategy throughout all of Asia and the
2
Pacific."
Communist China's entry into the Korean War
greatly affected American perceptions of the Peking regime.
Prior to Red China's participation in Korea many American
officials had viewed it as merely an unfriendly nation, but
after Peking actively allied itself with North Korea, the
United States tended to view Peking as a violently hostile
3
and aggressive ally of the Soviet Union.
This American

^The discussion of containment in Asia in this
dissertation does not include the area of the Middle East.
American policy-makers have treated the Middle East as a
distinct area rather than as part of their Asian policy.
2
Blum, ojo. cit., p. 158.
3
Ibid., p. 158. While this view is not clearly
identifiable through the promouncements of the Truman
Administration, it is quite evident under the Eisenhower
Administration, led by Secretary of State John Poster Dulles.
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perception of a monolithic Communist threat gave impetus
to a series of security arrangements between the United
States and countries in the Pacific.

In the latter half

of 1951 American security treaties were signed with the
Philippines, with Australia and hew Zealand (ANZUS) and
with Japan.

While Australia and New Zealand had desired

a defense treaty with the United States because they wanted
American reassurance against a resurgent Japan, Washington
considered the treaty's chief value a defense against
Communism.^
Growing Involvement In Indochina
Immediately after the outbreak of the Korean War,
the United States accelerated its military assistance to
the French in Indochina.

Prior to that time overt American

support of the French in Indochina, appeared to be tempered
by a reluctance to be associated with what had been consider
ed a colonial war.

However, with the Worth Korean aggression,

the United States' view of the war in Indochina shifted to
become one of a definite struggle between Communism and the
"free w o r l d . A m e r i c a ' s interest and involvement in the

^Fred Greene, U.S. Policy .And The Security of Asia,
(Hew York, 1968), p. 21.
5See Chapter 2, pp. 11-12. Truman, Memoirs,
op. cit., p. 339.
^Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall eds., The
Vietnam Reader, (New York, 1967), p. 54.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

70

Ind.och.ina war increased during.,the period of its involve
ment in Korea, and was to continue after the Korean
armistice.

7

In fact, Indochina had become of such great con

cern to American leaders that President Eisenhower stated,
prior to the Korean armistice, that not only was peace in
Korea necessary but "no less importantly, an end to the
direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indochina....
For any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive
8
armies to attack elsewhere would be fraud."
In July 1953, when the Korean Armistice was finally
concluded, Indochina became the focal point of American
interest in Asia.

Eisenhower, himself, in the now famous

"domino theory," expressed the rationale for U.S. involve
ment in Indochina.

He stated that the "loss of all Vietnam

would have a disastrous material and psychological effect
on the security of nearby states, which might then topple
9
like a row of dominoes."
The Korean Armistice, therefore,
did not remove the conflict between the United States and
the Communist world in Asia; rather it "only shifted the
■
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The United States military assistance to the French
in Indochina increased from $119 million in 1951 to $815
million in 1954.
In addition the Associated States of Indo
china received approximately $25 million in economic aid.
Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, Volume II
Vietnam at War, (New York, 1 9 6 7 ) , p. 808.
8
Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 28,
April 27, 1953, p. 601.
Q
Greene, op. cit., p. 60.
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center of conflict from the napth to the south.”'*'0
By April 1954, the French military position in
Indochina had deteriorated to the point where defeat was
imminent, if it did not receive outside assistance.
Secretary of State John Foster Dullest aware of the French
plight in Indochina, wished to ash the"* Congress for a
joint resolution to permit the use of American air and
naval power in support of the French in Indochina.

Mr.

Dulles' desires, however, did not correspond with the
Congressional mood at the time, nor did it enjoy the
complete approval of President Eisenhower.

Both the Presi

dent and the majority of U.S. Congressmen,with the trauma
of Korea still lingering,felt that the United States should
not Become directly involved in another Asianwar.

This

Belief was reinforced By the fact that such unilateral Ameri
can action offered no guarantee of success But did carry the
risk of involving American ground forces at a latter date.
Dulles was instructed By President Eisenhower to consult
with American allies and find out which allies might assist
the United States if and when it decided to directly inter
vene in the Indochina War.'*'"*"

In diplomatic discussions,

■^Amry VandenBosch and Richard Butwell, The Changing
Face of Southeast Asia, (Lexington, 1966), p. 174.
o

"^Chalmers M. Roberts, "The Day We Didn't Go To War','
in Marvin E. Gettleman, ed., Vietnam History, Documents and
Opinions On A Major World Crisis, [Great Britain, 1966),
pp. 104-105.
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Dulles was unable to convince J;he chief American ally,
Great Britain, to assist the United States in such an
intervention.

The British Government made it perfectly

clear that it would not he a party to any such action,
because it felt that

such action would seriously impede

negotiations at the impending Geneva Conference.

12

Britain’s refusal to support American action coupled with
his personal doubts concerning the success of such an
intervention, apparently determined Eisenhower's decision
not to involve the United States directly in the war in
Indochina.

President Eisenhower in explaining his decision

stated:
If the United’ States sent its flag and its own
military establishment - land, sea or air into
the Indochina War, then the prestige of the U.S.
would be engaged. ... We could not afford thus
to engage the prestige of the United States and
suffer a defeat which would have world-wide
repercussions.
13
The French without the additional military assistance
were unable to hold their position in Indochina. 'In addition
to the steadily deteriorating military position, there was
mounting pressure on the French Government from its people
to end the war.

The French populace had grown weary of the

war after eight years of fighting with no prospect of
success.

The heavy strain that the mounting cost of the

war placed on the French economy was a further incentive to

12Ibid., p. 109.
1^
Victor Bator, Vietnam A Diplomatic Traged.y,
(Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1965), p. 220.
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the French government to seek an armistice.

While the

French wished to conclude an armistice, Secretary of State
Dulles encouraged the French to continue their battle
against the Communists.

Yet Dulles could not change the

French position, without a U.S. commitment to intervene
on France's behalf, which Eisenhower refused to make.
At the Geneva Conference, which had originally
been scheduled to deal with the Korean and Indochina ques
tions, the proceedings focused on achieving an armistice
in Indochina.
A settlement was finally reached which brought
about a cessation of hostilities.

Vietnam was divided

along the seventeenth parallel, with the Communist forces
of Ho Chi Minh controlling the Worth and the French con
trolling the South.

On either side of this line of demar

cation there was to be a buffer zone.

The division was to

be only a temporary situation, and two years after the
Geneva Conference general elections were to take place to
determine what government would govern a united Vietnam. 15
In addition, the nations of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos
were forbidden to participate in military alliances or to
14 Source for Geneva Settlement taken from The
United States In Vietnam, by George McTurnan Kahin and
John W. Lewes, Appendix 2, pp. 348-376, (U.S.A., 1967)
15

Chapter 4 deals with what did take place in
Vietnam after the Geneva Settlement of 1954.
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allow foreign powers to establish military bases on their
territory.

An International Control Commission"*"^ was

established to see that the provisions of the Settlement
were carried out.
The United States was not pleased with the final
settlement and expressed its displeasure by refusing to
sign the final declaration.

In fact, when it became clear

that "the solution that was being arrived at in Geneva
would not accord with the American concept of an acceptable
settlement," Secretary Dulles left the conference, before
the final draft of the Settlement had been concluded, and
turned over representation of the United States to Walter
.Bedell Smith. 17

Dulles stated that his absence was his

way of "disassociating the United States from the agree
ments because 'American public opinion would never tolerate
the guaranteeing of the subjection of millions of Vietnamese to the Communist rule.'"

18

Although the United States

refused to confirm the settlement in the end, its represen
tative did state that the United States "would refrain from

"^Members of the I.C.C. were Canada, India and
Poland.
17Kahin and Lewis, ojo. cit., p. 60.
18
Ibid., p. 60. Mr. Dulles' statement was mere
rhetoric for the United States continued to be represented
at the Conference. What in fact Mr. Dulles did do was to
disassociate himself personally from the Settlement and
not the United States.
later, in 1955 and 1956 Dulles was
to rely heavily on his contention that the United States
"disassociated" itself from the Settlement.
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the threat or use of force to disturb the agreements."'
Furthermore, in a warning addressed to the Communists,

Smith added that his government "would view any renewal
of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid Agreements
with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." 20
As soon as the Settlement produced in Geneva,
confirming the stalemate situation in Vietnam, became an
accomplished fact, American policy in Asia "turned into
a clear cut containment posture."

21

The Republican Version of Containment
The Republicans' professed foreign policy was one
of liberation, one described by the London Economist as a
policy which "means either the risk of war or it means
nothing."

22

Eisenhower, in deciding not to intervene in

the Indochina War with American military forces had dis
played his administration's desire to shy away from war,
19

Buttringer, ojo. cit., p. 840. While the United
States was to refrain from the use of force, it nonetheless
actively pursued policies which if they were not against
the letter of the settlement, ran counter to the spirit
of the settlement.
See Chapter 4.
2QIbid., p. 840.
21
Bator, ojo. cit., p. 224.

o

22

Cited in Hans J. Morgenthau, "John Foster Dulles"
in Norman A. Graeliner ed., An Underlain Tradition .American Secretaries of State In The Twentieth Century,
(New York, 1961), p. 293-
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at least as much, as the previous administration had.
Consequently, the policy of liberation was indistinguishable
25
from the policy of containment in operation.
Thus,
Secretary Dulles was to spend much of his tenure in office
(1952-1958) "trying to transfer the concept of containment,
which he had so vigorously denounced in Europe - but which
had been effective there - to Asia, where its deficiencies
became steadily more apparent."

24

Secretary Dulles' version of containment in Asia
stressed the military aspects of the policy.

25

Under his

guidance anti-communism became a blinding dogma, that was
reflected in the rigidity of his containment policy.

The

policy became devoid of flexibility even when wisdom
demanded it.

26

The Eisenhower Administration attempted to implement
a policy of containment in Asia, particularly in Southeast
Asia, although they were almost totally unprepared to tackle
such a task.

In contrast to their knowledge of Europe, its

people, condition and needs, prior to American involvement
there, American policy-makers committed the United States
in Asia, "knowing little about its people and their hopes,

25rbid, p. 293.
24
.Coral Bell, o j d . cit., p. 13525
Bator, op. cit., p. 227.
26Ibid., p. 228.
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their weaknesses and their strengths."

27

As a result of

American policy-makers lack of knowledge concerning Asia,
they tended to visualize problems in Asia on the basis of
analogies with the area they were better schooled in Europe.

However, "in the absence of firm ties and mutual

interests of the kind that had bound the United States and
Western Europe," containment in Asia did not rest on a
stable foundation.

28

While, both the United States and.

the nations of Western Europe visualized a common external
threat to Western European security, a key factor in
cementing their bonds of cooperation, in Asia there was no
agreement between the majority of Asia leaders and the
United States on what constituted the common threat. 29
"Eor most of the Asians the enemy was not Soviet military
might or ... the rising power of Communist China," as the
United States contended, "so much as the past colonial or
semicolonial domination of the West." 30

American policy

makers failed to realize that agreement on a common external
threat is an "indispensable condition for the success of
27

Edwin 0. Reischauer, Beyond Vietnam: The United
States And Asia, (New York, 1967), pT 57.
28
David Mozingo, "Containment In Asia Reconsidered,"
World Politics Vol. xix, No. 5, April, 1967, p. 362.
29
Notable exceptions were Nationalist China, South
Korea, Thailand and the Philippines.
30
•Reischauer, o j d . cit., p. 79
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policies, modelled on European-type containment."

31

In

fact, some Asians felt that U.S. policy was too closely
aligned with former colonial policies and therefore considered it a threat to Asian freedom and progress.

32

By 1954-, America's policy of containment had
clearly Become a policy predominantly military in nature.
Beginning in 1949, with the collective defense alliance
in Europe (NATO), followed "by the Pacific alliances in
1951,

33

and the alliance with South Korea in early 1954,

containment, as it evolved, had Become almost synonomous
with collective defense alliances.

After the United

States' jolting diplomatic defeat in Indochina in 1954,

'

' secure a
Secretary Dulles renewed earlier efforts 34 to
security plan for Southeast Asia to prevent any further
Communist expansion in that area.

In a press statement

on July 23, 1954, Mr. Dulles stated there were two lessons
which the free nations should learn from the Indochina
experience, namely:

"that resistance to Communism needs

popular support, and this in turn means that the people
31Monzingo,

ojd.

cit. , p. 365.

32 Stebbins, ojo. cit. , p. 6.
33 Referring to the alliances with Japan, 1951, the
Philippines 1951, and Australia and New Zealand (AUZUS),
1951.
34
Prior to the Geneva Settlement 1954 Dulles had
discussed with American allies the necessity of a security
alliance for Southeast Asia. At that time, however, Britain
refused, fearing that such an alliance might disrupt the
impending Geneva Conference.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79

should feel that they are defending their own national
institutions (and) that arrangements for collective defense
need to he made in advance of aggression, not after it is
under way." 35

The Republicans in formulating an Asian

policy were to concentrate their efforts 'on the second
lesson learned in Indochina at the expense of the first.
They failed to realize that any collective defense arrange
ment needs the popular support of the nations of the area
to be successful.

This failure is evident in the negotia

tions that preceded the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization.
Asian Attitudes Towards U.S. Policy
The United States proposal, after the Geneva Settle
ment, for a collective defense alliance in Southeast Asia
did not meet with much enthusiastic support in Asia.

As

already noted, many Asian leaders did not agree with the
United States' perception that Communism was the primary
threat to the independence of the Asian nations.

Therefore,

many Asian leaders did not believe that a military alliance
designed to protect Asian nations from Communism would be
of any substantial value in insuring the defense of their
own national institutions.

On the .contrary, it appeared

that some Asian leaders felt that a formal alliance with
a superpower (the United States) would be a greater danger
to their nations' independence than the nebulous threat of
35

Yandenbasch and Butwell, op.

cit., pp. 371-372.
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Communism.

4

"Because America was an atomic superpower whether
it denied it or not, Asians looked for ulterior motives and
devious intent Behind each American move?

36

The increased

activity of the United States in Asian; affairs after World
$

War II, in China, Japan, Korea and also its support of
the French in Indochina, did nothing to alleviate such
suspicions and in fact they Became intensified.

While the

United States explained its involvement in Asia on humani
tarian grounds that it was attempting to protect the
independence of Asian nations, some Asians interpreted
American action as that of a powerful outside force inter37
fering in their problems.
The disparity Between the
region-wide preoccupation of the United States and the domes
tic or national preoccupation of Asian nationalist leaders,
particularly in South and Southeast Asia, often made "mutual
7Q

trust difficult to establish and maintain."
Another reason why many Asian nations preferred not
to align themselves formally with the United States was that
•zg
Wayne Ayres Wilcox, Asia and United States Policy,
(Englewood Cliffs, 1967), p. 10.
37
large segments of the elites in India, Indochina
and Burma. K. P. Karunakaian, India In World Affairs 19501953, (London, 1958), pp. 251-252.
7Q
Roger M. Smith with assistance of Lionel Landy,
"Some Southeast Asian Views of American Foreign Policy," in
William Henderson ed., Southeast Asia: Problems Of United
States Policy, (Cambridge, Massachusetts^ 1963), p. 112.
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many of them felt "that involvement in the cold war would
divert their attention and energy from the internal develop39 ■
ment of their countries."
Prince Sikanouk of Cambodia
declared:
Por our part we believe we have the right, consider
ing the vital problems which beset us, to stay away
from the bloss and so-called "defensive" military
organizations which in practice often show themselves
to be of a nature which tends to draw peoples into
adventures which do not concern them, and where
they stand to gain little.
40
While Prince Sikanouk's statement concerned Cambodian
feelings, it is a fair description of the feelings of.many
other Asian leaders.
Several Asian nations, because of the aforementioned
reasons, and because of the fear of some Asian leaders that
a thoroughgoing Western or Communist alliance would encounter
opposition from important and vocal segments of their popula
tions, chose a policy of non-alignment.

However, during the

Eisenhower Administration Secretary of State John Poster
Dulles seemed to reflect the belief that non-alignment was
i m m o r a l . P r o m an American point of view at that time,
non-alignment "was against the best interest of the free
world,"

42

because the U.S. regarded neutral countries as

^ I b i d ., p . 124.
40Ibid., p. 125.
41 This American attitude seemed to change by late
1957. Beginning in 1958 American policy seemed to show a
greater toleration of non-alignment.
4^William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan and Constance
G. Coblenz, United States Poreign Policy 1945-1955,
(Washington, D.C., 1966), p. 453.
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constituting a dangerous power vacuum susceptible to
communism.

43

The non-aligned nations of Asia resented

Dulles' condemnation of their foreign policy position.
Prime Minister U Uu of Burma, in June 1955, declared that
The implication (of American policy) seems to be
that a nation which does not choose sides and
join irrevocably with one or the other camps
in the armed truce that exists in the world
today lacks courage and conviction. And very
often the inference which seems to be drawn is
'if you are not with us, then you are against
us.' And if you are not with us, you must be
either openly or secretly in tow with communism. 44
American policy-makers' condemnation of non-alignment
stemmed from the fact that they did not understand that
many Asian leaders, particularly in Southeast Asia, were
concerned with the conflict "between nationalism and imper
ialism and not (that) between Communism and freedom.
Although in reality both the Asians and the United States
sought a similar objective - the maintenance of Asian
national independence - because they differed concerning the
major, immediate source of the threat, they very often
differed on the type of policy to pursue in attaining their
objective.

Therefore, while the United States wanted the

Asian nations to join with itself and other Western allies
in a military alliance for the area, many Asian leaders
43

Roger Smith, ojo. cit., p. 117.
o

^ U Uu, An Asian Speaks, (Washington, 1955)
quoted by Roger.Smith, ibid., p. 118.
^Lennox A. Mills, Southeast Asia,
1964), p. 169.

(Minneapolis,
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resisted such efforts contending that "the developments
of major power groupings" would give rise to tensions,
which would impede Asian efforts in the pursuit of parti
cular ohjectives.^

Due to the differing views between

the United States and many Asian leaders, it is not sur
prising that the latter rejected alignment with the United
States and individually sought to curtail American presence
and keep the cold-war struggle from the area.
Pre-SEATO Negotiations
In the preliminary negotiations leading up to the
Manila

Treaty (SEATO), many differing views, concerning the

desirability of a collective defense alliance in Southeast
Asia, were expressed by the participants.
' f 1,1' '

During the nego-

- 4 7

tiations seven nations,

that were asked by the United

States to participate in the alliance, and had agreed to do
so, displayed such varying interests, that the final alliance
arrangement was to be greatly hindered as an operative force.
In fact, of the eight participating nations only the
United States, Thailand and the Philippines v/ere primarily
concerned with the Communist threat, which for the most part
had by now come to mean in practical terms the threat of

46

Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblenz, ojo. cit., p. 453.

47 Great Britain, Prance, Australia, New Zealand, the
Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan.
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/Q

Communist China.

Yet, even among these three nations the

perception of the nature of the threat differed somewhat.
Thailand’s neighbor, Red China, had emerged from the Korean
War as a formidable power and the Thais, feared they might
become "swallowed up" by this growing giant.

The Philippines,

because it had experienced Communist subversion, was there
fore very interested in curtailing future Chinese-sponsored
Communist activity.

However, the Philippines was already

an alliance partner of the United States and seemed to be
interested in the proposed new alliance more from the point
of view of a guarantee and reinforcement of the previous
U.S. commitment.

The United States, on the other hand, was

interested in furthering its containment policy by strangthening the regimes along the periphery of Mainland China.
The remaining five nations expressed interest in the
proposed alliance more from the point of individual interest
than a collective interest.

Pakistan envisioned the arrange

ment as being an instrument which would strengthen itself
militarily against its enemy, India.

Prance seemed interested

primarily because it desired to retain some influence in
Asia, if only in a limited capacity.

Great Britain still

had interests in Asia, especially in Malaya, and therefore
felt it should belong to any alliance which might affect
/Q

Communist China's activities were perceived to con
stitute the greatest immediate threat to Asia and world peace,
whereas the U.S.S.R., after Stalin's death was exploiting
with some success the theme of relaxation of tension and
peaceful coexistence.
Sabbins, The United States In World
Affairs 1954, op. cit., p. 28.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

85

these interests.

Australia's and New Zealand's interests

could probably be attributed primarily to those countries
increasing dependence on American defense commitments.
Neither country wished to jeopardize their relationship
with the United States and thus were willing to agree
with American desires.

Also, like the Philippines,

Australia and New Zealand viewed the proposed alliance as
a guarantee and reinforcement of the United States' exist
ing commitment to them established in ANZUS.
While during the preliminary negotiations various
reasons for the desirability of an alliance had been ex
pressed by the participating nations, many Asian leaders
expressed adamant opposition to the proposal.

What was

of particular significance was that jthe strongest opposi
tion came from the larger and more influential nations
in Asia - India and Indonesia.

Peking naturally, also

objected vigorously, but that was to be expected, since
the main objective of the alliance as far as the United
States was concerned, was the creation of an instrument
which would contain mainland China.
India's severe criticism of the proposed alliance
irritated Dulles.

He was fully aware that India's refusal

to join the alliance would greatly weaken the "grand design"
against Communism, he had envisioned.

India, in condemning

the plan so vociferously, was influential in discouraging
other Asian states from participating in the alliance.
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Indian Prime Minister Nehru stated that "the peace of
Asia should he maintained by Asians" and the proposed
American alliance would in no way help peacemaking in the
area but rather hinder peace.^
similar criticism.

Indonesia expressed

The United States, however, was deter

mined to secure a collective defense alliance in the area
and therefore continued to press its proposal, despite the
fact that Asian opposition would hinder the effectiveness
of the alliance.
Ultimately, in September, 1954, a conference was
held in Manila to draw up a collective defense alliance for
Southeast Asia.

Among the participants were only three

Asian nations, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines.

The

results of the recent war in Indochina had been a major
influence on the decision by American policy-makers to con
clude a collective defense alliance in Southeast Asia and
yet Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia were prohibited from
directly participating in the alliance.

According to the

provisions of the Geneva Settlement (1954), these nations
could not join military alliances.

Pormosa had not been

invited to participate, because the. British and Pakistanis
already recognized the Peking regime.

Japan, likewise,

had not been asked to participate due to the feeling of
mistrust that existed among many Asians toward Japan.
49

While

Amry Vandenbasch and Richard Butwell, Southeast
Asia Among The World Powers, (Lexington, 1958), pp. 298-299.
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many Asian leaders had voiced opposition to the very con
cept of the alliance, it was feared Japanese membership in
the alliance would reinforce their opposition.

In any

event Japan probably would not have accepted an invitation
to participate because Japanese public opinion would have
been against it.

India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia

refused to be members, preferring to maintain their nonaligned positions "in the conflict that centered between
the United States and mainland China." 50
SEATO
The final product of the Manila Conference was the
collective defense alliance known as the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization.

The alliance was extremely vague in

its overall presentation.

The varying interests expressed

by the members during the preliminary negotiations were
evident in the alliance's lack of "definiteness, cohesiveness and organization."

51

The heart of SEATO, signed on

September 8, 1954, is found in Article IY, paragraph 1.
It states:
Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of
armed attack in the treaty area against any of
the Parties or against any State or territory which
the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter
designate, would endanger its own peace and safety,
and agrees that it will in that event act to meet

50

Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy, 1945-1960,
op. cit., p. 95•
51Bator,

ojd.

cit., p. 166.
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the common danger in accordance with its con
stitutional processes.
52
The United States qualified its interpretation of
Article IV, by asserting that its obligations applied only
in the event of Communist aggression.

Secretary of State

Dulles had originally intended that this position would
be specifically stated in the text of the agreement, but
he was opposed by some of the other member nations expecially G-reat Britain and Pakistan.

Dulles was in no posi

tion to push his demands for the inclusion of the anti
communist clause.
In addition to Article IV, paragraph 1, which
states the main purpose of the Manila Treaty, there are
three other provisions which are of significant importance.
These three provisions concern, the problem of subversion,
the description of the treaty area, and a proclamation of
general principles.
The problem of subversion directed from outside and
indirect aggression are dealt with in Article IV, paragraph
2.

This provision calls for
... immediate consultation on the steps for common
defense if a party believed the political independence
or territorial integrity of any member in the treaty
area or designated state or territory was threatened
by other than armed attack or for any fact or situation
that might menace the peace of the area.
53
52

p* 3•

Treaties And Other International Act Series 3170,

(--z

Russell H. Pifield, Southeast Asia in United States
Policy, (New York, 1963), pp. 114-115.
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Action, however, could only be initiated at the invitation
or approval of the government concerned.
One of the basic problems or weaknesses of SEATO
is that the treaty's emphasis is placed on meeting overt
aggression rather than the threat of subversion.

It is

ironical that as the provisions were being formulated, the
Communist shifted their strategy and began concentrating
on subversive activity rather than overt aggression such
as they employed in Korea.

The SEATO Association is

legally restricted to consultation in combating subversion
and thus is not able to meet effectively what most observers,
including now American officials, consider to be the main
obstacle to peace in the area. 55
What has become, a most important provision of the
Manila Treaty, expecially as far as the United States has
been concerned, is the description of the treaty area.
The area is defined as:
... the general area of Southeast Asia,including
also the entire territories of the Asian parties,
(Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines), and the
general area of the South-West Pacific, not includ
ing the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes
(21°30') north latitude.
56
54

American analysis of Communist activity and intent
was not aware of this at that time.
^9A SEATO report for 1962-63 stated that subversion,
infiltration and local wars remained the principal tools of
the Communist in the treaty area. D.E. Kennedy, The Security
of Southeast Asia, (London, 1965), p. 161.
56

Cited in A Report by a Chatham House Study Group,
"Collective Defense In South East Asia," (Hew York, 1958),
p. 9. Parenthesis added.
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The treaty territory as defined excludes Hong Kong and
Formosa hut does include the protocol states of Laos,
South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The only changes that have

occurred concerning the treaty area, have been the removal
of the Federation of Malaya, through its decision not to
join SEATO after achieving its independence in August, 1957,
and the dropping of the protocol States of Laos and Cambodia.
Laos was excluded as a result of the Geneva Settlement of
1962, and Cambodia was excluded because of its expressed
desires not to be covered by the alliance.
A proclamation of general principals called the
Pacific Charter was included in the text of the treaty, at
the request of the Philippines.

The Filipinos, sensitive

to the criticism of some Asian leaders that SEATO encouraged
colonialism, felt that the treaty should make it clear that
participating nations in no way supported colonialism.

The

Pacific Charter in effect states that members "were seeking
the welfare of the Asian peoples and were not supporting
colonialism." 57

While the proclamation was an attempt to

squelch the critical Asian attitude toward SEATO, it also
left the door open to a possible future extension of the
Asian membership.

As an effort to stem Asian criticism,

the Pacific Charter failed.

The Asian opposition and

criticism that followed the signing of the agreement inten
sified.

U.K. Krishna Minon, Indian delegate to the United

57Fifield, ojo. cit., p. 115.
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Nations, denounced SEATO as "an incipient and embryonic
infringement on our peace area approach." 58

Indian Prime

Minister Nehru described the alliance as "diplomacy by
threats and an unwarranted intrusion into Asian affairs.
Nehru was especially embittered not so much by the fact
that the West discussed Asian problems of peace and security,
as that it had taken upon itself, without significant Asian
participation and despite Asian protest, the right to imple
ment what it perceived to be the proper solution.

The

Indian Prime Minister seriously believed that the alliance
would have the effect of halting "the process of calming
down" that had begun at the time of the Indochina Settlement
(1954) and that the alliance would in fact 'increase the tension and unrest in the world.

60

Despite the Pacific Charter,

as far as Nehru was concerned^ SEATO "stunk of colonialism".
Some observers have argued that SEATO was to some degree res
ponsible for Nehru's efforts to establish a closer relation
ship with Communist China at that t i m e . ^

However, since the

Panch Shila agreement between India and Red China preceded
the Manila Treaty it would appear that SEATO at most reinforced
58
Vandenbasch and Butwell, Southeast Asia
World Powers, op. cit., p. 502.

Among The

59Mills, ojo. cit., p. 166.
60
°
Vandenbasch and Butwell, Southeast Asia Among The
World Powers, ojo. cit., p. 302.
^ B r i a n Crozier, South-East Asia In Turmoil,
(Middlesex, 1968), p. 103.
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an already amiable relationship that was encouraged by the
U.S.-Pakistan military aid agreement of February, 1954-•
India was not alone in its dislike of SEATO.

The

Indonesian Prime Minister was so strongly opposed to the
Manila Treaty, that he immediately "suggested

an- all-

Asian alternative to SEATO's commitments to ensure peace
in the area."

62

His immediate proposal was a mutual non

aggression treaty with Communist China.

Fortunately .for

the United States the proposal did not receive sufficient
support from the other Asian nations.
SEATO's military capabilities to effectively meet
an act of overt Communist aggression are questionable.

The

consensus appears to be that the alliance could not ade
quately do so, without expanding the incident into a nuclear
holocaust.

However, a detailed discussion of SEATO1s military

structure and capabilities are not germane to this discussion^
What is relative here is that the correlation between the
distribution of power and responsibility, is close among
SEATO members,

(both being centered in the United States).

The military backbone of SEATO ultimately rests on American
nuclear weapons and thus is not properly equipped to meet
the challenge of guerrilla warfare.'
62

Vandenbasch and Butwell, Southeast Asia Among The
World Powers, ojo. cit., p. 302.
^ S e e Fifield,

ojd.

cit., pp. 113-157*

64Ibid., p. 121.
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The then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
believed that SEATO would be a vital instrument in halting
the spread of international communism in Asia.

Yet, "what

ever compatibility of interest that flowed from the American
desire for allies, and the Asian desire for American aid,
it did not cover the specific and crucial question of the
future of China."

65

The United States in return for the

inconsequential military support it received from Asian
members in SEATO, was to pay a high political price.

For

example, the United States in increasing the amount of
military assistance to Pakistan through SEATO, placed an
enormous military and financial burden on India, a nation
which, because of its greater size and strategic geographic
location, was of even greater concern to the United States^
While this is but one example, it is typical of the inherent
contradictions between America's Asian policy and the object
ives it sought to achieve.
Instruments of the Containment Policy
In December, 1954, the United States signed a defense
pact with Nationalist China.

This completed the American

alliance system in Asia, the revised Japanese-American securt
ity pace of I960 being the only alteration. Under the pro
visions of the U.S.-Nationalist China defense alliance, "the
65

Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy .1945-1960, op. cit.,

p. 96.
. ^ Ibid., p. 96.
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United States assumed the standard obligation to meet the
common danger of an armed attack in accordance with its
r-7

constitutional processes."

This agreement additionally

"provided for mutual help in resisting Communist subsersive
activities directed from without against either signatory's
territorial or political stability."

68

American alliance-building efforts in Asia, during
the 1951-1954 period, seemed to be based on the premise
that pressures from Peking and Moscow were and would be in
the near future the "primary and at times the only causes of
69
Asian instability."
One would further conclude that Ameri
can policy-makers at that time believed the thrust of such
outside pressures would be in the form of aggression rather
than subversive activities.

The fact that military alliances

comprised the largest share of American efforts to counter
Sino-Soviet pressures and the fact that the provisions of the
alliances emphasized the responsibilities of the members in
the case of "armed attack'^ while in dealing with the problem
of subversion members' responsibilities are stated in such
broad and vague terms as "consultation" and "mutual help",
lends credence to such a deduction.
Although military alliances were the primary instru67

Greene,

ojd.

cit., p. 80.

68Ibid., p. 80.
^Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy .1945-1960, op. cit.,
P- 95.
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ments of the United States' containment policy in Asia
during the 1954-1963 period, other instruments, especially
the diplomatic and external aid instruments, played their
part in the implementation of that policy, as the follow
ing two sections will show.

Dulles believed that the

cement for effecting cohesion (anti-Communism and pro-United
States) was "a shared ideology and economic and military
interdependence." 70
U.S. China Policy
The policy of containment in Asia, during this
period, became intertwined with and at times seemingly sub
ordinated to the United States' policy toward Communist
China.
The United States "recognition and support of the
government of the Republic of China on Taiwan, renewed and
reinforced as a result of the Korean War," became the major
element of its China policy during the 1950's and continues
to exist today. 71
Prior to the outbreak of the Korean War and for a
short time thereafter, John Poster Dulles advocated the
/ft
admipission of Red China into the United Nations.
In the
'i
book War or Peace written by Dulles, he stated that the
organization (U.N.) "will best serve the cause of peace
70
■Brown, ojo. cit. , p. 76.
.71 Blum, ojo. cit., p. 145.
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if its Assembly is representative of what the world actually
!
is, and not merely representative of the parts we like.”
Continuing, Dulles stated that if a government did establish
control, it "should be represented in any organization that
purports to mirror world reality,” therefore if the Peking
regime exhibited its control of mainland China, "then it ...
should be admitted to the United Nations."

72

Yet, Dulles,

while serving in the State Department during the Truman
Administration, was hesitant about the United States
immediately recognizing the Communist regime in China.

In

explaining his seemingly contradictory position, Dulles
declared "that every government should be tested over a
period of time in order to establish the fact of control."

73

After assuming the office of Secretary of State in the
Eisenhower Administration Dulles' position regarding Peking's
membership in the United Nations shifted.

While he contin

ued to maintain that "the U.N. should be constructed on a
universal base," Dulles qualified this position by stating
that "universality should not turn the United Nations into
74
an impotent organization."
Some political writers and
72

John Poster Pulles, War Or Peace (London, 1950),
pp. 190-191.
^Michael S. Guhin, "The United States And The
Chinese People's Republic: The Non-Recognition Policy Review
ed," International Affairs, Yol. 45, No. 1, January, 1969,p« 54.
74
Ibid., p. 56. Mr. Dulles obviously was referring
to the fear that the Peking regime would use its veto power,
which it would receive as a member of the Security Council,
to prevent the U.N. from performing any type of pertinent
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analysts claim that Dulles, as Secretary of State, adopted a ridgid
position against recognition of Peking and its membership of the U.N.
because that was the overwhelming opinion of Congressional members
and their constituents.

75

However, while there is no doubt that
*

Secretary Dulles necessarily took Congressional and public opinion
into consideration in formulating America’s China policy,

76

it is

important to note that Dulles personal beliefs coincided with public
opinion at the time.

It would seem to be a distortion of the facts,

therefore, to insinuate that Dulles'China Policy was due to the
pressures of public opinion.

Instead it would be more accurate to

say that the China policy was a reflection of Dulles’ convictions and
were supported by congressional and public opinion.
Early in 1954, the United States' policy toward Communist
China was officially described as "a middle one, calculated tolimit
the capacity of the enemy for further aggression and to build up
the strength of our friends 11 - a policy of "pressure and diplomatic
isolation" that would

function in maintaining world peace. Yet, considering the fact
that the Soviet Union already possessed such power, the addition
of a Chinese veto at that time would prove to be no greater hinderance
to the U.N. Today, when a Sino-Soviet split is evident and U.S.Soviet cooperation has steadily increased, the fear of a Chinese
veto in the Security Council is understandable.
75

Robert P. Newman, Recognition of Communist China?, (New York,
1961), pp. 1-15. Also see Guhin, op. cit., pp. 44-63.
76

Dulles was always conscious of Congressional opinion.
During his tenure as Secretary of State he strove to please the
Congress, always remaining aware of the fate suffered by his prede
cessor, Dean Acheson, at the hand of the Congress. Hans J. Morgenthaw,
"John Foster Dulles," Norman R. Graebner ed., An Uncertain Tradition
- American Secretaries of State In The Twentieth Century, op. cit.,
p . 292.
!
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"at least slow the growth of the war-making potential of
Communist China and retard the consolidation of its diplo77
matic position."
Therefore, by 1954,- the American policy
of not recognizing, the Peking regime and American efforts
to block Communist China from attaining U.N. membership,
were additional instruments being used to contain Communist
China.

Just as the military alliances were an effort to

contain Peking's territorial expansion, the former instru
ments were an attempt to contain Peking's expanding influ7ft

ence.

It would be much more reasonable to presume, there

fore, that Dulles pursued a policy of non-recognition of
Peking a,nd worked to prevent Peking from attaining U.N.
membership by design, rather than as a result of the pres
sure of th^ domestic public opinion.
Pollowing Dulles' retirement in 1958, his successor
Christian Herter maintained the same policy.

In 1961, there

seemed to be a shift in attitude on the part of President
Kennedy toward the possible admission of Peking into the
77

Statement made by Walter P. McConaughy, then
director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Department of
State Bulletin, Vol. 30, January 11, 1954, pp. 40, 42 cited
in Blum, ojo. cit., pp. 119-120.
7ft

Michael Edwards states that the American belief
that non-recognition is an effective instrument in blocking
Peking's attempt to extend Communist rule in Asia is a
myth.
It is similar to saying fire can be prevented from
spreading by denying that it is fire. Michael Edwards,
Asia In The Balance, (Baltimore, 1962), p. 183.
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Yet,, before this: apparent change in attitude was able

1Ui» mainfest. itself in II.S..policy,,Peking, .in: 1962, became involved
in ax harder: conflict with India.. Peking's militancy removed all hope of
the Ulnited States adopting a: more realistic-policy.

The Kennedy Am-

nrinistratinn knew that: the: American people would be in no mod at that
time to, accept a changer, i n .America'S China policy, especially one that
would have appeared to be favorable to Peking by the American people.
Having already, received; heavy criticism from the Congress and the American
public for the Bay ofPigsr fiasco,.the Kennedy Administraton did not feel
it could then pursue a policy which.would draw heavy critcism and op
position by Congress and the American people;
It is quite'apparent; however:^ 5 President Kennedy did not use the
policy at non-recognition and a policy of:blocking Peking admission to
the HT..FT.. as instruments: tor contain. .China as M r . Dulles had.

But in so

far as the policy did: not, changey.the rhetoric of containment was often
used as; a rationale..
Siho-Ameriiran; relations- fbcused durihg the 1950's and continue
to fauces today/ an: the- island of 'Taiwan. . InrPeking's view "Taiwan is
Chinese territory a n d the: 'liberation*’of.Taiwan and the defeat of the
national i st regime arec required too complete the unification of China."

79

As previously stated,, the United:States recognizes and supports the
nationalist Government on;Taiwan"asstheclbgal government of China.

Yet,

the United. States maiirteairs:- thatt theclegallstatus of Taiwan remains unset
tled*
T he Japanese Ffeace: Treaty effective :April 28, 1952, stripped Japan
of "all right,, title: and.claimssto Formosa and the Pescadores." It
did not,, however,, establish, present.or future legal rights in connection
79

A. Doak Barnett, "The United States and Communist China" in
Willard L.. Thorp e d . ,The: United States:And The Far East, 2 ed.,
((Englewood. Cliffs,. 1962) ,, p. .14-3, .
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with these islands.

fto

While both Mao Tse-Tung and Chiang Kai-shek are well aware of
the American position both point back to the Cairo Conference of 19^3 >
where the U.S. agreed that the islands should be returned to China.
O

“i

Therefore both insist that the area is indisputably a part of China,
and are determined that China should be united. . The United States
since the beginnning of the Korean War has stationed its Seventh
Fleet in the Taiwan Straits to avoid open confrontation between
Peking and the Nationalist regime, which might set off general war
in Asia.
On September 3, 195*+5 Communist artillery began a heavy shelling
of the off-shore island, Quemoy.

The Nationalists retaliated with

attacks on the mainland "but discontinued them about a month later,
evidently at American r e q u e s t . a result of the Communist
attacks and probably as part of an agreement with the Nationalists
to stop their attacks on the mainland, The United States signed a
defense alliance with the Nationalist regime.
In the three years following 195*+? Communist China’s attempts
to bring about the "liberation" of Taiwan were

'^Allen S. Whiting and Robert A. Scdlapino, "The United States
and Taiwan," in Thorp ed. Ibid.. p. 161.
8lIbid.. p. 161.
Qp
°^Harold C. Hinton, Communist China In World Politics. (Boston,
1966), p. 261.
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carried out for the most part through diplomatic means.
The Nationalist regime during this period built up its
military forces on the off-shore islands.

Chiang Kai-shek'

was skeptical of American intentions, because the United
States was carrying on ambassadorial discussions with
Peking in Warsaw.

The Nationalist leader feared that the

-discussions might lead to a "two China" arrangement, a
situation which he considered out of the question despite
the fact that such a de facto situation existed.

Continual

American statements emphasizing the fact that the U.S. was
arming the Nationalist Government only as a defensive mea
sure and thus by implication not as a supporting gesture of
Chiang1s desire to regain control of the mainland, intensi
fied C h i a n g ^ suspicion of the United States.

Chiang Kai-

s h e k ^ fear that American policy-makers did not support
his personal ambition of regaining control of the mainland
were entirely justified.

While the United States could not

officially advocate a "two China" policy because of domestic
pressures against such arrangement, it is clear that American
policy Was based on this strategy.

The United States, al

though it wished to eliminate the Communist control of the
mainland, was not prepared to risk an Asian war to achieve
this desire.

At the same time the United States had become

steadfast in maintaining Taiwan as part of the "free world."

^Communist China shelled the off-shore islands
briefly in 1956.
•

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

102

Taiwan had become strategically important to the American
defenses in Asia.
In 1955, President Eisenhower in a letter to
Winston Churchill concerning the Taiwan crisis, wrote:
We believe that if international Communism should
penetrate the island barrier in the Western Pacific
and thus be in a position to threaten the Philippines
and Indonesia immediately and directly, all of us,
including the free countries of Europe, would soon-be in far worse trouble than we are now. Certainly
the whole region would soon go. 84
America's support of the Nationalist regime thus was based
on Taiwan's strategic importance as a link in the United
States' island chain defenses and Taiwan's symbolic impor
tance in displaying to the "free world" America's determina
tion to halt Communist advances, rather than on the belief
that the Nationalist G-overnment was the legal and rightful
85
government of China.
U.S. efforts to prevent the Nation
alist Government from attacking mainland China seems to be
further evidence.
That the United States Taiwan policy has incurred
the wrath of the Peking regime is understandable.

Through

unilateral action the United States has prevented the Com
munist regime not only fron consolidating Taiwan, at one
oa

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate Por Change: The
White House Years 1955-1956, (New York, T 9F 3 , pp. 470-471.
OC
"President Kennedy especially alarmed Nationalist
Leaders by repeatedly referring to the 'defense of Taiwan'
and our commitments to 'the government and people of Taiwan.'
The term 'Republic of China' was Confined in usage mainly
to official documents and communiques." Allen S. Whiting
and Robert A. Scalopino, o j d . cit., p. 161.
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time part of China, under its control, but has actively
supported an alternative to the Peking regime.

Prom

Peking's point of view the survival of the Nationalist
Government is a threat to its own position.
The United States in its determination to contain
Communist expansion in Asia has complicated the settlement
of the Taiwan issue by placing it in the realm of the cold
war struggle.

Yet the United States seemingly has pushed

aside the feelings of the Taiwanese people in the formula
tion of their policy.

The native-born inhabitants consti

tute the vast majority of the population of Taiwan.

Despite

the fact that "mainlander refugees" and native-born Taiwanese
are both of the Chinese race, substantial cultural differences exist between the two groups.

86

"These cultural dif

ferences, reinforced by occupational and political dispar
ities, have presented a problem on Taiwan, albeit one not
07
openly discussed."
While the indigenous Taiwanese popu
lace has displayed signs of unrest, as long as economic
conditions remain reasonably good and some social mobility
is possible, mass revolt seems unlikely.

However, if the

United States officially pushes for a two China policy,
there is the possibility that "such a policy will exacerbate
political tensions within Taiwan, and may risk an upheaval
61 Communist." 88 At
that could only be of advantage to the
86Ibid., p. 162.
87Ibid., p. 162.
88Ibid., p. 179.
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present there does not appear to he any solution to the
Taiwan question which would he satisfactory to parties
concerned, hut the United States must become more aware
of the Taiwanese position, if the question is ever to be
resolved.
The U.S. China Policy, a central element in its
overall containment policy in Asia, is rejected by most
Asians.

Despite the fact that many Asian nations acknow

ledged a growing fear of Communist China during the 19541963 period, especially the latter part, most of these
countries maintained that the United States must face world
reality, and its China policy does not.

Some of the main

Asian complaints concerning the U.S. China Policy is that
it is too negative, and defensive, not to mention unrealis
tic.

For these reasons Asian nations refuse to support it.

And yet, the success of the containment policy is dependent
upon the cooperation and collective action of Asian nations.
Because non-Communist states in Asia favored a more flexible
realistic American policy toward China, a successful imple
mentation of containment was thus hindered.

In perpetuating

its myth-based China policy, the United States isolates
Taiwan from the mainstream of thought and action in non89
Communist Asia,
and fosters a situation of continual
potential crisis.
89

Chester Bowles, The 'China Problem; Reconsidered",
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 38 April, I960, p. 477.
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Foreign Aid In Asia
When the containment policy first became operative
in Western Europe, U.S. economic assistance, in the form
90
of the Marshall Plan, was the primary instrument.
In
Asia, American economic assistance has been, for the most
part, a secondary instrument in achieving containment
objectives.
During the Eisenhower Administration, U.S. foreign
aid to the countries of Asia was restricted.

While Presi

dent Eisenhower personally desired to cut down on the amount
of American foreign aid, he found it difficult to do.

He

came to realize that foreign aid was necessary "to support
/
Secretary of State John Poster Dulles' polico-strategic
,

drive to complete a ring of strong points around the
Communist bloc."

91

But, Secretary of State Dulles' preoccu

pation with the military aspect of containment and his per92
sonal prejudice against non-alignment
greatly influenced
the allocation of American assistance to Asian countries

90 This was to change, beginning in 1950 when NATO
became the prime instrument of containment in Europe.
91 Charles J.V. Murphy, "Foreign Aid: Billions in
Search of a Good Reason" reprinted in Harry Howe Ranson,
ed. An American Foreign Policy Reader, (New York, 1965),
p. 372.
92
By 1958 Dulles' position on non-alignment shows
signs of toleration.
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while he was in office.

It was Dulles' opinion that

... economic aid to nations not militarily allied
with the United States was an extravagance (the U.S.)
could not afford; that such nations were essentially
hostile to (the U.S.) purpose anyway, seeking to
embarrass (it) and to play off East against West
for their own material gain; that many of these
new nationalistic regimes were more interested
in following "socialistic" models of development,
and thus had ideological leanings toward the "other

Wet United States G-overnment
Foreign Assistance
(In U.S. $ millions)
Country
1955A)
1959
1963
Ceylon
4
19
(1)
India
118
320
736
Wepal
2
14
3
*Pakistan
142
378
67
Burma
10
14
(1)
Cambodia
28
21
20
*Taiwan
86
109
74
Indonesia,
9
17
77
*Japan
48
65
33
*Republic of Korea
232
279
231
**Lao s ,v'
35
37
31
Malaipia
5
(1)
(1)
*Philippines
21
8
24
*Thailand
16
48
29
*Vietnam
210
203
177
*U.S. allies
** Laos neutralized 1962.
(1) less than $500,000
Source:

A) Statistical Abstract of the United States 1952,
(Washington, 1963), pp• 8^5-867.
B) Ibid., 1963, pp. 860-861

U.S. Foreign Assistance
Commitments Under Economic and Military
Assistance Programs
(In U.S. $ millions)
Year
Economic
Military
1955
1,821
2,396
1959
1,916
2,110
1963
2,296
1,810
Source:

Statistical Abstract of the United States 1964,
(Washington, 1964), p. 859.
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side" in the Cold War despite their pretentions
of non-alignment; and finally if (the U.S.)
discounted these ideological incompatibilities
and extended aid, most of the would-be bene
ficiaries lacked the administrative and tech
nical talent, economic structure, and will to
make significant gains with the additional
capital.
94
It is often difficult to clearly distinguish between
military assistance and economic assistance in the American
foreign aid program.

A division, therefore, into the two

categories of military assistance and economic assistance
is not particularly enlightening and more often than not,
confusing.

It is important, however, to distinguish

between what Arnold Wolfers refers to as "short-run aid,
military or economic, both being in the field of defense
broadly conceived, and economic development aid that will
bear material fruit at best after two or three decades." 95
During the Republican Administration not only was the largest
part of U.S. assistance to Asia sent "to increase defense
capabilities in countries on the southern and eastern borders
of the Soviet Union and Communist China," but the amount of
"military assistance and that part of economic aid, which
finances defense support or other security objectives, were

94
Walter W. Rostow, The United States in the World
Arena, (hew York, I960), pp. 364-65. Also see Brown,
op. cit., pp. 100-101.
95

Arnold Wolfers, "Questions of Priority in Mutual
Security Allocation," in Ransom op. cit., p. 419.
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roughly double the level of developmental a i d . " ^

Yet,

while the major portion of American assistance to Asian
nations was designated to build military defenses against
Communism, the major problem faced by most Asian leaders
was that of economic development.

The Indonesian Ambassa

dor to the United States, Murkarto Natowijdo, in 1954,
discussing Asian problems stated:
The significance of the danger is inherent in
the failure of economic developments ... to keep
pace with those in other parts of the world is
not fully appreciated by the West.
The emphasis
of the Western Powers has been on achieving a
military balance of power.
97
Most Asian leaders, even some of those allied to the United
States, agreed with Natowigdo's assessment.

98

American aid

programs, because they were not directed toward what most
Asians agreed was the major problem of the area, disappointed
many Asian leaders, alienated others and produced some
results no one wanted.

99

The United States in viewing Communism as not only
96

Joan M. Nelson, Aid, Influence and Poreign Policy,
(New York, 1968), pp. 20, 4.
97
Vandenbasch and Butwell, Southeast Asia Among The
World Powers, op. cit., p. 31398 In 1956 the Thai press strongly criticized the
predominately military emphasis of U.S. aid programs.
Thailand
was at the time and continues to be today one of America's
staunchest supporters in Asia. Stebbins, The United States
In World Affairs 1956, op. cit., p. 131.
99 Henry J. Reuss, "The U.S. Poreign Aid Program: An
Appraisal," The Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, July, 1961, Vol. 3 3 ^ pp. 23-29,- pp.24-25.
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the primary but virtually the absolute enemy in Asia, gave
its assistance to any government, even a reactionary one,
when it was or appeared to be the only alternative to
power in the hands of men orientated toward Communism.
Asian leaders desiring American assistance ironically dis
covered that a noisy Communist minority "was an absolutely
invaluable natural resource."'^'*'

Indeed, Chester Bowles

has stated that "the unearthing of a local Communist under
ground might be expected .. to produce more American dollars
102
than the discovery of oil or uranium."
As a consequence ,
a government in powei; as a means of obtaining aid,would fre
quently exaggerate the danger of communism within its border.
In making a declaration of anti-Communism a major
criterion for the granting of assistance, the United States
found itself at times supporting a despot or a military
oligarchy, W'hile at times "a despot or military oligarchy
was the only possible alternative for the exercise of
power, excluding Communist or radical reformers," American
policy-makers restricted their own choices by "equating
radical reformers with Communists."

103

American support for

■^^Raymond Aron, "Reflections on American Diplomacy,"
Daedalus, Journal of American Academy of Arts and Sciences,
Vol.
91, Rail, 1962, pp.715-32, p. 724.
■^■^Department of State Bulletin, Vol.
1963, No. 1251, p. 940.
102
u Ibid. , p. 940.
103

Aron,

ojd.

48, June 17,

cit., p. 724.
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autocrats,.. because; they declared themselves to be antiOkrnTmi-ntBt:,. often meant,in .reality, that the United States
was- supporting a irresponsible and corrupt regime that had
littLe support, from., its. people,.as in. .the case of Syngman
Ehee in. Korea,. General Khourni. Nasavan in Laos and Ngo Dinh
Uiem in. SBanth: Vietnam.. When indigenous forces rose up to
oppose these type governmentsAmerican "support of these
gpTOmments. became a powerful- issue.around which to organize
GEppusitibn.1^ 0^

The- United States, .thus, found itself, at

times;,,, being considered: by -some.nationalist groups, the
aliTy of reaction, and: the. enemyt of progress.
Asian. nationalists

Because some

viewed, theeUnited.States as an impos

ing farce perpetuating an unsatisfactar3r status quo, they
often allied themselves. with.theCommunists in an effort to
105
sweep) aw^r hath, thee United:;Statessand:the unhappy past.
TThe United: States,, confusing, all.'.discontent and disorder
with. onfstideE aggression-. orr polit i callsubvers ion,aided -effort s
to suppress: these, nationalist.group a t ■times and,- therefore,
was responsible:- in: part: fbrr increasing,the Communist appeal
in that area.. In: T93W,.eighttUVSS .Senators in a letter to
the Eresideni expressed theirrfearrthat American military
assistance to: Asia. was: inc re as ing ^rathe r than decreasing
the problems, in. that, are an. Iitwasstheir opinion that the

■^^Sfenator: Edward ML...Kennedy., .Decision Bor A Decade,
((Garden City.-,. 1968).,. p...152..
105

South Vietnam is an excellent example.
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Ill
United States,by contributing to the maintenance in power
"of regimes which have lacked broad support within their
countries," by creating "a militaristic image of the United
States," and by "perpetuating military hierarchies" in Asia,
the United States has at times endangered "the very value
of individual freedom which (it) seeks to safeguard.
American defense assistance was intended to promote
stability and security in Asia.

In this sense it can be

said to have defeated its own ends."

107

Not only was such

assistance manipulated by some regimes, to secure their
own power at the expense of people, but excessive militar
ization placed a great burden on the economics of these
weak nations, in need of economic development.

Still an

other adverse affect of American stress on military assis
tance was that it aroused fears in neighboring non-Communist
neighbors, excerbating relations between neighbors by altering the local balance of power.

108

At the same time,

relations between some of these non-Communist nations and
the United States were strained, thus, promoting relations
between these nations and China, because it was an alterna
tive .

"^^Wolfers, "Questions of Priority in Mutual
Security Allocation," o j d . cit., p. 418.
107
D. E. Kennedy, o j d . cit. , p. 250.
108Bium5
cit., p. 174. Arnold Wolfers, "Ques
tions of Priority in Mutual Security Allocation," o j d . cit.,
p. 424. D.E. Kennedy, o j d . cit., p. 250.
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President Kennedy, noting the importance of econ
omic development in these underdeveloped nations, pursued
aid programs in most Asian countries which emphasized
developmental aid rather than military aid.

Yet, his

Administration could not, through aid programs, remedy the
deficiencies caused by some recipient nations' own unsound
fiscal or economic policies.

On the other hand, the United

States continued to run the serious risk of being viewed
as an imperialist nation, whenever it took any initiative
in sponsoring internal changes in Asian lands.'109
Contradictions in the Asian Containment Policy, 1954 - 1963
Walter Lippman, in an article in the hew York HeraJLd
Tribune, described the American position in Asia in 1961
in this manner:
The revolutions in South Korea and Iran, following
the disorders in Laos and South Vietnam are a
warning that in Asia the policy of containment by
American satellite states is breaking down.
In
all four of these countries the governments have
been (U.S.) clients, indeed they have been (U.S.)
creations. All of them are crumbling for the
same reason.
In relation to the popular feeling
of independence and the rising popular expecta
tion of material welfare, these American client
states are not only corrupt but they are intoler
ably reactionary.
The fact that they are also
under the protection of a foreign and non-Asian
power is an additional liability. 110.
109 Testimony of Edwin Reischauer, Hearings Before The
Committee on Foreign Relations Januahy 31, United States
Senate, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, "Asia, The Pacific
and the United States) (Washington"^ 1967), p. 8.
^Walter Lippmann, New York Herald Tribune, May 18,
1961 reprinted in Chang Hsin-hai, America and China: A New
Approach to Asia, (New York, 1965), p. 257.
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Mr. lippman perhaps exaggerated the situation, but he did
amply point out some of the adverse effects America's Asian
policy had wrought, as well as some possible explanations
for their occurrence.

The main thrust of Mr. lippmann's

criticism was directed at what was the main handicap of
America's Asian policy - it often went against the grain
of Asia's most potent force, nationalism.

In so doing a

successful containment policy not only became impossible,
but opposition to the United States often became the
logical consequence.
In pursuing the policy of containment in Asia, the
United States, a superpower, was pursuing its global interest.
Secretary of State John Poster Dulles and his successors
followed a policy of military containment in China because
they believed it was in the interest of the free world.

Por

most Asian nations, however, their prime concern was with
local objectives, and they, therefore, "formulated policies
of purely national character, often designed to improve
their internal conditions and create modern social struc
tures."'^"*'

Because U.S. interests and Asian interests at

times were perceived to be different by the respective
parties and because the individual .interests among Asian
nations also at times differed and were sometimes opposing,
any attempt to unite these divergent attitudes and interest
into an anti-Communist coalition was almost an impossible
111

Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblenz,

ojd.

cit., p. 455*
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feat.

The United States failed to unite the majority of

Asian nations in an anti-Communist coalition, and its
policies served the Communist purpose.

SEATO, America's

China Policy and its Poreign Aid Programs had divisive
effects.

Asian nations who allied themselves with the

United States tended to become isolated from the rest of
Asia while various non-aligned countries were pushed toward
the Communist bloc as the only alternative to American .
112
dominance.
Even after the Communist Chinese adopted a
more militant Asian policy, which aroused fears in all
the Asian nations, most Asian nations still were unwilling
to ally themselves with the United States, because its
policy of military containment had already displayed so
many shortcomings that it offered no reasonable alternative.
While American policy-makers generally did not
understand why Asian leaders refused to adhere to the
American policy, Soviet Premier Khrushchev in a speech in
1955, expressed the reasons quite accurately.

He stated

that the United States was attempting
... to push ... (the peoples of Asia) off the path
of peaceful development and on the path of militari
zation and preparations for new war. It is this
purpose, incidentally that lies behind all kinds
of military pasts and blocs knocked together in
South-East Asia and the Hear East and in other
areas of the world. They arouse the justified
suspicion of the peoples of Asia, because sponsor
ing them are the forces which at one time
implanted and defended the colonial order.
113.
112
113

D. E. Kennedy,

ojd.

cit., p. 235.

Reitzel, Kaplan, Coblenz,

ojd.

cit. , p. 415.
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While Khrushchev's statement naturally distorted American
intentions, it does describe the impression many Asian
leaders held about American policy.
Defenders of the United States containment policy
in Asia, constantly point out the fact that Communist China
did not expand territorially, with the exception of Tibet.
However, they fail to mention the fact that during the
same period, 1954-1963, Chinese influence in North Korea,
North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Nepal, Burma and Pakistan
increased. 114

They also fail to mention that a policy

directed against Red China is not effective in prohibiting
adventures by second or third level powers seeking to alter
existing situations and it is equally ineffective in pro
hibiting internal conflicts.

In fact, the United States

because of its many commitments continually faces the
prospect of being drawn into local or internal conflicts,
which many feel is the case today in Vietnam.
The United States, for all its intensive involvement
in Asia during the 1954-1963 period, was not able to insure
Asian stability.

Its policy which was intended to maintain

an international status quo, evolved into a policy that
often protected an unsatisfactory internal status quo, while
Asian nationalism demanded a new and acceptable order.
o

114

Vidya Prakash Dutt, China And The World: An
Analysis of Communist China's Poreign Policy, (.New York,
1966), p . 36.
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Containment, therefore, did not alleviate Asian problems and
may have compounded them, and yet, Asian progress and
stability is a prerequisite for any policy which attempts
to prevent the expansion of Communism in that area.
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CHAPTER IV
VIETNAM

Hans J. Morgntb.au has stated that the United States
is "militarily engaged in Vietnam by virtue of the basic
principle of its foreign policy that was implicit in the
Truman Doctrine of 1947" and followed by each successive
administration.1
of communism.

This basic principle is the containment

Eormer President Johnson confirmed this

fact in a major policy speech on Vietnam in 1965.^

Amer

ica's present tragic involvement in Vietnam is thus a
consequence of its containment policy in Asia.

It is

due to this fact that the present war in Vietnam has stirred
many leading men, both in government and in academic circles,
to question not only the Americanization of the Vietnam War
but also almost all aspects of America's containment policy
in Asia.

It, therefore, seems most appropriate to devote

the last chapter of this thesis to a case study of American

■*"Hans J. Morgenthau, "We Are Deluding Ourselves in
Viet-Nam," New York Times Magazine, April 18, 1965 reprinted
in the Viet-Nam Reader, op. cit., p.' 37.
2
See Lyndon B. John, "Speech §,t John Hopkins Univer
sity," Department of State Bulletin LVI, April 26, 1965,
pp.

606-610.
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involvement in Vietnam.
Vietnam was temporarily divided into two zones, at
the conclusion of the Erench-Indochina War in 1954.

This

division, according to the settlement reached at the Geneva
Conference (1954), was to he resolved by the Vietnamese
people in general elections to be held in 'July, 1956.
luring this two year interim, however, the United States
went about creating an independent anti-communist state
in the southern half of Vietnam.

The United States design

ed a two-pronged plan to achieve this situation.

One prong

consisted of the Manila Treaty (SEATO), initiated by the
United States following the Geneva Agreements that granted,
in effect, "protection in advance to the southern regroup
ing area against any attack by indigenous forces based in
the other half of the same country."4

The other prong was

the United States' efforts to build a political entity in
South Vietnam.

To further its objectives the United States

launched a massive program of economic assistance to South
Vietnam and "started to retrain and reorganize the South
Vietnamese army," under the leadership of its "hand-picked"
5
candidate, Ego Dinh Diem.

3George McTurnam Kahin and John W. lewis, ojo. cit.,
p . 68.
4Ibid., p. 63.
5
Edwin 0. Reischauer, ojo. cit., p. 25-
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American policy-makers apparently were determined
to prohibit the Communist-from gaining control of all of
'Vietnam, for despite the Agreements decided upon at the
Geneva Conference, the United States, through unilateral
action, went about making the seventeenth parallel a
permanent division.
held in 1956.

The reunification elections were not

Diem, with full American support, refused

to allow South Vietnam to participate in such elections,
stating both that his government had not signed the Geneva
agreements and that the absence of all liberty in North
Vietnam made the question of electoral and pre-election
g
campaigns practically unattainable for the moment.
In
fact, however, the main reason Diem and the United States
did not want the elections to take place was simply that
Ho Chi Minh would have easily won the election and therefore
his regime would have become the ruling government of all
Vietnam.

(The Communist belief that reunification elections

^U.S. Senator Ernest Gruening and Herbert Wilton
Beaser, Vietnam Eolly, (Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 165.
Assistant Secretary of State Walter S. Robertson defending
Diem's failure to agree to hold reunification elections told
a group of Americans that such elections should not occur
because of "crimes against suffering humanity committed by
the Worth Vietnamese.' He went on to charge the Northern
regime of having "sold their country to Peking." Marvin E.
Gettleman ed. , History, Documents, and Opinions on a Ma,jor
World Crisis, (England,1965), p . 170.
7
David Schoenbrun, Vietnam How We Got In, How To
Get Out, (New York, 1968), p"! 4^7 See also Reischauer,
op. cit., p. 25. Gettleman, o j d . cit., p. 171.
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would be held in Vietnam, and that Ho Chi Minh would emerge
victorious, seems to have been a major factor in their
agreeing to the armistice in 1954).

When it became apparent

that Diem would not abide by the Geneva Settlement, refusing
to hold reunification elections, the North protested the
violation to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, but
found little satisfaction.

The Co-Chairmen seemed to be of

the opinion that as long as no hostilities had taken place,
it would be unwise to press the issue.

Ho Chi Minh, then

appealed to Communist China, but like Britain and the Soviet
Union, the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, Peking in
dicated that "they were more interested in the maintenance
18
of peace than in reunification elections in Vietnam.

With

out the backing of the two leading Communist nations, North
Vietnam could do little; it was in no position to take on
what in effect was the United States and its vast power
q
alone.
The Eisenhower Administration's decision in 1954 to
create a separate independent state in South Vietnam, des
pite the fact that such action was contrary to the spirit
of the Geneva Agreement, was due in part to domestic pres
sures.

The United States at that time was still gravely

concerned and disillusioned by Senator McCarthy's charges
of a "global communist conspiracy."
8

Gruening and Beaser,

ojd.

£dd to that some

cit., p. 167.

9Ibid., p. 167.
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dissatisfaction with, the stalemated conclusion of the Korean
War and it becomes apparent that "it would have been politi
cal suicide for Eisenhower to appear to be appeasing the
Communists," in Indochina.

Eisenhower-and Dulles were

fully aware of some of their Republican cohorts charges
against the previous Democrat Administration for "losing
China," and did not want to risk a similar fate, accusing
their Administration of "giving Indochina to the Reds."'*'"*'
Dulles, because of his personal convictions and the atti
tude of the Congress, left the Geneva Conference early in
the proceedings, in an effort to disassociate himself and
the Eisenhower Administration from "negotiations which were
likely to result in an armistice involving concessions to
Asian Communists." 12

Furthermore, the Administration re

fused to give even its oral assent to the final declaration
of the conference.

Despite the Administration’s efforts to

disassociate itself from the Geneva Settlement, it did not
escape unscathed.

Some Congressional disapproval of what

they considered an unfavorable settlement, was heard none
theless.

Senator Jenner appraised what had occurred in

Geneva thusly:
■*"^Schoenbrum,

ojd.

cit.,

p.

43.

U Ibid., p. 4312
Donald lacater "Power Politics At The Geneva
Conference -1954". The selection is from The Emancipation
of French Indochina, (hew York, 1961), pp. 313-26, 332-37
in Gettleman o j d . cit., p. 129. However, Walter BedellSmith, the Under Secretary of State, was left behind to
lead the United States delegation.
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The United States has been out-thought, out-traded,
and out-generaled. ...
It does no good to say we did not physically sign
the Geneva agreements.
That is an old excuse of
Pontius Pilate, who washed his hands to keep his
conscience clear. 13
Senator Jenner, if he had criticized Secretary Dulles'
personal behavior and lack of diplomacy at the conference,
would have been justified.

But it is very doubtful whether

the United States would have been able to achieve a more
satisfactory settlement in Geneva. ^

On the other hand,

because the Geneva agreements were not to the Eisenhower
Administration's liking, the Eisenhower-Dulles team went
about altering the settlement.
After the deadline for reunification elections had
passed without either ballot or undue incident, American
policy in Vietnam up until 1961

15

was one of continuous

13

Bernard B. Balls, The Two Viet-Nams, second revised
ed., (New York, 1967), p. 253.
■^Bedell Smith, upon his return to Washington stated:
"I am ... convinced that the results are the best that we
could possibly have obtained in the circumstances.
...
diplomacy has rarely been able to gain at the conference
table what cannot be gained or held on the battlefield."
Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs 1954, op. cit.
p. 255.
"^Bernard K. Gordon chooses the year 1962 as the one
in which Vietnam became of paramount importance. He goes on
to state that up until that time "the United States had not
yet made any suggestion that its role in Asian security was
inextricably linked with its ability specifically to prevent
South Vietnam from being absorbed by the Hanoi Government."
Whatever U.S. commitment to South Vietnam that did exist up
until that time was an incremental combination of specific
commitments. Bernard K. Gorden, Toward Disengagement In Asia,
A Strategy for American Eoreign Policy, (Englewood Cliffs,
1969), pT 24.
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aid: ±331 support off the. anti-Communist ruler, Diem.

During

this: period American policy-makers apparently did not see
the.- ne.e.d to reexamine their policy, despite growing evi
dence of Diem''s.. tyrannical rule and the. growing numbers
among; the, Sbuth.Vietnamese population opposed to his
regime..
By: X9.6X,when President Kennedy took office, the
condition o f the. Diem .regime had seriously deteriorated and
w a a getting worse..

Relations, between the Diem Government

and. the1 United States had become:strained during the pre
vious: year;.

The. American. Ambassador to South Vietnam had

carried so many, messages., of.disapproval from the United
States,, that: Diem no: lbnggrrwelcorned h i m . F o l l o w i n g an
attempts d coup d 'eiat.in.Novemberj .1960, "things had gotten
even.: worse,, ,P'Pi 'em, believing that:the American Ambassador
had. previous: knowledge: of .the attempt and did not warn the
regime..X77 President: Kennedy,, .uponi.assuming office, appointed
a n e w Atoba^adhr-to: StethhVietnamiwith the hopes "of restor
ing goad relations: with::Diem" nand :at the same time "attempt
ing to: influences him:, toward: concessions that would bring his
regime wider’support: fro nr:within ..Vietnam and make it politi
cally easier f o r the-United States to give him aid he
THE

requested.."'

^ H o g e r Hilsmar,.To Move A Nation,
mSlO)„ pp.. 4X9,-420..

(Garden City,

I7Ibid., p. 420.
*^Tifciid..,, pr.. 420..
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During the first year of the Kennedy Administration,
while the President gave the impression that he believed
much of the opposition the Diem regime faced was due to
Diem's own mistakes, the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, was
speaking of "the determined and ruthless campaign of propa
ganda, infiltration and subversion by the Communist regime
in North Viet-Nam to destroy the Republic of Vietnam."

19

It is particularly interesting in this connection to note
that Rusk had been Assistant Secretary of State for Par
Eastern Affairs during 1950-1952, under the Truman Adminis
tration.

It was at this time that the United States began

to view the Viet Minh resistance to the Prench "as part of
the international aggressive Communist movement of conquest,"
rather than primarily a colonial war.

20

It is curious that

even as early as 1950 Mr. Rusk failed to take into account
"the strong nationalistic motivations of the Vietnamese
people," in assessing the Vietnam situation.

During the

Pirst Indochina War and later as Secretary of State, Dean
Rusk continually seemed to have formed his opinions on Viet
nam on the basis that Ho Chi Minh was a Communist and therefore
21
was "being told what to do by Peking and Moscow."

■^Secretary Rusk's New Conference of November 17,
1961. Reported in U.S. Senate Committee on Poreign Relations,
Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam,
2nd rev. ed., 89th Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 87.
20

•Gruening and Beaser,

ojd.

cit., p. 201.

21Ibid., p. 201.
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Bhring 1.961 President Kennedy, moved cautiously in
developing his Vietnam policy,, "appreciating the internal
aspects of the conflict,."" and. becoming increasingly fearful
that the- United States "might be following the same disastrous path" the. Prench.had previously taken.

22

In

(October 1961,. the President: sent: Maxwell Taylor and Walt
Rostow: to Vietnam to find out "Whether Vietnamese national
ism hah turned i'rre.v.ocably against (the United States)" or
■whether it might: still "herve as. a. has is for the fight
against ■Communism.."'23

Kennedy,. ih.aftempting to evaluate

the true state ccf affairs: in: Vietnam.:,was constantly remind
ed of his awn fact-finding mission.to Vietnam as a Senator
in 1.951-

At that. time. Kennedy had concluded that the Prench

■were net being; successful, because- they had been unable to
gain the- support of. the Vietnamese: people.
Fcrticeably- missing: from the:Taylor-Rostow mission
was any ranking; member' oil thee States Department.

Roger

Bill smar „ who. ini the latterr-parte off thee Kennedy Administra
tion became Assistant Secretary■offState.for Par Eastern
Affairs,, stated: the: reason.was. that; .
he ((Rusk:)) did note want: thee State :Department to
piE^y a prominent rolee in: thee upcoming decisions

M c h m a a : Kb hen: and fJo hr.,W. lewis, op. cit.,
m>- 1^7/’
—I2&-.

■'Arthur- M.. Sehlessiiige r;.A-1.Thou sand Days: John P.
Kennedy in the: White- House.,. (Boston^.1965)~, p. 545. Maxwell
Taylor at the time was a general: in. the U.S. Army and Walt
Rostow a White House aid.
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on Vietnam. For he regarded Vietnam as essentially
a military problem even though a number of his
colleagues in the State Department disagreed.
24
Considering Secretary of State Rusk's views on
Vietnam and the lack of proper State Department represen
tation on the Taylor-Rostow fact-finding mission, it is
not surprising that the major theme of the missions
report to the President was military.

The report suggested

that"the problem was primarily a military one, which could
be solved by a larger commitment of American power including, if necessary, American fighting men." 25

The recommen

dation to use American combat forces, although qualified in
the Taylor-Rostow report, was similar to an earlier reccommendation proposed by the Chiefs of Staff in April of

1961.
24Hilsman, ojo. cit., p. 421. Arthur Schlessinger
concurs with Hilsman. He states:
"It expressed a conscious
decision by the Secretary of State to turn the Vietnam
problem over to the Secretary of Defense. Rusk doubtless
decided to do this because the military aspects seemed to
him the most urgent ... ." Schlessinger goes on to say that
"Kennedy doubtless acquiesced because he had more confidence
in McNamara and Taylor than in the State Department."
Schlessinger, ojo. cit., p. 545.
Averell Harriman, who was about to take over as
Assistant Secretary for the Par East at the time disagreed
with Rusk. Harriman was sure that the crisis in Vietnam
"was political in its origins and had resulted from Diem's
repressive and reactionary policies in face of a Communistmanaged peasant insurrection." "The trouble with the State
Department," Harriman said, "is that it always underestimates
the dynamics of revolution." Ibid., p. 547.
25
George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, djo. cit.,
p. 128.
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Theodore C. Sorensen states, in his biography of
Kennedy, that the President did not approve of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff recommendation concerning combat troops.^
The same was apparently true of the Taylor-Rostow recom
mendation, for he again refused to send American combat
forces to Vietnam, while accepting the majority of the
other recommendations in the report.

President Kennedy,

however, in response to the various reports recommending
the use of American combat forces in Vietnam,
... tripled the number of advisers to be sent to
Vietnam, "with officers assigned at the batallion
level as well as to regiments, to advise in combat
as well as training, and to aid in unconventional
as well as conventional warfare. United States
logistical support was increased (helicopters) to
fly South Vietnamese soldiers from place to place
and ultimately as it turned out, into battle).
In addition, more money and more instructors were
made available to the South Vietnamese Civil Guard
and Self-Defense Forces.
27
Kennedy's actions, despite his own apparent misgivings,
conformed to Secretary of State Rusk's credo that the
problem in Vietnam was primarily a military one.

His dec

ision to increase military aid to Vietnam followed the
pattern of American foreign policy decisions in Asia since
the outbreak of the Korean War, which emphasized meeting
■the Communist threat by means of military force.
s>
It is curious that while Kennedy accepted a neutral
ist government in Laos, he never serious contemplated a
26

Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy,

(New York, 1965)

p. 652.
27 Gruening and Beaser, ojd. cit., pp. 205-206.
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similar settlement in Vietnam.

Schlessinger, then a Special

Consultant to the President, argues that such a policy would
not have worked in Vietnam.

He claims that,

... the collapse of the Dulles policy in Laos had
created the possibility of a neutralist solution
there; but the survival of that policy in South
Vietnam, where the government was stronger and
the army more willing to fight, left us in 1961
no alternative but to continue the effort of
1954. 28
However, while Schlessinger may be correct in saying that
the South Vietnamese Government was stronger than the U,S.
supported Laotian Government, it is also true the Diem
Government was not a strong one at that time.

The growing

unrest in Vietnam which had reached serious proportions
by 1961 and the attempted coup d'elat in late I960 seem to
be evidence of this fact.

Schlessinger's contention regard

ing the willingness of the Vietnamese army to fight is
either wishful thinking or a distortion of the facts.

Prime

Minister Nguyen Cao Ky in February, 1966 described the
army's attitude toward Diem thusly:

"We were dying for a

cause, but we saw little evidence that the cause was worth
laying down our lives for."

29

Therefore, it is more reason

able to assume that the South Vietnamese Army did not possess
the "willingness to fight" which further enhanced Diem's
opponents' chances of success.
The Kennedy Administration in their remaining years
28 Schlessinger, ojo. cit., p. 538.
29

Buttinger, ojo. cit., p. 985*
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in office concentrated on projecting their contention to
the people of the United States and the- world that Communism
was the enemy in South Vietnam, and the insurrection there
was directed from the North.

In 1961 the State Department

issued a "White Paper" entitled "A Threat to Peace:
Vietnam's Effort to Conquer South Vietnam."

This

"sought at every turn to give the impression that

North

document
hut for

Ho Chi Minh and his cohorts in the North there would he
nothing hut peace and prosperity in South Vietnam."^
Secretary of State Rusk and Under Secretary of State George
Ball attempted to reinforce this impression in all their
Vietnam policy speeches.

As an example, in a major address

before the Economic Club of Detroit in 1962, Ball stated:
The struggle in South Vietnam today is not a local
civil war.
It is a carefully planned and motivated
campaign of subversion and insurgency - equipped
and directed from Hanoi.
31
And yet later in the same speech the Under Secretary did
admit that,
Strong ties must he developed between local communi
ties and the Central Government.
The village people
must he helped to acquire a sense of identity with
the National State.
32

30 Gruening and Beaser, ojo. cit., p. 21.1.
31
^ George W. Ball, "Vietnam: Pree-World Challenge
in Southeast Asia," from an address to the Economic Club
of Detroit, April 30, 1962, reprinted in Arthur C. Turner :
and Leonard Ereedman, ed., Tensions in World Affairs,
(Belmont, California, 1964-), p. 297*
52Ibid., p. 300.
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Prom Mr. Ball’s latter statement one would conclude that
the people in many areas of South Vietnam neither supported
nor identified themselves with the Government at that time.
It would, therefore, seem reasonable to assume that much of
the South Vietnamese population were either opposed to the
Dien government or were indifferent, not caring what side
won the war, as long as there was some hope that living con
ditions would improve.

In the latter case the people were

quite vulnerable to Communist propaganda promises; in the
former case, if these people were the ones responsible for
attempting to dispose the government, it was civil war.
In either case the major problem in South Vietnam was
internal.

The State Department, however, refused to accept

that fact.
The State Department, if they had t.o focus

on

the theme of aggression, would have done themselves a favor
as well as perhaps sparing thousands of American boys and
millions of Vietnamese people the brutalities brought about
by the escalation of the War.

While there is little doubt

that the Communists were involved in the insurrection, theyfound ready allies in the Vietnamese nationalists.

While

in reality there was some aggression from the North, there
was also civil war.

While some of the revolutionaries were

Communist, some were nationalists.

33

But perhaps because

^Richard N. Goodwin, Triumph or Tragedy, Reflec
tions on Vietnam, (New York, 1966), p.~?5• Also see
Buttinger, ojd. cit., pp. 981-992.
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the situation in South Vietnam was so complex and therefore
had no easy or single solution, the United States Government
deluded itself into believing that Hanoi-controlled aggres
sion was the major if not the sole problem, in which case
the solution became simple - additional military commitment.
During 1962 and 1963 the situation in Vietnam steadily deteriorated.

34

The United States during that time

increased the amount of aid and the number of its advisers
to the Diem regime, despite the growing rift inside t h e ■
Kennedy Administration over its Vietnam policy.

Arthur

Schlessinger, Jr., a Consultant to the President at that
time, writes that the group of dissenters to the Vietnam
policy, was led by Averell Harriman, then Assistant Secretary
of State for Par Eastern Affairs, who insisted the United
States was on the wrong course in South Vietnam. 35

However,

the Rusk-McNamara coalition remained content with the
military predominance of the United States' Vietnam policy,
and their views were to win out at that time.

^‘Htfhile from hindsight there is no doubt that this
was the case, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense
McNamara, and General Harkins, head of the American advisers
in Vietnam at that time, all claimed the opposite was true.
In the spring of 1963 Secretary McNamara authorized the
Defense Department to announce "we have turned the corner
in Vietnam" and General Harkins predicted that the war would
be won "within the year." Schlessinger, 0£. cit., p. 982.
35
^uRoger Hilsman, then head of the State Department
Office of Intelligence and Research, and Michael Porrestal,
a White House Aid, were others to share Harriman's views.
Ibid., p . 984.
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Up until August, 1963 American leaders had put
little pressure on the Saigon regime to initiate reforms
in South Vietnam, even though numerous reports had noted
the necessity of such reforms.

The Kennedy Administration

had consistently requested Diem to adopt various reform
measures with each additional outlay of assistance.

Diem

neglected the requests.
Early in May, 1963 open conflict between the Diem
regime and the Buddhist organizations erupted.

The Buddhist

crisis began on May 8, 1963, when the Buddhists of Hue
protested a Diem order forbidding them to display their
religious flags.

Troops were ordered to disburse the pro

testers which resulted in open confrontation between the
Government Eorces and the Buddhist in which nine persons
were killed.

The nine deaths added to the Buddhist's

furor and as a result the number of demonstrations increased,
including human sacrifices, protesting against the Diem
regime.

Buddhist .leaders demanded that Diem punish those

responsible for the murders on May 8 and compensate the
families of the victims, but he refused to meet these demands.
Washington became deeply concerned about the Buddhist
crisis in South Vietnam.

The Kennedy Administration not

only felt guilty in supporting a regime that seemed to prac
tice religious persecutions, but there was also grave con
cern that the growing public resistance to Diem would hinder
36

Buttinger, ojo. cit., p. 993.
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the war effort against the "communists."

37

The latter fear

is guite understandable considering that probably about
70 per cent of the Vietnamese people considered themselves
Buddhist.

■58

President Kennedy, disgruntled by Diem's,

unwillingness to reconcile the Buddhists, instructed the
American Ambassador in Vietnam to warn Diem that if he
failed to compose the Buddhist struggle, the United States
might publically disavow his Buddhist policy.

In a tele

vision interview on September 2, 1963, the President told,
an American public,which had become enraged by what they
considered a religious persecution,
The repressions against the Buddhist ... were very
unwise ... all we could do is make it clear that
we don't think this is the way to win.
39
During the same interview discussing the general situation
of the war effort, Kennedy said:
I don't think that unless a greater effort is made
by the government to win popular support that the
war can be won there. In the final analysis, it
is their war. They are the ones who have to win
it or lose it. We can help them, we can give
them equipment, we can send our men out there as
advisers, but they have to win it - the people
of Vietnam - against the Communists.
... In
the last two months the Government (Saigon) has
gotten out of touch with the people.
40
One week later in another national broadcast Presi
dent Kennedy reiterated that the United States was using
37

Ibid., p. 995.

Schlessinger, op. cit., p. 987.

58Ibid., p. 993.
39
Gruening and Beaser,

ojd.

cit. , pp. 226-227.

40Ibid., p. 226.
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its influence on the Saigon regime to take steps to "win
hack the support of the people."

Particularly interesting

was Kennedy's mention that he feared Vietnam might become
a situation similar to the one the United States faced in
the Chinese civil war after World War II.

He stated:

Strongly in our mind is what happened in the case
of China at the end of World War II, where China
was lost, a weak government became increasingly
unable to control events. We don't want that.
41
In effect, Kennedy was admitting, contrary to official
State Department releases, that not all the opposition to
Diem stemmed from Hanoi's aggression.

At the same time,

however, it is apparent that he did not believe the situa
tion in Vietnam had deteriorated to the point where a policy
of containment had no chance of success, as 'Truman had
believed was the case in China.

Kennedy, although never

seriously contemplating American disengagement in Vietnam,
at that time, made it clearly known that while he intended
to continue the American commitment, he was not in total
agreement with Saigon's policies and would be forced to
cut-back American assistance to Vietnam, if that government
continued to pursue policies which alienated the Vietnamese
42
populace.
Above all he believed that the United States
must restrain itself from taking over control of the war
effort.

For in doing so the United States would convert
o

41
42

Hilsman,

ojd.

Schlessinger,

cit. , p. 505.
ojd.

cit., p. 547.
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the Vietnam struggle into a white man's war, in which case
the United States would lose as the French had lost a
decade earlier.

President Kennedy's fearful prophecy

became reality during the Johnson Administration.
On September 12, 1963 the President stated the
objectives of his Administration's Vietnam policy:
... we have a very simple policy in that area
(Vietnam) ... we want the war to be won, the
Communists to be contained, and the Americans
to go home. 43
At•,that time he again referred to his growing
disenchantment with Diem's policies, stating:
What helps to win the war, we support; what
interferes with the war effort, we oppose.
44
The Kennedy Administration was planning to place
heavy pressures on Diem forcing him to alter his aggres
sive policies, but before they were applied Diem was
assasinated (November 1, 1963).

A military junta led by

General Duong Van Minh took control of the Saigon Govern
ment.

The New York Times summed up the Kennedy Administra

tion's attitude toward the coupd'etat thusly:
The Administration welcomes the coup d'etat in
South Vietnam, assumes that its policies helped
to bring it about and is confident of greater
progress now in the war against the Communist
guerillas.
45

43 Hilsman, ojo. cit., p. 506.
^ Ibid., p. 506.
45 ’
Max Prankel, New York Times, November 2, 1963
in Kahin and Lewis, ojo. cit., p. 145.
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The Times description obviously did not correspond to the
Government's official statement, but it did describe fairly
accurately the actual attitude of the men in the Kennedy
Administration.
However, before President Kennedy had time to eval
uate the new regime in Saigon, and perhaps alter his Vietnam
policy because of the leadership change, he, too, was struck
down by an assassin.
By the end of the Kennedy Presidency the war in .
Vietnam had become a major problem for American foreign policy
makers.

During those years the Communist had steadily in

creased their strength.

The National Liberation Pront, the

political organization of the Viet-Cong, which had emerged
in 19604^ and had received open verbal support from Hanoi,
was well established at the time of Kennedy's death.

In

many parts of rural Vietnam it had established an alterna
tive de facto government, "the degree of its administrative
authority varying from province to province."

47

Much of the

Vietnamese populace had become alienated from the Saigon
Government because of Diem's oppressive policies.

As the

situation in South Vietnam deteriorated, the Kennedy policy
46
There are some indications of the prior establish
ment of the Liberation Pront. Yale anthropologist Gerald
Hickey wrote in J1958 that in a South Vietnamese village he
studied, had "for the first time experienced the activities
of a relatively new political movement - the Mai Tran Dan
Tac Gioi Phong Mien Nam Viet Nam (National Pront for the
Liberation of Vietnam)" Gerald Hickey, Village in Vietnam
in K a h m and Lewis, ojo. cit., p. 110-111 ff.
47Ibid., p. 145.
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became one of increased American support and aid, both
military and economic, to the Saigon regime.

President

Kennedy/"personally seemed to have believed the problem
in Vietnam was more than just a military one, ;requiring a
dR
military commitment.
However, Kennedy did little more
than recommend that the Saigon Government initiate a pro
gram for land reforms; for the most part such recommenda
tions went unheeded in Saigon.

The number of American

advisers in Vietnam, increased from approximately 750 in .
1961 to about 17,000 by the end of 1 9 6 3 . ^

The United

States, during the Kennedy Administration, became more
directly involved in the Vietnam war, yet it had been able
to retain a position where the military struggle in Vietnam
remained essentially Vietnamese.

While Kennedy's policy

enlarged the American commitment in Vietnam, thus reducing
to some degree the following Administration's choice in its
Vietnam policy, "he did succeed in keeping both the 'militar
ization' and the 'Americanization' of the struggle in Vietnam within tolerable limits."

50

AQ

Schlessinger states that "Kennedy, beset by the
missile crisis, Congressional elections, Skybolt, deGaulle,
Latin America, the test ban negotiations and the civil rights
fight, had little time to focus on Southeast Asia. " Instead,
his confidence in McNamara, led the President to go along
with the Secretary of Defense's policy. Schlesinger, op.cit.,
p. 982.
49 Senator Vance Harke, The American Crisis In
Vietnam, (New York, 1968), p. 3£7
50

Hilsman, ojo. cit., p. 579.
op . cit., p. 37•

Also see Harke,
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President Johnson inherited the problems of Ameri
ca!'ss Vietnam: policy at ar_time* .as stated above, when the
attaj^gie: was: stilli essentially; between the Vietnamese.
While thee American-involvement :ih_Vietnam had increased,
thu Johnson: Administration was: still "afforded some options
asc to which.direction the. Vietnam policy would take.
Shortly after Lyndon Johnson assumed the Presidency,
the Secretary General of the;United Nations, U Thant, is •
reported to have met-with him and conveyed a message from
H u Chi Minh:proposing^ discussions on a possible settlement
ILtfc is: bedieved. that, at that time Ho Chi Minh’s recommendatians consisted of. a coalition government for South Vietnam
and' the neutralization of South Vietnam.

~

President Johnson

dfficb not; immediately"react":to:the-message of U Thant but his
Hew; Year-*i messages to: South. Vietnam's leader, General.Duong
VSar. Minh',, cieariy: s±ated:.his^refusal to accept any settlement
tihufc ihcdhdsd: thee neutralization: o>f:South Vietnam. \ In the
rrreeeage: PTesi dert" Johnson stated : :
Hfeuttcaiihatibn'.off Shut if:Vietnam .would only be
another, name. for. a Communist take over. ... The
Unitad States, will continue to furnish you and
yonzr people with:the-., fullest .measure of support
i m this- bitter.-fighte .... .We shall maintain in
V i e t n a m : American personnel and materials needed
ttoo assist: you.: in:achieving victory. 52
Thu neutralization:offSSuih:Vietnam: at that time would have
DiikuCy; Xedd to: aaChmmundst^eontroiled Government.

"nuhih: and -Lewis 5 .op: .cit r r p . 145.
52
Hew York Times, January 1 and 2, 1964.
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Duong Van Minh had been in control of the South Vietnam
Government less than two months and there was no evidence
that he had been able to consolidate firm control in that
short period.

The questionable stability of the new Saigon

government and the strength of the Communists, in a neutralized
Vietnam, would have likely resulted in a situation similar
to Laos, where the Communists had increased their area of
control after the nation was neutralized in 1962.

President

Johnson's position on the possible neutralization of Vietnam
was the same as that of his predecessor, President Kennedy,
whose policies he had pledged to continue.

However, unlike

the Kennedy Administration's rationale for believing neutralization unacceptable. 53 President Johnson's reasons seem
much more realistic.

At the same time, Johnson's unwilling

ness to accept neutralization as a basis for a settlement
and his promise to continue American assistance to Saigon
to achieve "victory", made a settlement at that time
impossible from Hanoi's viewpoint.
The year 1964 witnessed a growing discontent with
American involvement in the Vietnam War among U.S. Congress
men and the American press.

Some Congressmen were calling

for a reevaluation of the entire United States containment
policy in Asia, as had similarly been done during the Korean
War.

Senator Mike Mansfield, a leading member of the

Senate's Poreign Relations Committee stated that the time

~^Vide Supra, pp. 15-16.
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had come for the United States to "face up to the realities
of today, and not depend on the wishes of yesterday."

54

The problem, however, among Congressional critics and
between Congressional critics and the Administration was
that there was little agreement on what those realities
were.
President Johnson proceded very cautiously with his
Vietnam policy in 1964 because it was an election year.
..’ ■ v A - W o

vy

The

A-'vor

American people were aligning Afchemselves--4nte^ two main cate
gories:

the "hawks", those

war, and the "doves", those
withdraw troops from Vietnam.

advocating the escalation

ofthe

advocating the United States to
President Johnson, not wishing

to alienate any sector of the electorate chose a middle of
the road stand on Vietnam.
While Vietnam evolved into a campaign issue in the
United States, the situation in Vietnam continued to deter
iorate, and the failures of American policy became more
apparent.

By the end of July, 1964,

Prance was calling for the neutrality of Indochina.
Cambodia had begun to accept Russian military aid.
Civil strife had broken out in Laos over which the
United States had begun
reconnaissance flights
and had lost two planes
early in June, 1964. 55
On August 2nd and 4th the now much
of Tonkin incidents occurred.

questioned Gulf

According to the Secretary of

Defense, on these dates, three North Vietnamese PT boats
54

Gruening and Beaser, 0£. cit., p. 230.

55Ibid., p. 235.
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attacked an American destroyer.

These attacks, according

to Secretary McNamara, were unprovoked and occured in
International waters.

President Johnson, on August 4 in

a nationwide broadcast, told the American people of these
hostile acts committed by the North Vietnamese.

The Ameri

can people were told that aggression "by terror against
the peaceful villagers of South Vietnam" had been joined".
"by open aggression on the high seas against the United
56
States."
The United States would respond to the belli
gerent acts in a "limited and fitting" manner.

Johnson's

"limited and fitting" response turned out to be retaliatory
bombing raids on Vietnamese PT boats and petroleum dumps.
While the Congress at that time did not criticize the
President's actions, in retrospect the bombing raids do
seem to have gone beyond the scope of a "limited and fitting"
response. 57

The President in justifying the need to retal

iate and in determining the form the retaliation should take,
pushed aside the fact that the American destroyer was not
damaged in the alleged attack and that two Vietnamese PT
boats were sunk.

In so far as the U.S. Navy had already

56rbid., p. 236.
57
In April, 1964 "Ambassador Adlai Stevenson told
the Security Council the United States had 'repeatedly1
expressed its emphatic disapproval of 'retaliatory raids,
whenever they occur and by whomever they are committed.'"
The United .States then voted for the resolution which
condemned "reprisals as incompatible with the purposes
and principles of the United Nations." On November 25, 1966,
the United States voted to censure Isreal for her reprisal
raid on Samu, Jordan. Harke, ojo. cit., p. 50.
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punished the aggressor, the addition of the bombing raids
seemed to be out of proportion to the actual "crime" commit
ted.

However, today it is quite apparent that the Johnson

Administration used the Gulf of Tonkin incident as an
excuse to escalate the war, a policy that some members of
the Administration had been advising for some time.
In addition the President went to the Congress and
asked them for a resolution "affirming the national deter
mination that all such attacks will be met, and that the.
United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting
58
the free nations of the area defend their freedom."
The
vast majority of Congressmen enraged by the "alleged" attack
on the American vessel willingly and hurriedly consented
to Johnson's petition.

The final resolution stated,

That the Congress approves and supports
mination of the President, as Commander
to take all necessary measures to repel
attack against the forces of the United
to prevent further aggression.
59

the deter
in Chief,
an armed
States and

The resolution because of the ambigious meaning of the phrase
"and to prevent further aggression," came back and haunted
many Congressmen.

Because the resolution did not qualify

what was meant by further aggression or against whom the
aggression had to be directed, the President in 1965 used
58
President's Message to Congress, August 5, 1964.
Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1964, pp. 261-263.
59 Southeast Asia Resolution, Background Information
Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, op. cit., p. 128.
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the resolution as a justification for increased American
involvement and escalation of the war in Vietnam, against
the protest of some Congressmen, men who voted for the
/\
resolution-, not realizing the possible repercussions of
their action.
Although the United States unilaterally responded
to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, it did also protest the
North Vietnamese attacks in the Security Council of the
United Nations.

However, the protest consisted merely of

verbal denunciation of the attacks, and at no time did the
United States ask the Council to assume jurisdiction of
the Vietnam conflict.
The retaliatory bombing raids had set the stage
for American escalation of the Vietnam war; yet President
Johnson on the "campaign trail" during the months of
September and October gave no indication that the United
States intended to do so.

On the contrary, he constantly

criticized his Republican opponent, Barry Goldwater, for
even suggesting that the U.S. bomb North Vietnam and use
nuclear, weapons if necessary to win the war.

Johnson said:

I want to be very cautious and careful and use it
only as a last resort, when I start dropping bombs
around that are likely to involve American boys in
a war in Asia with 700,000,000 Chinese. So just
for the moment I have not thought that we were
ready for American boys to do the fighting for
Asian boys....
60
e

Nearing the end of the 1964 presidential campaign, Lyndon
6Q

Brown,

ojd.

cit., p. 327.
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Johnson reiterated unequivocably "We are not going to send
American hoys nine or ten thousand miles away to do what
Asian hoys ought to he doing for themselves.

President

Johnson’s statements throughout the campaign gave no indica
tion that he would escalate the American involvement in
Vietnam, as his "war monger" opponent had suggested the
United States should do.

The homhing raids on North Viet

nam were presented as "just retaliation" and not as it
turned out, the initial step in a pattern of escalation.
Johnson's promise to keep American hoys out of comhat in
Vietnam, turned out to he nothing hut campaign oratory,as
the American people found out within the year.
During the

presidential campaign, President De

Gaulle of Prance and Secretary-General U Thant appealed to
President Johnson to hegin negotiations for a Vietnam
settlement, hy calling for a reconvening of the Geneva Con
ference.

Johnson, on the advice of his political advisers

neglected the appeals, stating that such a consideration
should he postponed until after the Presidential elections.
Yet, after the election had come and gone and President
Johnson had heen elected in one of the greatest landslides
ever recorded in a Presidential election, he again rejected
U Thant’s proposal.

Eric Sevareid in an article in look

magazine, November 30, 1965 states:

6lIhid., p. 327.
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In the early autumn of 1964 ... U Thant ... pri
vately obtained agreement from authorities in
North Vietnam that they would send an emissary to
talk with an American emissary in Rengoon, Burma.
Someone in Washington insisted that this attempt
be postponed until after the Presidential elec
tion. When the election was over, U Thant again
pursued the matter. Hanoi was still willing to
send its man. But Defense Secretary McNamara
... opposed the attempt. He said the South
Vietnamese Government would have to be informed
and it would have a demoralizing effect on them;
that government was shaky enough, as it was ... .
U Thant was furious over this failure of his
patient efforts.
62
Secretary McNamara's statement that Saigon "govern
ment was shaky," was an understatement.

At the end of

October 1964 a civilian government was installed in Saigon,
the fourth government since Diem in 1963.

The civilian

government, however, did not find favor among the Buddhists
63
who soon organized demonstrations against it.
Premier
Huong's civilian government lasted until January 27, 1965
when the military leaders led by General Khanh staged a
successful coup.

While American officials became increas

ingly concerned about General Khanh's growing opposition
to "the U.S. political presence in Saigon," and anti-Ameri
can feelings grew in South Vietnam,^^the Viet Cong were
able to increase their already strong position.

Some men

in the Johnson Administration believed South Vietnam had
62
Eric Severeid, Look, November 30, 1965 in
Gruening and Beaser, ojo. cit., pp. 256-257.
Kahin and lewis,

ojd.

cit . , p. 164.

64Ibid., pp. 164-168.
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reached the point where it could not he "saved" without
a heavy U.S. commitment, that included combat forces
if need be.
On February 7, 1965 the Vietcong attacked a United
States military compound at Pleiku.

Seven Americans were

killed and 109 were wounded as a result.

The United States

"enraged" by the terrorists action again bombed the North
as a "retaliatory" measure.

However, some evidence has

since come to light, that the bombings were planned pre
vious to the Pleiku attack, and were therefore not merely
65
retaliatory actions.
Pleiku was a convenient opportunity
that the Johnson Administration was able to use as justifi
cation for action they had every intention of taking in any
event.

The United States had already decided to bomb the

North in an effort to reduce the infiltration of forces
from there,that the American leaders claimed was responsible
for the deterioriating situation in the S o u t h . ^

Further

more, it is "coincidental" and "convenient" that in February
1965, the United States State Department came out with a
"White Paper" on Vietnam entitled, ""Aggression From The
North:

The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign to Conquer
65

Charles Roberts, a White House reporter for 11
years, has said that Johnson told him in May, 1965 that
he, Johnson, had made the decision to bomb four months
before Pleiku, in October,^1964 at the height of the
Presidential Campaign. HarTce, ojo. cit., p. 51.
^Brown, o j d . cit., pp. 353-336.
and Beaser, ojo. cit., pp. 265-284.

Also see Gruening
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South Vietnam."
Upon reading the State Department's "White Paper"
one would find that it is nothing more than a justification
for American escalation.

The "facts" presented in the docu

ment do give reasonable evidence that some aggression from
the North existed.

However, at the same t'ime the evidence

is not so concrete as to disprove that the cause of the
war in Vietnam was essentially the South Vietnamese people's dissatisfaction with the Saigon Government.

Yet, even in

"proving" that there was aggression from the North, the
State Department found it necessary to distort some of the
facts.

Por. instance the "White Paper" refers to the Inter

national Control Commission's reports that stated "there
was 'sufficient evidence to show beyond a reasonable doubt'
that North Vietnam had sent arms and men into South Vietnam
to carry out subversion with the aim of overthrowing the
legal Government t h e r e . W h a t

the document does not

state, however, is that the same Commission's report also
found the governments of South Vietnam and the United States
in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954-

In examining

the figures cited in the "White Paper" concerning the number
of Communist weapons captured and the number of "infiltrees"
from the North it is difficult for many to come to the same
conclusion as the State Department - if the "other side"
C . **7

"Aggression Prom the North, The Record of North
Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam" Department
of State Publication 7839, (Washington, D.C., 1965).
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would halt its aggression everything would he all right
in South Vietnam.

The "White Paper" does nothing more

than give some "evidence" that North Vietnam supports
the guerrillas in South Vietnam, hut that is no more a
secret than that the United States supports the South
Vietnamese government against them.^®
The American "retaliatory" homhing raids following
the Communist attack at Pleiku in February, 1965, were
continued during the following month.
ing soon proved ineffective.

However, the homh

The insurgency and terror

in South Vietnam and the number of men infiltrating from
69
the North increased, rather than diminished.
As the
"Americanization" of the war became more apparent, with no
solution in sight and as the number of casualties increas
ed, especially the number of civilian casualties, people
from all parts of the world and from all walks of life began
to heavily criticize the United States Vietnam policy.

In

March, 1965 seventeen non-aligned nations issued a statement
expressing their concern about the "aggravation of the
situation in Vietnam" and stated that it was their belief
that foreign military intervention was responsible for the
situation.

The group of nations called for negotiations,

without any preconditions "so that a political solution
C.o

See I. P. Stone, "A Reply to the White Paper,"
G-ettleman, 0£. cit., pp. 535-341.
69

Brown, ojo. cit♦, p. 334.
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to the problem of Vietnam may be found in accordance with
70
the legitimate aspirations of the Vietnamese people."
The United States reply to the non-aligned nations' request
was made on April 8.

Its content was a reiteration of the

American position - negotiations were possible the moment
the aggression from North Vietnam ceased.
President Johnson, on the previous day, had deliv
ered his celebrated speech on Vietnam at John Hopkins.
This address is very important because it is the most thor
ough statement of the Johnson's Administration's Vietnam
policy.

In the first part of the speech President Johnson

states the reason why the United States is involved in
Vietnam.
... we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every
American President has offered support to the
people of South Vietnam. ... we made a pledge to
help South Vietnam defend its independence.
71
This reason, while heavily used by defenders of President
Johnson's policy, is too shallow a reason to justify the
heavy commitment of the United States to Vietnam.

More

over, in reviewing his predecessors' correspondence with
the South Vietnamese government, the "pledge" President
Johnson spoke of is in reality an interpretation on his
part, rather than an actual fact.

President Eisenhower

and Kennedy both offered assistance to Saigon, but with
____________________________________________ o_________________________

70 G-ruening and Beaser, ojo. cit♦, p. 279.
^ Department of State Bulletin LVI, April 26, 1965,
pp. 606-610.
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the understanding that certain conditions be met.

In so

far as Saigon more often than not neglected to initiate
many of the reforms suggested by the American Presidents,
it would seem that the United States technically could
rescind its offer.

President Johnson, himself, must have

had some doubts concerning the nature of America's
"pledge" for he felt it necessary to give further reasons
for his Administration's policy.
We are there to strengthen world order. Around
the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people
whose well-being rests in part on the belief
they can count on us if they are attacked. To
leave Viet-Uam to its fate would shake the
confidence of all these peoples......
72
We are also there because there are great stakes
in the balance . . . .
We have (responsibility) there for the same
reason we have a responsibility for the defense
of Europe. World War II was fought in both
Europe and Asia, and when it ended we found
ourselves with continued responsibility for the
defense of freedom.
73
The latter two reasons offered by Lyndon Johnson were the
core reasons for the United States' involvement in Vietnam.
The Johnson Administration perceived a Communist victory
in Vietnam as a threat to its post-war policy of contain
ment.

What President Johnson was unable to realize or

acknowledge was that American policy and perceptions,
especially his Administrations', had elevated the predom
inately civil war in South Vietnam to the plateau of a

75Ibid.
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Cold War struggle.
In defining the real enemy in Vietnam Johnson said
The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask
the fact that it is the new fact of an old enemy.
Oyer this war - and all Asia - is ... the deepening
shadow of Communist China. ... It is a nation
which is helping the forces of violence in almost
-every continent.
The contest in Viet-Nam is part
of a wider pattern of aggressive purposes.
74
According to President Johnson therefore, Communist China
was the stage manager of the insurgency in Vietnam. 75
Despite the fact that no Chinese soldiers had taken part
in the struggle in South Vietnam, the United States pre
sumably was defending Saigon from Chinese domination.
What is especially curious is that the same China was un
willing to give more than verbal support to Hanoi back in
1955-56, when Hanoi desperately needed assistance if its
demand that the elections subscribed to in the Geneva
Accords was to be realized.
President Johnson in stating his reasons why the
United States was in Vietnam and in defining Communist
China as the ultimate enemy there had implicitly placed
Vietnam in the wider framework of America's containment
policy in Asia.

In stating his response to the Communist

challenge in Vietnam it becomes explicit.
... we must say in Southeast Asia as we did in
Wueope, in the words of the Bible:
'Hitherto
shalt thou come, but no further.'
76
74Ibid.
75 Broun, ojo. cit., p. 535.
7^Department of State Bulletin, April, 26, 1955.
op. cit.
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The President made perfectly clear

his Administration’s

determination to win the war in Vietnam.
We will not he defeated. We will not grow tired.
We will not withdraw; either openly or under the
cloak of a meaningless agreement.
77
At the same time, the President went on to speak of his
willingness to explore

the possibilities of anearly

peaceful settlement to the war:
We will never be second in the search for a
peaceful settlement in Vietnam.
We have stated this position over and over
again fifty times and more, to friend and
foe alike. We remain ready, with this
purpose, for unconditional discussions.
78
Yet, the phrase "unconditional discussions" must denote
a different meaning to President Johnson than it does to
other men; for on the very next day, as has
noted, Johnson's reply

already been

to a similar request by a group of

non-aligned nations, demanded a pre-condition.
In the latter part of this address Johnson spoke of
the need to improve the "life of man in that conflict-torn
.corner of our world."

79

He divulged his plans for a

billion-dollar American investment on a Mekong River pro
ject, which potentially could provide food, water and
power to dwarf America's own TVA.

While the project itself

was a constructive ideal, practically it could only bring

77Ibid.
78Ipid.

•

79Ibid.
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about its intended objectives if there was peace.

General

Maxwell Taylor once used a revealing phrase which appro
priately describes the necessity of peace first - it is
"difficult to plant corn outside the stockade when the
Indians are still around."®^1
Despite President Johnson's expressed readiness
for a peace settlement in Vietnam, the mighty arms which
he claimed were "symbols of human failures" were soon
increased.

The number of. bombing raids were increased

and more American boys were sent to Vietnam.

There was,

therefore, a credibility gap between the President's verbal
desires to find a peaceful settlement and his decision to
further escalate the war.

It is difficult to understand

how or why the Administration concluded that Hanoi would
be willing to talk peace while under heavy bombardment.
Even if the bombing seriously crippled Hanoi's war efforts,
which later evidence indicated it did not, for Hanoi to go
to the peace table under such conditions, would have, in
effect, been an act of surrender.
When the increased bombing raids produced no visible
productive results, world and domestic pressures were ex
erted on Johnson to halt them.

Under these conditions

Johnson decided to suspend the bombing to give Hanoi a
80

* '
Stanley Hoffmann in a letter published by the
Hew York Times May 1, 1966 reprinted in Stanley Hoffmann,
Gulliver's Troubles, Or The Setting of American Poreign
Policy, (Hew York, 19*58), p. 384.
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chance to honorably seek negotiations.
halted from May 12 to May 18, 1965.

The homhing was

At the end of the

six days the United States claimed Hanoi had made no
response; it therefore not only continued the bombing but
increased again the number of bombing raids and the number
of American forces in Vietnam.

Also in May, 1965, Presi

dent Johnson went to the Congress and received additional
appropriations to carry out the United States' war effort
in Vietnam.

In July, 1965 the number of American troops,

in Vietnam was increased by 75 per cent.

The American

escalation continued until late 1965, but there was no
sign of the struggle ending.

On the contrary, since the

Johnson Administration had embarked on its program of esca
lation, the potentially explosive nature of the Vietnam war
had increased.

It became noticeably evident that both the

Soviet Union and Communist China had increased their
assistance to Hanoi.
In 1965 as large-scale American combat troops were
introduced into South Vietnam a war alarm occurred in the
81
major cities throughout southern and coastal China.
"Pitched to the slogan of preparing for war 'sooner rather
than later, nuclear as well as conventional,' a Chinese
civil defense campaign built up, complete with air-raid
drills, pamphlets and films on protection against atomic

^Aliens S. Whiting, "How We Almost Went To War
With China," look, April 29, 1969, p. 77.
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fallout."82

In early May, 1965 the Chinese Chief of Staff

Lo Jui-Ching claimed, "We will go on supporting and aiding
the Vietnamese people, whether or not U.S. imperialism
bomhs our country and whether or not it enlarges the war."

85

Johnson's policy of escalation threatened to touch off a
major war with China, hut was ineffective in bringing about
a swift end to the Vietnamese war.
The year 1965 was a time of low morale in South
Vietnam for another Saigon government had fallen.

American

casualties were rapidly rising as were American critics of
the Johnson Vietnam policy.

As the United States took

over the major combat functions in Vietnam, President
Johnson explained, "We did not choose to be the guardians
84
at the gate, but there is no one else."
Yet, in reality
nothing could be farther from the truth.

,

Since 1954,

immediately following the Geneva Conference, the United States
had followed a policy of self-appointed guardians of Saigon
regimes.

Granted, the previous Administrations may not have

laid the basis of a sound Vietnam policy, but no one had
forced the Johnson Administration to escalate the war; it
was their decision and their mistake.
At the end of 1965 and during the first month of

82Ibid., p. 77.
85Ibid., p. 77.
8^Broun, ojo. cit., p. 341.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

156

1966, President Johnson again suspended the bombing.

The

bombing operations had proved to be a dismal failure in
bringing Hanoi to its knees, while the threat of a wider
war with Communist China intensified in late 1965.

In the

early fall of 1965 Mao had sent regular forces of the
Chinese People's Liberation Army to North' Vietnam.

While

these forces were primarily engaged in railroad, road and
bridge construction, there existed the possibility of
Chinese troops joining Hanoi in the case of a U.S. invasion.

85

Purthermore, Chinese anti-aircraft units moved in to protect
vital targets in North Vietnam, and to shield Chinese engin
eering and construction personnel.8^
On January 7, 1966, during the 37-day bombing halt
Secretary of State Rusk issued his Pourteen Points for
negotiations in response to Hanoi's Pour Points, issued in
on

April, 1965.

At that time Rusk said "the two positions

were really not far apart" and "certainly, there was reason
88
for negotiations on the basis of both positions."
How
ever, Secretary Rusk's optimism was based on the American
condition that Hanoi was willing to back down on their
85

Whiting,

ojd.

cit. , p. 77.

86Ibid., p. 77.
87

Hanoi issued its Pour Points as a basis for
negotiations less than one week after President Johnson's
speech at John Hopkins University, where he stated the
U.S. was always ready for "unconditional discussions."
88

Broun,

ojd.

cit., p. 341.
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position that any negotiations include the National Libera
tion Front.

Hanoi- could not accept Rusk's condition; to

do so -would have been an admission of guilt by Hanoi, that
they were aggressors.

Not only that, but Hanoi realisti

cally knew that any settlement without the NLF, would not
be lasting.

Mr. Rusk made it clear that until Hanoi was

willing to agree to this condition, there existed no basis
for negotiations as far as the Johnson Administration was
concerned.

In explaining the Administration's position,

the Secretary said:
If the Vietcong come to the conference table
as full partners, they will ... in a sense
have been victorious in the very aims that
South Vietnam and the United States are
pledged to prevent. 89
The question arises,what aims are the governments of Saigon
and the United States pledged to prevent?

By examining the

policy statements of the United States and Saigon one must
conclude that both governments are attempting to prevent
the forceful conquest of South Vietnam by the Communists,
or in more positive terms to secure the right of self-deter
mination for the Vietnamese people.

To admit the Vietcong

to the conference table, does not necessarily abandon these
goals.

What it does,is admit the fact that the Vietcong

are a southern grouping and that the war in Vietnam is
essentially a civil war.

While the United States consis

tently claimed the Vietcong was merely a "southern arm" of

^ N e w York Times, January 29, 1966.
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Hanoi, it must "be remembered Hanoi Has also consistently
claimed that the Saigon regime is nothing more than a
puppet of the United States.

Therefore, Hanoi, while

repeatedly denying recognition of the Saigon regime as
the legitimate government of South Vietnam, was willing
to concede to their presence at the conference table„

If

the United States seriously desired negotiations, and one
accepts compromise as an essential part of negotiation,
then Hanoi's insistence on HUE1 representation was not
unreasonable.

The request was unreasonable as far as the

Johnson Administration was concerned because it did not
desire compromise, but all-out victory.

Their refusal to

grant the N1D representation was "intrinsically bound to
the theory that (the United States is) resisting a war of
90
aggression and the opening blow for world conquest."
While American soldiers continued to die at the hands of
the Vietcong, the Johnson Administration found it impossible
to recognize its political arm, the HLF, and begin meaning
ful negotiations.
On January 31, 1966 the Administration resumed its
.aerial attacks with "even greater punch."

Secretary of

State Dean Rusk explained that the bombing was resumed
because "the response has been negative, harsh, unyield
ing ...

."91

a

■^Harke, ojo. cit., p. 63*
91Ibid., p. 58.
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Meanwhile, the Johnson policy of escalation was
receiving increasing criticism in the United States.

The

.Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January, 1966 began
hearings on Vietnam.

During the hearings the Senate

Committee heard the testimony of many distinguished Ameri
cans who were opposed to the Administration's policy.
reasons for their opposition were varied.

The

For example

General Gavin testified that he feared the American esca
lation would begin to hurt the United States' world
strategic position.

He went on to say "When (the United

States) begins to turn (its) back on what (it) is doing
in world affairs ... to support a tactical confrontation
that appears to be escalating at the will Of an enemy (it)
is in a very dangerous position."

92

On the other hand the

former diplomat, George Kennan, who first introduced the
concept of containment, questioned American military inter
vention in the first place.

Furthermore, Kennan concluded

that the prestige of the United States was being damaged
abroad because of its excessive involvement in Vietnam,
particularly in Japan.

General Gavin, a year later,

agreed with Kennan on this latter point, when he again
appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee.

It is

especially interesting that these two distinguished men
opposed Johnson's policy on grounds similar to those used
by the President to defend the policy.
92

Obviously a

Broun, ojo. cit., p. 342.
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credibility gap existed.
President Johnson, while the Senate Hearings were
in process, conveniently found that the time was right to
meet personally with the leaders of the Saigon Government.
In Honolulu, the two Governments in a public declaration
proclaimed their common objectives and efforts to maintain
an independent South Vietnam.

During the conference the

leaders discussed joint military operations, but the main
news to emerge from the meeting dealt with new programs
for the socioeconomic benefit of the Vietnamese people.
Yet, while the Vietnamese people's need of such programs
were unquestionable, peace was their foremost need, and a
pre-condition if the programs were to be successful.

But

the Honolulu conference ended without peace in sight.
Throughout 1966 and 1967 the war continued and the
number of bombing raids and American combat troops increas
ed, until the number of American boys fighting the war
that should be fought by Asians, reached approximately
540,000.

During this period the Administration often spoke

of how the United States was winning the war.

Each act of

escalation was explained as a necessary act to bring the
war to an end.

While the Administration just as often

spOke of their willingness to negotiate, it was quite clear
that they were banking on a military victory.
The Communist Tet offensive in February, 1968 crush
ed the Johnson Administration's illusions of a military
^

victory.

Henry Kissinger points out that from a strictly
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military point of view, the Tet offensive was an American
victory.

93

However, he also points out that more import

antly it was a political defeat in the countryside for
Saigon and the United States.^

"The Vietcong had made

a point whose importance far transcends military considerations: there are no secure areas for Vietnamese civilians." 95
Washington faced the sad realization that from hoth a
military and political point of view, its policy was a
failure.

Militarily, the American and South Vietnamese

forces were not defeated, hut they had not made any signi
ficant progress in bringing the war to an end, and the Tet
offensive had vividly showed that it was unlikely that they
could in the near future.

This realization caused President

Johnson, for the first time to put a limit on the number
of American troops for Vietnam.

He refused General West

moreland's request for an additional two hundred thousand
American troops, to secure a "major improvement" in the
military situation in South Vietnam.

96

President Johnson,

finally faced the reality, that the American military mach
ine after almost four years had been unable to improve
93
^Henry A. Kessinger, American Poreign Policy,
Three Essays, (Hew York, 1969)1 p^ 106.
•^Ibid., p . 106.
95Ibid., p. 107.
•96 Coral Bell, "Security in Asia: Reapparisals after
Vietnam," International Journal, Vol. XXIV, No. 1, Winter
1968-69, p. 3.
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appreciably the military and political situation of the
Government of South Vietnam. 97

In facing these facts,

President Johnson found that an eventual commitment to a
political solution was inevitable and began the quest for
a negotiated settlement.

98

On March 31, 1968 President Johnson before a nation
wide television audience announced a partial halt in the
bombing of North Vietnam.

In November of the same year the

Administration announced that peace negotiations would take
place in Paris, with the United States, Saigon, Hanoi and
the NLP represented.

After almost three years of continuous

battle, and countless deaths, the United States no longer
maintained that NLP representation at the peace table meant
in a sense victory for the ’’other side."

Yet, because the

United States "yielded" in 1968, after three years of
insisting it could not allow NLP representation at the peace
conference, the "other side" had indeed gained a victory in
a sense.

The NLP presence brought out the weaknesses and

failures of the United States' past policy and the internal
contradictions within it.
The peace negotiations in Paris begun under the
Johnson Administration and continued by the succeeding
Nixon Administration have yet, at the time of this writing,
to bear any fruit.

So today the war in Vietnam continues

^Ibid. , p . 4 •
98Kissinger, ojo. cit. , p. 108.
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and the "blood of American boys and innocent South Viet
namese civilians redden the soil of that country, demon
strating the failures of American leaders and the inade(luaey of their Asian foreign policy.

99

In examining the United States' Vietnam policy
since 1954, one might conclude that the U:S. commitment
there has actually been an American commitment to itself to contain Communism.

This writer concurs with this con.- .

elusion for two reasons.

First, during the 1954-1956

period the United

States deliberately went about under

mining the Geneva

Accords of 1954; Accords perceived to be

clearly unsatisfactory to American interests.

Secondly,

during the 1960's American statesmen have seemingly:'been
unable to define who is to be contained in
"White Papers" of

Vietnam. The

1961 and 1965 state that the enemy is

Hanoi and therefore it is Hanoi that must be contained.
President Johnson, however, especially in his John Hopkins
Address in 1965, strongly suggested that China was the real
enemy in the Vietnam war and therefore it was China that
must be contained.

On the other hand, Dean Rusk, Secretary

of State in both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations,
when asked in an interview for MacCleans in February, 1968,
if he regarded China as the real enemy in Vietnam, replied
99
• The Hixon Administration have displayed favorable
signs of earnestly attempting to end the war. However, at
the time of this writing, it is not possible to evaluate
its policy, or foresee any immediate end to the war.
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"No.

The aggressor nominates himself by his own action.

Yet in continuing Secretary Rusk said:
But in simple terms we believe and have believed
throughout my term in office and before, that
if Hanoi were to take over South Vietnam by
force, the effect would be to stimulate the
expansionist ambitions of China and greatly
weaken the will and capacity of independent
nations of South East Asia to resist.
Thus Vietnam has a direct bearing on freedom
throughout South East Asia and particularly
freedom of the area from Chinese pressure
and subversion. 101
Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs,
William P. Bundy in Eebruary of 1968, gave yet another
slightly different assessment of the enemy in Vietnam.
He stated:
the nations of Southeast Asia are individually
threatened by the parallel and mutually rein
forcing ambitions of North Viet-Nam and
Communist China. 102
While the debate between American statesmen over
who is the enemy in Vietnam and therefore who is to be
contained has concentrated on Peking and Hanoi, American
refusal to accept the National Liberation Front as a
party to peace negotiations up until March of 1968, and
U.S. refusal until recently to consider a coalition
government as a basis for a settlement, indicates that

^ ^ State Department Bulletin, Vol. 58 No. 1493
February 5, 1968, p. 208.
101Ibid., p. 208-209.
102

Ibid., p. 177.
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the Nil* was then to he the enemy to contain.

Thus, while

American statesmen have had difficulty agreeing on the
face of the enemy, they have agreed on its name - Communism,
that evil which threatens world peace and the American
way of life.
Vietnam is a key element in the United States'
Asian containment policy.

The bankruptcy of the Vietnam

policy is due to a considerable degree, to the failures
in the entire Asian containment policy, in which context
it was formulated.
Asian containment, as constructed during the Dulles
era, is based on the image of a monolithic threat.

Yet,

currently it is quite apparent that there is disunity and
diversity in "international" communism.

This fact, almost

by itself, makes a general policy of containment irrele105
vant.'
In any event, the original notion of containment
became vulgarized in Asia, "so that while acquiescing in
Soviet power in Europe, the United States, without counting
costs and feasibility has set itself against parochial
Asian Communism of minor s c a l e . V i e t n a m is the classic
example.

Indeed, American goals in Asia sometimes seemed

105
Herman Kahn, "On Establishing A Context for
Debate," in Erank E. Armbruster, Raymond D. Gastil, Herman
Kahn, William Pfaff, Edmund Stillman, Can We Win In Vietnam?,
(New York, 1968), p. 45.
■^^Edmund Stillman, "Containment Has Won, But ... "
The New York Times Magazine, May 28, 1967, p. 76.
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even more generalized - the containment of disorder, be
it national or social discord,

105

because the United

States has allowed itself to perceive all discontent as
Communist inspired.

The United States, because of this

mistaken perception, has found itself supporting regimes
whose oppressive policies have caused much of their
population to become discontented.

American policy

because it has become identified with the status quo,
which at times may be regarded as less than satisfactory
to the Asian peoples concerned, has at times alienated
and seldom cultivated the important Asian nationalist
forces.

When alienated, these nationalist forces some

times become associated with and later, as in Vietnam,
106
"largely subordinated to the Communist movement."
The
United States, therefore, must learn from its Vietnam
experience that it is not enough to support the governments
in Asia who proclaim to be anti-Communist, but that the
support of the Asian peoples themselves is needed, if it
is to successfully achieve its desired objectives in Asia.
Vietnam has proved beyond a doubt that while the United
States may be able to advise and assist Asian peoples, it
cannot force them to fight Communism, especially where
Communism is allowed to appear as the better alternative.

105Ibid., p. 76.
"^"^^Senator J. W. Pulbright, "On the Arrogance of
Power" in The Viet-Nam Reader, op. cit., p. 209-
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In Vietnam, as in most of the developing countries in Asia,
American policy-makers must come to realize that the "over
whelming problem is not to buttress but to develop a
political framework."

107

The United States policy of

containment in Asia, with its dominant stress on military
Blight, cannot meet this demand.

At the same time this is

not meant to suggest that the entire military aspect of
the policy must be or should be eliminated; it is merely
to suggest that a greater emphasis must be placed on
political aspects, for the basic problems facing the Asian
nations are political.
Furthermore, "while the United States has committed
itself to the containment of Communism everywhere in the
world," American policy-makers must come to realize that
"this commitment must obviously be subject to qualifica108
tions."
As stated in a Report to the U.S. Senate
C-OBimittee on Foreign Relations:
It does not follow, however, that it is in the
interest of the United States or that it
enhances (its) national security to respond
to (Communist) pressures in all circumstances
and in every specific situation in Southeast
Asia. Nor does it automatically follow that
that an ever-deepening total involvement of
the United States on the Southeast Asian
mainland is the only way or, in all circum
stances, the best way to deal with the
implications of the Chinese hostility.
109
107

Kessinger, 0£. cit., p. 1G6 .

108

Hans J. Morgenthau, "Vietnam-Another Korea?" in
Tension Areas in World Affairs, op. cit., p. 303.
109„The Vietnam Conflict: The Substance And the
Shadow," Report to Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate, (Washington, D.C., 1966).
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American policy-makers, obviously, have not realized the
necessity to qualify this commitment.

If they had,the

United States would not have found itself involved in a
land war in Asia, which threatened to bring on a major
confrontation with C h i n a , a

situation contrary to the

United States' national interest.

110Vide Supra, pp. 1511-152.
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CONCLUSION

For almost twenty years the policy of containment
has been the foundation of America's Asian policy.

Yet

today leading Americans are still asking, what is America's
Asian policy? and what are its objectives?

A study of the

containment policy in Asia brings out the reason why such
inquiries are still made.

Containment as an operative

policy in Asia has become so distorted that the fundamental
concept, so successful in Europe, has become obscured.
In its original European environment, containment
reflected a cold assessment of American national interest.
Despite the Administrative rhetoric that was used in intro
ducing containment at the time of the'Truman Doctrine,
stripped bare, the policy was as Coral Bell has stated, a
traditional balance of power strategy.^

In an effort to

maintain a European balance of power, which was perceived
p
to be endangered by the threat of Soviet expansion,
^Vide Supra, Chapter 1, fn. 33.
2
It has been a matter of debate, especially in the
1 9 6 0 ' s whether or not the Soviet Union in the immediate
post-war period did in fact have any design to control
Western Europe and world domination. However, the statement
here, represents what all evidence indicates was the Ameri
can and Western Europe perception of Soviet intent at that
t ime.
169

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

170

programs within the economic, military and political
spheres were initiated with the object of building "situa
tions of strength" in Western Europe as a counterweight
to the Soviet controlled Eastern Europe.
The initial success of the policy in Europe can
be attributed to three main factors;

(1 ) it was a policy

whose objectives were vital to U.S. interest;

(2) the

objectives were within American means to achieve and;

(5)

the policy had the support of those the United States was
trying to protect.

Western European support for the policy,

the indispensable factor in the policy's success stemmed
from the area's agreement with the United States on the
serious nature of the threat to their security and the
common identification of the Soviet Union as the source
of the threat.
The weight American policy-makers gave to factors
1 and 2 as a necessary prerequisite to attempting contain
ment is evidenced by the American refusal to apply the
policy to the Chinese Civil War, where American interests
were not clear, and the desired objective seemed unattain
able .
Containment was first actively applied in Asia at
the outset of the Korean War.

At that time there was still

no indication that the policy was too be the basis for the
United States Asian policy as a whole, for in extending the
•z

Ronald Steel, Pax Americana, (New York, 1967) p. 11.
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European limits of the policy President Truman let it he
known that it was to be a "symbol" of American determination
to live up to its commitments to the lands along the Sovietcontrolled periphery.^- Originally, therefore, containment
was applied to Asia because it was believed to be an
integral element in the maintenance of European balance.
With the entrance of Communist China into the Korean
War, American leaders seemed to think of containment as a
specifically Asian policy.

The Communist alliance in Korea

was looked upon as a monolithic threat in Asia similar to
the Soviet threat in Europe.

Because the struggle in Asia

was viewed as being the same as it was in Europe, the United
States attempted to apply the same remedy.

5

The successful defense of South Korea without percipating World War III, reinforcing containment's success in
Europe, led American leaders to implement the policy on a
wider scale in Asia - despite the fact that the general
Asian situation differed from the particular situation in
Korea just as it differed from the situation in Europe.
John Poster Dulles, the chief architect of the Asian
containment policy, immediately found Asian opposition to
his policy.

Many of the Asian nations seemed to be oblivious

to the monolithic threat of Communism that Dulles claimed
threatened their security..

Actually Asian leaders were well

^See Chapter 2, p. ^9.
5
Steel, ojo. cit., p. 31*
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aware of the possible threat a resurgent China posed but
made a distinction between Communism as a social doctrine
and Communism as a form of Chinese and Soviet imperialism the United States did not.

In any event', Asian leaders

were-primarily concerned with maintaining their newly
won independence and believed the tight alliance bonds
favored by the United States to be oppressive limitations
on their freedom, rather than the source of protection
Americans claimed it to be.
Despite the rejection by many Asian leaders of
his proposed policy, Dulles tenaciously went about imple
menting it, seeking the cooperation of those Asian leaders
willing to join the United States in its "crusade" against
Communism.
The main instrument of Dulles' version of contain
ment was the military alliance.

The United States, using the

aggression in Korea as an example of potential future Com
munist activity in Asia, entered into alliances in Asia de
signed to combat overt aggression.

In its search for

military allies in Asia, the promise of American economic
assistance was waved as an incentive.

As a result, the

United States found itself allied with some nations which
offered little or no hope of ever becoming military bulo

warks against Communism and "which had special uses of
their own for military aid it furnished.

This aid in turn

^Ibid., p. 31.
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was used by despotic rulers to secure their personal
power position.

When national sentiments turned upon

the ruler, the United States, because of its association
with the regime, often became the target of Asian anti
colonialist sentiments.

Events in Vietnam and Laos

provide good examples of this type of situation.
Because of the nature of its alliance system in
Asia the United States has also found itself caught in the
middle of regional confrontations.

Eor example, in South

Asia the U.S. was placed in a situation where an allied
power, Pakistan, was hostile to a non-allied power, India,
in whose security the U.S. has a major stake.

Under these

conditions the United States has found relations with both
nations complicated, often resulting in one or both nations
reacting against U.S. policy.
In both instances the alliance system has had a
divisive effect hardly conducive to the successful imple
mentation of the containment policy.
Even the military strategy of the alliance system
has proved inadequate.

As previously stated, it is based

on an assumed need to combat a Communist frontal attack
similar to the one used in Korea.

The Communist, however,

have adopted a new tactic that is commonly referred to as
"wars of liberation," the type presently employed in Viet
nam.

This type of Communist approach is based on guerilla

warfare.

There had been a fundamental shift in American

military strategy to meet this type of challenge, but the
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impiemerttatijon-of; it;has;been..difficult and has not met
wiLth: much- success..
Ah; ocbseesibn..wi thi Communism has led the United
Statese: into: thee trap., ofIindiscriminately condemning it
as; the. enemy all. orer Asia. . This has complicated America's
A^siar; poimey ,. for; it; has:perpetuated the myth of a cohesive
Gbmmunisi conspiracy.. Today,.however, the United States
no longer

faces, a..monolithic Communist bloc controlled

and used, for- the. furtherance -of.its own interests by the
Soviet: Union,, or.-even an .Asian conspiracy directed by
Bedcing,. as;: some;- Americair.leaders..persist in believing.
Iins.i7.ead,. the; Uhitedi Slates; faces .in Asia a "variety of
aammunisms.;,.whose- relationszwithlthe Soviet Union and China
change from.country, to country, and from time to time and
whose, bearing.upon .the interests of the United States re7
quires: empiri'cal_ examihat ionr.in each concrete instance."
W rilB containment:in..Asia has evolved into an openeanieai coanmitment: tec resisttCdmmunism at all cost,• President
JUdinson. h a s madee i±t clearrthat;the maintenance of a balance
of.' power: in. Asia ..has; been.,the-continuing fundamental objec
tive: off the^ American .Asian;.p o1 i cy,; In October, 1966,
Jfedxnsou; slated::: "Nbc sihgleenatidn. can or should be permitted
O

1

tto dmnihate: the; Paeific:Regiono1.' “ Johnson's statement

''Ifens; JJ..Morgenthau,..A. hew foreign Policy Por The
Uhfted States,. (New;Tork,,1969), ■P • 124.
O p

Por full text see Department of State Bulletin,
November 28, 1966, pp. 812-816.
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explicity brings out what was implicit in the domino
theory of President Eisenhower and in President Kennedy's
policies.
If the United States is ever to achieve this balance
in Asia,^ it must first decide and

clearly state who is to

be balanced in Asia.

it sufficient to say the

No longer is

enemy is Asian Communism, for since Communism has become
polycentric, such an ambiguous enemy can never be balanced.
If, indeed, the United States wishes to balance the growing
power of China in Asia, then it should state so.

As Inis

Claude Jr. has pointed out, "the balance principle states
that a state should join ... only if its own security is
affected."'1'®

Therefore, to achieve an Asian balance the

U.S. must pursue a policy that is determined in terms not
of Communist ideology but of the compatibility of a nation's
security interest with the interest of the United States.'1''1'
Por example, both a Communist and a non-Communist Asian
nation could share the common interest of balancing the
power of Communist China in Asia.
In Asia it is quite apparent that the United States

^It must be noted that while in declaratory policy,.,
balance of power, connotes the idea of equilibrium, in
operation a preponderance of power is sought, or in other
words, a favorable balance. See Inis L. Claude, Jr.,
Power And International Relations, (New York, 1965), Chap. 2.
10Ibid., p. 147.
■^Morgenthau, 0£. cit., p. 124.
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has concentrated on the secondary objectives of the contain
ment policy - the preservation of the network of military
alliance and the suppression of "Communist" insurrections at the expense of the primary objective of that policy the maintenance of the balance of power.

Believing that

every Communist threat was equal and thus deserving of an
automatic American reply, the United States has found
itself in a catastrophic situation in Vietnam which ha3
been both morally compromising and militarily frustrating.
The United States thus has become the true victim of its
own obsession.
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